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The argument from pathos is one of the three normative modes of 
persuasion in deliberation. The argument from pathos in deliberation serves 
six functions. It serves as a perceptual capacity; it is a constituent element of 
deliberative judgment: it communicates importance: it is a powerful motivator: 
it serves several aesthetic functions. and it is expressive. 
An examination of the cognitive structure of the emotions reveals the 
epistemic potential of the emotions. The success conditions necessary for an 
emotion to grasp its object yields three epistemic results. The apprehension of 
particular object of an emotion confers salience: the formal object names a 
quality that conceptually relates the emotion to a normative principle. and the 
propositional object provides the connection to semantic matters. The 
semantic properties of emotional language help structure and determine the 
sophistication of one • s emotional responses. 
The relational potential inherent in the evaluative and causal beliefs 
that constitute the emotions not only help to organize one's emotional 
repertoire. it also provides fertile opportunities for persuasion. These 
relationships are dynamic. and they are manifested in one's integrity. This 
relational potential also manifests itself in the various persuasive strategies 
open to the writer. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
And yet it is this emotional power that dominates the court, 
it is this form of eloquence that is the queen of all. 
- Quintilian, lnstitutio Oratoria VI. ii. 4 
1 
Of the three modes of persuasion identified by Aristotle, logos, ethos and 
pathos. pathos stands as the least understood and most controversial. The 
psychological and empirical claim that emotion is a power in rhetoric has 
never been doubted. The kind and nature of that power is, however, a crucial 
issue for rhetoric. Aristotle's belief that pathos is a mode of persuasion implies 
that the passions and emotions are subject to and capable of rational and 
normative justification. Yet an explanation of that possible justification has 
not been forthcoming. Despite its power and importance, the complex region 
of argumentation we call the argument from pathos remains largely 
unmapped territory. Curiously, we repeatedly advert to its importance, and in 
the course of diverse kinds of analysis (for instance, stylistic, semantic and 
cultural analysis) we mention and note the variety of its manifestations. Yet 
we do little to analyze how 'it' functions or what its role is. 
The reasons for our analytical reticence may be individually diverse, 
but they arise ultimately from two features of the traditional approaches to 
argumentation. The first feature is methodological: our theoretical 
preoccupation with highly general activities, like the nature of deliberation 
or the scope of public discourse, as well as the role of general concepts like 
'good', 'right', 'power', and 'freedom' has allowed us to push this inquiry into 
the periphery. The reasons for this are obvious: if we concern ourselves with 
matters of highly general articulation, we will find little to say about the 
emotions because they cannot be found there. The search for necessary or 
sufficient conditions within a discourse aim differs markedly from an 
examination of the highly particular and frequently circumstantial features 
that affect the argument from pathos. The analytical techniques traditionally 
deployed to explain the conduct of discourse are imprecise tools to explain the 
functional roles inherent in emotional persuasion. 
The second feature counsels a cautionary sense of prudence. The 
terrain is so vast and its functioning is so protean that we find the subject to 
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be not only daunting but also humbling. The terrain is daunting because the 
conceptual and practical problems that cry for explanation lie on the frontiers 
of many of the concepts that we use to make sense of our experiences. Two 
brief examples may illustrate this problem. One commonly held belief about 
the emotions is that the emotions are subjective. The emotions of distress 
share a painful apprehension of a present and apparent evil. Yet the 
phenomenological experiences of brooding, annoyance and torment differ 
significantly. While we may use the felt quality of an experience to identify 
the presence of that emotion, the felt quality is never a condition sufficient to 
explain that emotion. The idea of the subjective is also invoked to explain the 
relativity of the emotions. Relativity appeals to the idea that what we perceive 
emotionally is subject to the perceptual and conceptual apparatus of the 
perceiver. Since that apparatus varies somewhat from person to person, 
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emotional experience is said to be subjective. Although this is true, such an 
account tells only part of the story. The properties and qualities present in the 
object of the emotion help determine what is perceived. An account of the 
complexities of the multiple interactions between the perceiver's perceptual 
capacities and the object must consider and involve several senses of the 
objective as well (de Sousa 150-156). The perplexing complexities that arise in 
trying to explain the nature of emotional experience must be explained. and 
this attempt runs the risk of making wrong guesses as well as offering 
incomplete accounts of how they are to be understood. 
Emotional persuasion has always been suspect. The potential for 
manipulation is ever present; and the potential for deception, both of others 
and oneself, is likewise present. Understanding how such machinations are 
effected is, certainly, an important task. It is not, however, the task of this 
study. To be able to say how such acts of persuasion are pernicious and 
illegitimate will not, by implication, explain how such persuasion can be 
legitimate. This dissertation will explore several justificatory issues important 
to the argument from pathos; in particular, it will explain how the argument 
from pathos in deliberation is and can be a normatively legitimate form of 
persuasion. 
What we call the emotions are a set of complex interactions. Some of 
these interactions involve neurological and hormonal changes in the body 
and the brain. These changes can also produce further physiological effects 
(e.g., trembling, crying, a change in coloration, etc.) as well. The emotions are 
also complex patterned responses of occurrent and dispositional feelings, 
thoughts and judgments that can, in tum, lead to further behavioral 
responses. In this study I will not be concerned with the biological 
dimensions of the emotions nor will I be concerned with Questions about 
sexuality and idc:ntity. Both issues are obviously fascinating and important in 
their own rights, but they are not the subject of study here. 
I will be concerned with those aspects of the emotions that are, in 
principle, under some voluntary control. Any argument claiming the 
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normative status of this form of argumentation must, at the least, be concerned 
with these aspects of the emotions. I will be concerned with those emotions 
that help us to have an appropriate regard for the good of others and oneself 
in deliberative contexts. Even here I must be selective; I have, for example, 
also excluded the important issues of the appetitive desires. But this 
demarcation requires a qualification. What is vaguely. if accurately, called the 
'emotionality' of the emotions is presupposed in all that I argue for. Neither 
the emotions nor the argument from pathos can be reduced to the mere 
articulation of the constituent beliefs and judgments operating there. The 
affective dimension cf the emotions can be forgotten only at the peril of 
rhetorical failure. Emotional persuasion capitalizes on the inherent 
potentialities present in the emotions that can be actualized. 
The emotions have four dimensions present in their structures that can 
be voluntarily controlled. I will pose them initially as observations; each will 
be argued for throughout. First, the emotions and passions are not blind 
surges of affect. Emotions are cognitive; they are structured and partially 
constituted by certain beliefs. Obviously, these beliefs need not be consciously 
present in an emotional episode. By itself, this claim does not imply that these 
beliefs are true or even reasonable for an emotion to be identified. If I am 
angry with John because I believe he insulted me. and that belief turns out to 
be false. my emotion. as long as I don't know that belief is false. will still be 
anger. A minimal criterion for an emotion's rationality requires that the 
beliefs which constitute it must be true. While the truth of these beliefs is 
necessary for an emotion to be rational. their presence is not a sufficient 
condition for rationality. 
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Second. these beliefs are. typically. highly evaluative. These beliefs are 
concerned with what we desire and what we fear. with what brings pleasure 
or delight as well as what brings pain or distress. Furthermore, these 
evaluative beliefs have objects; they point to what the emotion is directed 
towards. or what it is about. or is undergone for some end. But these 
evaluations also involve judgments about the person experiencing them. 
Parents who are proud of their child's accomplishments have the child as 
their object. but the character of the pride they feel is defined by their 
relationship to the child. That one's emotional responses and reactions 
involve some relationship is one of the commonplaces in explaining the 
emotions. Yet the idea of relationship is but one manifestation of the broader 
idea of one's characteristic stance towards an object. When two people view 
the same event and say, "That's pathetic," they can mean two entirely different 
things. 'Pathetic' is a rough synonym for 'pitiable'; it is also an adjective 
meaning 'miserably inadequate'. The first sense suggests that the person 
judging the event is sympathetic; the latter stance is contemptuous. 
Taken together, these two claims, that emotions are grounded in belief 
and that they are evaluative, are crucially important. Our emotions can be 
assessed as rational or irrational. The beliefs which serve as the basis for an 
emotion may also be independently judged as true or false. It is important to 
recognize that 'rational' is ambiguous here. 'Rational' can and is being used 
here in its descriptive sense; that is, emotions are either 'cognitive' or 'non 
cognitive'. We must also use 'rational' in its normative sense; that is, 
conforming to some normative view of the right way to reason (Nussbaum, 
Therapy 80-81). For the argument from pathos to be judged a proper mode of 
persuasion the necessary and sufficient conditions that must be satisfied for 
both senses of 'rational' must be explained. Not surprisingly, the nature of, 
and the relationship between, these two notions of rationality and the 
emotions has become recently the subject of inquiry for both psychologists 
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and philosophers.! Importantly for this exploration, they were the concern of 
many ancient thinkers as well, particularly Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian and 
the Stoics.2 Long neglected, their accounts of the passions are a significant 
contribution to our understanding of these questions. In fact, I agree with 
Martha Nussbaum's judgment that their accounts are, in some areas, superior 
to any contemporary account of these questions (Nussbaum, Therapy chapters 
9 and I 0). Their accounts are powerful, in large part, because they were 
concerned with those aspects of the emotions that impinge on questions of 
choice and decision, issues central to deliberation. We can no longer afford to 
ignore their significant contributions to understanding these questions. 
Third, the emotions are causally complex. We are most familiar with the 
ways extrinsic events can elicit an emotional response, but this is only one 
facet of a causal explanation. The beliefs and judgments that structure the 
emotions are dynamic. Once an emotion is elicited, its internal potential moves 
it to completion. In some cases, this process can be cognitively controlled and 
even arrested. If I fear that my child was hurt in a bus crash. that fear will 
probably end when I discover the child is safe. But this is not always the case. 
When we learn that our anger is not justified we find, often enough, that we 
are still rankled or frustrated. The capacity for emotions to persist and even 
transform themselves is a testament to this internal dynamic. It also suggests 
that our occurrent emotions often involve more central and stable aspects of 
our characters or identities. Our emotions can be governed by our 
dispositions, virtues, vices, sentiments, traits and temperament. These deeper 
dimensions of one's character not only govern the occurrent emotions, they 
help to ground them. Robert Gordon notes, with good reason then, that the 
emotions have causal depth (I). The dynamics that make up the causal depth 
of the emotions is fertile ground for effecting emotional persuasion. 
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We also must recognize that these three observations lead to another 
complexity. Even if one's beliefs are true and justify experiencing an emotion 
of a certain sort, it still may not be appropriate to either display or act on that 
emotion. Fear in the face of objective danger may be rational, but when 
courage is called for, neither displaying that fear nor acting on it is 
appropriate. This observation points to a final observation. The emotions 
form a part of our conduct and the question of what is appropriate, requisite or 
deserved, with their normative satisfaction conditions, become crucial issues 
here. This concern with action is presented as a problem arising about the 
particular case because deliberation is so concerned. While I have posed this 
final consideration this way, it invokes more universal concerns. When 
Socrates announces at the end of Book I of the Republic that "it is no chance 
matter we are discussing, but how to live," he articulates what is, most 
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probably, the most basic practical problem each of us faces (352d). One 
common, broad and provisional distinction we draw in answering this 
question is that between the good life and the happy life. While the domains of 
these two categories share considerable overlap. the distinction tries to 
capture the difference between moral and rational or prudential 
considerations that must be brought to bear in answering this question. 
Obviously, the life and the expression of the emotions are deeply involved in 
the ethical concerns of our lives, and they are deeply involved in the 
satisfaction of the kinds of lives we choose to live. 
Although it is brief, Aristotle's analysis of the argument from pathos 
remains one of the most sophisticated. Aristotle employed a functional 
explanation to account for the change in judgment that passions effect in the 
audience. In Book II of the Rhetoric he argues: 
The emotions [pathe] are those things through which. by 
undergoing changes, people come to differ in their 
judgments and which are accompanied by pain and pleasure, 
for example, anger, pity, fear, and other such things and their 
opposites. There is need to divide the discussion of each into 
three headings. I mean, for example, in speaking of anger. 
what is their state of mind when people are angry and 
against whom are they usually angry, and for what sort of 
reasons; for if we understood one or two of these but not all, 
it would be impossible to create anger in someone. (1378a 20-27) 
Aristotle's explanation of emotional persuasion involves a three-fold analysis: 
a discussion of one's state of mind, a discussion of pertinent considerations 
about the agent or object towards whom or what the emotion is directed, and an 
explanation of the role of reasons present in the emotion. 
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Aristotle's account emphasizes the psychological stance of the audience. 
That state of mind, the audience's 'reason-state'-- that is, the psychological and 
causal dimension of an emotion named by terms like 'wanting', 'fearing', and 
'desiring'-- is also necessary for explaining the logical form of emotional 
argumentation. To successfully affect the deliberative decision, the argument 
from pathos must effectively direct the audience's reason-state that forms a 
part of the targeted emotion towards its appropriate object so that the 
argument will serve its designated role or function. The argument from 
pathos does not, strictly speaking, target the emotion itself; rather. the 
argument from pathos evokes the object of the emotion, or it targets the causal 
and evaluative reasons affecting one's appraisal of that object in order for that 
emotion to successfully serve its role for the sake of the deliberative aim of the 
essay. 
The Six Roles of Emotion in Deliberation 
There are at least six ways in which the emotions serve as a part of 
deliberation. Some emotions are important in deliberation because they make 
certain features of the deliberative situation salient. The beliefs which 
ground and individuate the emotion make us sensitive to features in a problem 
that otherwise would remain obscure. This perceptual role is closely allied to 
the second role the emotions can play: emotions form a part of deliberative 
judgment. They alter judgments in kind or by degree. This role manifests 
itself in several ways. Emotions like trust and mistrust can ground a 
deliberative judgment. The judgmental component in the emotion itself can 
also correspond to the deliberative judgment. Indignation felt on behalf of 
another is a defiant protest which defends a value that has been violated. 
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Other emotion~ help define our stance towards a situation. For instance, we 
can feel sympathy for a friend who rightfully regrets some action. The third 
way the emotion, play a crucial role may be characterized as a feature of 
engagement. We care about what is important to us. This line of inquiry is 
intimately related to ethics. When we focus on the role of the emotions we see 
the generative power of concepts like care, concern, love and friendship. If, 
as L A. Richards claimed, attitudes are incipient actions, then they are closely 
related to the fourth role that the emotions can play. The emotions and the 
passions are crucial determinants in motivation. Aristotle argued that bouLe sis 
and orexis are rational forms of desire. He is also not alone in arguing that 
other forms of motivation, notably the appetites, fear and rhumos (roughly 
damaged amour propre), are subject to normative considerations. 
The first four claims for the roles the emotions can play deal with the 
practical and the moral dimensions of the emotions and experience. 
Significantly, the roles the emotions play and the significance they carry are 
not limited to operat.ons in these spheres. The emotions participate in and 
form a part of the aesthetic dimension of our lives. It is not just that pity and 
fear form a part of our understanding of classical tragedy, although that is an 
important part of the life of the emotions. The sometimes vague but important 
connection between the fine and the good is bridged by the emotions. The 
concept most often invoked here is that of decorum. The importance of the 
aesthetic dimension of the pleasurable and the painful in moral education has 
long been a psychological fact that moral theorists must give an account of. 
Finally, the emotions are important because they express attitudes. The 
tone and tenor of an intentional action is frequently an important feature to 
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consider when assessing the character of that action. This idea is most 
apparent when the tone is inappropriate or untoward in some way. To express 
gratitude grudgingly, to keep an important and moral promise unwillingly or 
reluctantly, to say 'no' to a simple and reasonable request churlishly, are all 
aspects of actions that deserve evaluation. It is important to remember that 
the expression of these attitudes is an important vehicle for creating a sense of 
ethos. 
Obviously, there are conceptual overlaps in these claims. The 
perceptual capacity influences judgment and is present in our responsive 
sensitivity to the feelings and needs of others. In principle, our judgment 
grounds the expression of attitudes, and the expression of attitudes is guided m 
part by aesthetic considerations. The aesthetic, particularly the idea of 
decorum, is governed by what we care about. Obviously, some of the strategic 
possibilities and problems inherent in each of these roles has long been 
recognized by rhetoricians in the past. 
The Plan of This Treatise 
This study will explore in detail several of the six roles of emotion in 
deliberation. I will explore the role of salience by identifying and explaining 
the satisfaction conditions necessary for this perceptual capacity to function 
cognitively. I will also explore some of the roles emotion serves in 
· deliberative judgment. These two functions are obviously important in their 
own right. but they are also prior to the other roles that emotion can play in 
deliberation. They are prior in two ways. First, they are prior in importance. 
Second, they are prior as a matter of procedural protocol in deliberation, and 
this claim does not preclude the real possibility that they are absent in cases of 
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bad practical reasoning. In fact, this observation will. on occasion. explain 
how such reasoning is deficient. The interdependence of these functions can 
be illustrated by recognizing that while judgment is prior to questions of 
importance and motivation. it is through these other two functions that 
judgment is made clear. 
To achieve these goals. we must understand in more detail how these six 
functions operate in the deliberative search. The remainder of Chapter I 
will sketch a model of deliberation, and I will briefly indicate how these six 
functions operate in deliberation. 
In Chapters II and III, I will explore in more detail each of the six 
functions of pathos in deliberation. I will discuss the roles of emotional 
perception and judgment in Chapter II. Many emotions are perceptual 
sensitivities that often serve as the starting point for our deliberations 
because we find that emotion salient. Yet perception and salience are subject 
to an important consideration. We perceive a situation from a certain point of 
view. One's role. or more broadly, one's sense of agency, crucially affects our 
capacity for emotional perception. The rest of the chapter will focus on the 
complexities of emotional judgment and the several persuasive methods that 
are available to affect those judgments. The issues of judgment will be 
presented within the framework of the five formal patterns that all emotional 
arguments participate in. 
In Chapter III I will discuss the four remaining functions: 
importance, motivation, aesthetic consideration and the expressive potential 
inherently present. Like the account of judgment, I will also discuss the 
various methods we have to affect these functions rhetorically. The role of 
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imponance often manifests itself through the strategies of amplification, but 
the crucial principle that makes its use clear is that of priority. Questions of 
motivation will lead to an investigation of the role of the emotions in more 
complex psychological states. I will discuss two ways emotions can be involved 
in more complex psychological states. 
Chapters IV, V and VI will explore the formal and pragmatic 
conditions which must be satisfied if an emotion is to serve a legitimate role in 
deliberation. To accomplish this I will argue that certain classes . of emotions 
serve deliberative ends, that these emotions are capable of achieving salience, 
and that the problems of relativity and point of view inherent in emotional 
perception can be adequately dealt with. 
If the emotions tell us something about the world, they do so through 
what is called salience. Salience is the discovery of the internal relations of 
those beliefs, evaluations, desires and fears that constitute the emotion and 
which appropriately map onto the deliberative situation. If the emotions do 
tell us something about the world, then we must identify and explain the 
necessary and sufficient conditions that must obtain for an emotion to serve 
this function. This will require a detailed examination of the conceptual and 
causal relations between an emotion and its objects. A case for this kind of 
objectivity must, obviously, be made. This exploration will be the first task of 
Chapter IV. 
The investigation into the objects of the emotions will lead to two other 
issues. The cognitive structure of the emotions will help explain the semantics 
of adjectival expressions involving emotion terms. The nature of propositional 
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objects, the objects of expression of emotional states, will lead to a discussion of 
attitudes; and this discussion will set the stage for Chapter V. 
In Chapter V I will argue that we have two classes of emotions that are 
important to deliberation. The first class. called the deliberative emotions, is 
central to this task and they share four properties. First, these emotions are 
constituted by beliefs and evaluations that are capable of comprehending both 
the actions of agents and their characters. Second, these particular 
evaluations are in part governed by and explained through what is called the 
formal object of that emotion. A formal object of an emotion is integral to the 
concept of each emotion. It is the evaluative category that makes the emotion 
rationally intelligible. The formal objects of the deliberative emotions are 
those which are bound to the well-being and destinies of communities and 
individuals. Third, the deliberative emotions are members of families of 
governing sentiments, dispositions or virtues. The fact of this positioning is 
crucial for understanding the persuasive possibilities present for each 
emotion. Fourth, these emotions are particular responses to deliberative 
situations and are compatible with other allied dc::liberative emotions. The 
second class of emotions is simpler in structure and work in concert with the 
deliberative emotions. Finally, in this chapter I will explore these conditions 
by examining a group of four emotions--pity, indignation, fear and anger--
which we frequently experience as part of our response to deliberative 
situations where harm and the questions of merit and desert are involved. 
This analysis will include a discussion of how the deliberative emotions are 
causally coordinated, and the chapter will conclude with a discussion of some 
of the persuasive techniques involved in arousing or extinguishing anger as 
an important deliberative emotion. 
Yet we must also explain how the problems of relativity and point of 
view of those in the deliberative situation work with and modify this 
objectivity for salience to be achieved. Chapter VI will address both 
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problems by exploring the several strategies we have for producing emotional 
arguments. I will explore six strategies in this chapter. 
We have lived far too long in ignorance about this complex and 
pervasive mode of persuasion. This study is an attempt to reveal some of those 
conditions and principles which govern this vital dimension of persuasion. 
An Aristotelian Conception of Deliberation 
Of the several vibrant theories of deliberation and practical reasoning 
commanding attention today, the Aristotelian conception is certainly one of 
the strongest. Pan of its strength is acknowledged in the fact that many of 
Aristotle's arguments and insights are shared by rival conceptions, both 
ancient and modern. A clear example of this may be found in the work of the 
Stoics. While the Stoics take issue with many of Aristotle's arguments, they 
frequently do so in the context of accepting other arguments out of which the 
point of disagreement has arisen. For instance, Seneca disagrees with 
Aristotle's understanding of the role of anger in life. As Martha Nussaum 
argues. the reader of de Ira will proceed through two of the three books which 
comprise the work before any points of philosophical disagreement arise 
between the Stoic and Aristotelian conception of that emotion. (Therapy 402-
438). Contemporary explorations by ethical philosophers who loosely are 
called realists acknowledge their debt to Aristotle. The work of writers like 
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John McDowell, Mark Platts and Martha Nussbaum, for instance, build on 
specific arguments first offered by Aristotle} In particular, many of 
Aristotle's ideas concerning the emotions and the idea of pathos continue to 
articulate the dirc:ctions of inquiry we currently take in trying to understand 
this diffuse area of concern. 
The catholic quality of an Aristotelian conception of rationality is 
strengthened by a second crucial feature inherent in this approach. Aristotle 
advocated a practical and empirical pr.:>cedure of inquiry that is sufficiently 
general and inclusive so that no possible approach is excluded from the 
beginning of that inquiry. The strengths of this procedure have been 
advocated by diverse thinkers. Henry Sidgwick advocated this procedure in 
The Methods of Ethics, and more recently John Rawls recommended its 
adoption in A Theory of Justice.4 As we recognize today, no starting point for 
this inquiry is entirely neutral; to use a current metaphor. there is no 
archimedean starting point (Williams, Ethics 22-29). Yet Aristotle's starting 
point has proved not only resilient, it has also proved to be as, if not more, 
inclusive than its rivals. 
Finally, the Aristotelian conception offers a sophisticated conception of 
the deliberative agent in ways that articulate the relationships between how 
we feel and respond to how we think and judge. Aristotle offers a compelling 
account of the relationship between virtue and reason, the passions and 
reason, and the virtues and the passions that cannot be ignored. 
Despite the power of his insights, there is much in Aristotle's 
conception that remains obscure. We are fortunate that Aristotle has had such 
able scholars in this century to explicate, comment upon, and interpret his 
writings. The first major exploration of his conception of deliberation was 
done by D. J. Allen.5 But the seminal exploration of Aristotle's conception of 
deliberation in this century is widely accepted to be "Deliberation and 
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Practical Reason" by David Wiggins (215-238). Wiggins begins by questioning 
several of Allen's interpretative judgments concerning several passages in 
Books ITI and VI of the Nichomachean Ethics. Through exegesis, illuminating 
paraphrase and interpretation, Wiggins clarifies many confusing features of 
Aristotle's discussion of deliberation. He concludes his analysis with a 
discussion of seven features that define the character of Aristotelian 
deliberation. I want to draw on tJtose final insights to help characterize the 
role of the emotions in deliberation. 
This task of articulation will also involve using the conceptual 
distinctions recently articulated by Lawrence Blum. In his recent work, Moral 
Perception and Particularity, Lawrence Blum argues that a particular act of 
moral perception and judgment involves seven analytically distinct steps or 
stages (30-61 ). Blum's account is relevant and useful for three reasons. First, 
he is concerned with providing a conceptual account of the phenomena of 
moral perception and its relationship to moral judgment, both of which are 
central concerns of deliberation. Second, his explanation of these phenomena 
is formal in nature; it is successful to the extent that it makes clear those steps 
which any normative theory must give substance to. Finally, the six functions 
I am exploring participate in and help inform those stages. His formal account 
will help locate these six functions and the potential roles the emotions play in 
deliberation. 
Ordinary deliberation is not, typically at least, a matter of technical 
calculation of probabilities toward some determinant outcome, nor is it 
predominantly the instantiation of some rule or principle in a particular 
situation. Deliberation often begins with the question. "What shall I do?" and 
demands a search for an answer or response to a particular situation or 
context. We face a problem or an opportunity. We are presented, tacitly at 
least, with a choice. This choice implies the possibility of a decision and 
decisions have aims and ends. Neither means-end reasoning nor rule-case 
reasoning can proceed until we are able to articulate what the aim of 
deliberation in this situation should be (Wiggins 230-231 ). They are, m fact, 
processes that occur much later in the deliberative search. 
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Lawrence Blum offers a more accurate description of the opening stage 
of deliberation. He discerns seven steps or stages in moral perception and 
judgment. The first stage involves "the accurate recognition of a situation's 
features" (58). We take a situation to be of a certain character and describe it 
so. Frequently, several properties of the situation elicit an emotional 
response. We may experience an emotion of delight or distress if we are 
attending to the problem in the present tense. Yet we may also initially attend 
to the prospects suggested by the situation; we can sense something 
desiderative or fearful in the implicit choice to be made. In either case, the 
emotional perception serves as a starting point for our deliberations. When 
we see the deliberative situation in terms of some emotion, the features of the 
situation are made salient. Second, we recognize those features as having a 
certain kind of significance. The two stages may be thought of as the two 
components of moral or practical perception, but they are distinct. To 
perceive another person as suffering, for example, is to characterize it a 
certain way, but to see that suffering as morally significant is an exercise in 
judgment. The first two roles that emotions play in deliberation are a 
functional part of this broader perceptual capacity (Blum 58). 
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The third and fourth stages concern the matter of whether someone 
should become engaged in the situation. Stage three involves the raising of 
the question whether to become involved or not. It is tempting to characterize 
this step as a choice between passivity or engagement, but it is not as simple as 
this (Blum 58). We find situations where we are too remote from the problem 
to do any good. We also find situations troubling, yet we also recognize that 
our own involvement would just make the matter worse. Furthermore, we may 
discover that we have identified the relevant concern in a certain deliberative 
situation, yet we are unable to find any acceptable way to address that 
concern. One can, quite rationally, will the end without willing the means 
(Wiggins 232-233). We can do this because deliberation is Janus-faced. We not 
only look forward toward the end, discovering possible ways to attain that goal; 
we also look backward from the point of view of the end itself to test whether a 
proposed means adequately satisfies the end in all relevant aspects. 
Stage four occurs when we judge whether or not we should, in fact, take 
action. But the wants and desires of the deliberating agent are not 'given'. No 
theory of practical reasoning can be viewed as adequate if it takes the wants 
and concerns of a deliberating agent as a closed and complete system. We 
cannot assume these concerns are closed, in part, because the wants and goals 
of the individuals deliberating are presupposed by but not expressed in, their 
reasoning. We often revise our desires and wants within the processes of 
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deliberation. We also cannot make this assumption because it is of the essence 
of deliberation that these concerns make competing and inconsistent claims 
(Wiggins 231-232). Inconsistent desires are not like inconsistent beliefs. With 
inconsistent beliefs we reject the one that is false and, as it were, move on. To 
reject one desire in favor of another does not entail the elimination of the 
rejected desire. Our emotions obviously play important roles here. That which 
engages our attention is that which we find important in some way. Care, 
concern, compassion and pity all invest a situation with significance. 
The emotions that involve one's agency share four characteristics that 
help to explain their roles here. These emotions have desiderative, fearful or 
evaluative conditions in the forms of beliefs, attitudes and judgments. These 
beliefs comprehend their objects, that is, the rerevant features of the 
deliberative situation, and they evaluative comprehend the actions and 
characters of agents. The specific beliefs that constitute the emotion fall 
under an evaluative category, called the formal object of the emotion. The 
formal object of the emotion conceptually links the beliefs within the emotion 
to other kinds of judgments (Lyons, Emotion 100). Since the emotions do not 
occur in isolation, they serve as signs of deeper dispositions, traits and virtues, 
and these more stable aspects of character become activated. Finally, these 
deeper aspects of character make coordinate the range and types of emotions 
that one is capable of experiencing. We may experience several emotions that 
are compatible with our sense of agency and the deliberative situation. 
Likewise, decisions to act or not are bound to issues of motivation and 
the perception of future goods or harms are underst~od, in part at least, as 
what is desirable or fearful (Blum 58-59). We also recognize that there are 
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different kinds of goods, extrinsic and intrinsic goods, instrumental and final 
goods, and so on. And within these kinds of goods there is a plurality of objects 
and activities which exemplify that kind of good. Furthermore, such concerns 
may themselves be subject to change and alteration as imagination and 
reflection play upon the possibilities, wants and desires found in the 
deliberative context. This is so because an activity may be good in different 
ways according to different contexts and aims. 
In essence, deliberation is a search for what qualifies as an adequate 
and realizable specification of what would satisfy the want that animated that 
act of deliberation. The fifth stage requires that we select or make articulate 
that principle or maxim which is applicable (Wiggins 234, Blum 59). The task 
of finding an adequate specification led Aristotle to deploy the metaphor of 
aiming, of hitting the target, as an apt characterization of deliberation as a 
:eresis, a search. This stage is important. Offenses and harms, for example, are 
usually analyzable under several different principles. When we encounter 
suffering we may recognize that several possible principles can come into 
play. The rule, "Alleviate suffering," may invoke two further principles. We 
may consider the principle of beneficence which demands that we do good for 
another, or we may consider the principle of nonmaleficence which demands 
that we refrain from harming another. 
The indeterminate character of our values and goals expressed in 
deliberation is constitutive of our human freedom and, for finite mortals 
facing an indefinite number of contingencies with limited powers of 
prediction and imagination is constitutive of practical rationality itself 
(Wiggins 233 ). Selecting a principle which best governs the situation is, 
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obviously, a crucial task. The sixth stage is that which determines what act 
best instantiates the principle selected in stage five (Blum 60). Stages five and 
six have been called 'specification,' the process by which principles are 
brought to bear on a situation, and it includes the tasks of coordinating the 
relevant applicable norms that articulate various levels of generality and 
particularity. 6 
There are two sets of operations working here and both use spatial 
metaphors. When expressed as a metat:Jhor, specification lies at the opposite 
end of a 'vertical' continuum from abstraction. Our specifications are further 
enhanced by considering what is relevantly similar and different in related 
situations. The continuum of similarity and analogy can be posed as a 
'horizontal' axis intersecting the vertical one. 7 
One's specification of an act for the chosen end must satisfy several 
conditions. When we specify an action we make substantive qualification to 
the application of the principle covering the end that is chosen. For example. 
one must will the conditions necessary for achieving that end. If good health 
is my chosen end then I must exercise regularly, eat a proper diet, and get 
adequate rest; each of these conditions are necessary for attaining good 
health. What is necessary for obtaining a goal is not the same as what is 
sufficient to bring about the end. there are occasions where we must create 
those conditions that are sufficient to bring about the goaL It is common in 
the final minutes of close basketball games to foul the opposing team's worst 
foul shooter. The trip to the foul line is made necessary by the rules but it is 
also a (usually) sufficient means to regain possession of the balL Finally, and 
crucially for the argument from pathos in deliberation, there must be a 
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motivation to bring about the specified action. One's motivation to bring about 
the principle must transfer to the specified action which instantiates it. 
The capacities inherent in our characters that govern our occurrent 
emotions are also described in terms of a spatial metaphor. The capacities 
within one's character or identity may be seen as a set of formal and causal 
relationships that is visualized in terms of a sphere. The closer one places a 
capacity near the core of the sphere, the more central that capacity is in one's 
character. We perceive the features of a deliberative situation and those 
perceptions are evaluated and made significant and thus activate deeper 
aspects of one's character. Through the offices of specification these 
evaluations move 'outward' and are given their particular emotional 
motivation and expression. Significantly, these deeper judgments can revise 
our emotional repertoire towards the situation and specify a new occurrent 
emotion that is requisite for the situation. 
Wiggins argues that Aristotle's phronimos, the individual of practical 
wisdom. is that person who can bring to bear on a deliberative situation the 
greatest number of relevant concerns commensurate with the importance of 
the context (233). The question of what counts as the best practical syllogism 
is not a question of numerical superiority of concerns, nor is it simply a 
question of the unconditional acceptability of its major premise. The best 
practical syllogism is evaluated for its adequacy to the situation. He suggests 
that there is an instructive analogy here with an important distinction made 
by Donald Davidson. There is a crucial difference between a judgment of 
probability taken in relation to judgments of probability relative to evidence, 
and a decision, taken in relation to judgments of the desirability of an action, 
relative to such and such contextual facts. As Wiggins argues: 
inasmuch as the [practical] syllogism arises in a determinate 
context, the major premise is evaluated not for its 
unconditional acceptability, nor for its embracing more 
considerations than its rivals, but for its adequacy to the 
situation. It will be adequate for the situation if and only if 
circumstances that could restrict or qualify it and defeat its 
applicability at a given juncture do not in the practical 
context of this evidence obtain. (233-234) 
This issue of adequacy implies a further conceptual consequence about the 
nature of deliberation. Wiggins argues that the goals and concerns of 
deliberating agents may be diverse and incommensurable in such a way that 
they need not constitute any sort of a basis for a psychological or empirical 
theory capable to make prediction possible. This inability is not a failure of 
giving an account of deliberation. The task of providing a perspicuous 
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account of deliberation is not measured by predictive prowess; rather, it has as 
its subject the de~ision processes which are constantly deployed and 
redeployed on new situations and cast back over old ones (Wiggins 234). This 
adequacy is grounded in one's sense of 'reflective equilibrium', a concept first 
developed by John Rawls (54). In extreme cases, what is adequate will manifest 
itself as an issue of integrity. 
The final stage concerns how best to perform the action selected (Blum 
60). What would count as a successful act must include not only the end 
towards which the act aims to achieve, it also includes the manner in which 
the act will be carried out. The manner of one's expression, its tone and the 
perspective indicated by one's attitudes are important here. The ancient idea 
of decorum is, clearly, one of the governing principles in this step. 
The Ar~ument From Pathos as a Dispositional Strate~y 
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The experience of the emotions is largely a temporal matter. This 
temporal fact can be exploited as a matter of timing one's appeal. More 
precisely. we can say that this sense of timing, joined with the strategic 
function inherent in an emotion's point, affords the writer with opportunities 
to localize and target the type of appeal made and thus direct its intended effect 
at crucial points within a piece of deliberative discourse. In fact, the 
possibilities inherent in the argument from pathos help determine the 
dispositio!lal strategies a writer can utilize. By examining the opportunities 
inherently present at different stages of an essay, one can see how each 
functions individually and how they can combine collectively in an essay. 
The classical rhetoricians saw the possibilities inherent in the 
argument from pathos as dispositional strategies. Yet the classical discussions 
of arrangement are dense and conflicting. Their conflict is instructive 
because their accounts differ, in large part, over the role of pathos in 
deliberation. They were correct on one point, however. The argument from 
pathos occurs in stages and these particular stages have operational goals. 
Aristotle argued, fo.- instance. that two elements are essential for 
persuasion. One must state the issue (prothesis) and one must provide 
arguments for it and against the opposite claim (pisteis). An introduction and 
conclusion frame these two essential parts, making a total of four elements. 
Not surprisingly, different rhetorical occasions call for different dispositional 
strategies. This practical necessity led to further subdivisions of the parts of a 
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speech. Quintilian argued that there were five parts: exordium. partitio, 
confirmatio, refutatio, and peroratio. The anonymous author of the Rhetorica 
ad Herennium claimed there were six elements: exordium, narratio, divisio, 
confirmatio, refutatio, peroratio. The different classifications of the parts of a 
speech were theoretical responses to account for the possibility of 
complications inherent in the issue at hand and the subsequently increased 
possibilities for pathos to work in deliberations. 
The complications and further possibilities they found in actual 
discourse cannot be explained, however. by further subdividing the speech 
into smaller discrete operations. To do so is to confuse the function of the 
argument in question with its operation. Furthermore. they did not recognize 
that the different principles that govern these operations differ according to 
the aim of the discourse and canons of reasonableness that are relevant to that 
aim. The aim of an epideictic speech on the fourth of July which appeals to 
the audience's patriotism will differ markedly from the aim of a political 
advertisement on the radio which also appeals to the audience's sense of 
patriotism. What counts as a 'reasonable' patriotic inference in each will 
differ as the aims differ. The aim of the deliberative search will govern. in 
part. what satisfaction conditions must be met. These satisfaction conditions 
are usually formulated as rules. The rules governing the Socratic elenchos are 
designed to secure presumptive knowledge, while the rules that govern 
Aristotelian dialectic are designed to move us beyond presumption towards 
first principles. The principles governing satisfaction produce commitment 
rules and canons of relevance, as well as specifying how informative a piece 
of discourse should be. The satisfaction conditions sufficient to justify a 
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deliberative decision to take a certain course of action may differ from an 
inquiry and a critical discussion. These canons of reasonableness are subject 
to further qualification. Because deliberation is particular, the role of the 
participants becomes important. Many of the premises that make up 
individual arguments from pathos are presumptions. These premises must be 
acceptable to the author and the audience who are deliberating. 
Both classical and contemporary rhetoricians agree on the functions 
and possibilities present in the introduction. The classical rhetoricians split 
the opening stage, conventionally called the introduction, into two parts, the 
exordium and the narratio. A successful exordium must satisfy three aims. The 
foremost task is to establish good will. Deliberation has trust as a necessary 
condition for its operation; and trust, in part, is a reliance on another's good 
will. There are four sources out of which this good will may be established: 
from the character of the author, from the character of the author's 
opponents. from the audience, and from the issue itself. Second, the author 
must make the audience attentive to what will follow. Attentiveness can be 
achieved typically through the novelty of the issue, by emphasizing its 
importance, by showing it is of concern to all, or by the fact that it is 
incredible. Finally, the exordium must make the audience receptive to the 
issues to be argued for. These three tasks should be thought of as necessary 
preparatory conditions for any type of deliberation. It is important to note 
that the three types of appeals made here are to those governing dispositions 
or attitudes that should operate in all acts of deliberation. They work to incline 
the audience towards the aim of the work. 
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The narratio sets forth the history of the problem. While there are 
many ways to achieve this purpose, the most straightforward way is by simply 
setting forth the facts, usually in a way that excites the expectations of the 
audience; it may be achieved by beginning with a digression. in a way which 
gives the impression that the digression itself has been forced on the writer 
by the force of some emotion; or through the use of some analogy or apt 
quotation, the significance of which will be coordinate with the problem at 
hand. A digression will succeed if the audience's impression of the focus of 
the emotion working on the author in that digression is, or can be seen to be, 
directed in the same way towards some related feature of the de Iiberati ve 
situation. The function of this strategy is expressive. An analogy wiii work if 
the focal property in the analogous situation is the same as that in the 
deliberative situation to which it refers. The property denoted in the 
analogous situation not only refers to that property; the analogous situation 
also serves as an exemplar of that property. Thus, the act of reference 
exemplifies the prop..:rty, making it relevant to the deliberative situation. The 
function of this strategy is perceptual. Finally, a successful narratio will 
display three qualities: brevity, clarity and plausibility. 
All deliberation arises from a problem, a question or controversy to be 
resolved. Because what is at issue has two sides, the issue must be clarified so 
that the goal of the deliberation can be understood. This is the task of the 
partitio. The conceptual nature of the dispute determines what sort of 
obligations the writer has to satisfy. In a criminal court case, for example, the 
prosecution has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime. The defense does not have to prove the defendant 
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innocent; it has to demonstrate reasonable doubt, a lesser burden of proof. 
When the obligation of one participant in a dispute is greater for one than the 
other we have asymmetrical obligations. In civil cases, typically. the level of 
obligation is the same for both parties. In a show cause hearing for 
nonsupport. the custodial parent must show that the defendant was and is 
capable of meeting the contractual obligations of the custody agreement. The 
defendant must show that the conditions for legal obligation do not obtain or 
that that he or she cannot be expected to meet those obligations. The 
persuasive obligations for both participants are symmetrical: the plaintiff 
must prove the opposite thesis of the defendant and the defendant must prove 
the opposite thesis of the plaintiff (Walton Informal Logic 11-12). 
When the obligations are symmetrical. the claims are strongly opposed; 
when the obligations are asymmetrical. the claims are weakly opposed. Strong 
opposition carries the commitment of proving the opposite thesis; weak 
opposition carries the obligation of questioning and testing each particular 
claim. but it does not require proving the opposite thesis. The distinction 
between symmetrical and asymmetrical persuasive obligations becomes 
important when an author considers what sorts of cognitive attitudes can and 
should come into play and how those attitudes can be aroused. The cognitive 
attitudes of doubt and skepticism will serve as a useful example. In an 
asymmetric dispute. the party with the lesser burden of proof can target a 
local skepticism against the opposition's argument; doubts can be specific. In 
symmetrical disputes the use of doubts and skeptical arguments are, by 
themselves. insufficient; they must be counterbalanced by arguments that 
build confidence or enhance trust in the positive argument propounded 
(Walton, Informal Logic 12-13). 
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Logically, the claim that is made can be expressed positively or 
negatively. A positive claim can be formulated as "It is the case that X," and 
negative claims can be formulated as "It is not the case that X." Claims can be 
singular, only one claim is advanced; or they may be complex. when more that 
one claim is advanced. For example, if someone were to argue against current 
welfare system he or she may claim, "The welfare system doesn't work; it 
doesn't encourage a work ethic, and it doesn't foster a sense of self-worth." 
The claim is complex, more than one thesis is advanced; but the claim is 
unmixed. all the claims are asserted in the same form. If the claim were 
phrased. "The welfare system doesn't work; it encourages laziness. and it 
doesn't foster a sense of self-worth," we say the claim is complex and mixed; 
the logical form of the claims differ (Walton Informal Logic 12-13). 
The observations just made may seem too obvious to require mentioning. 
but they have important implications for the argument from pathos. Complex 
claims allow one the possibility to target specific emotions for each of the 
claims individually. A claim that concerns a present evil wiii have the 
emotions from the genus of distress as possible candidates; a claim concerning 
a present good will have emotions from the genus of delight as possible 
candidates; a claim concerning a future apparent evil will have emotions from 
the genus of fear as candidates; and a claim concerning a future good will 
have emotions from the genus of desires as candidates. Furthermore, a claim 
that is advanced affirmatively carries a different tenor from one advanced 
negatively. Emotions are also comprehended in terms of their contraries; by 
examining the persuasive strength of a possible emotion and its contrary in 
terms of the claim and the deliberative aim of the essay one can make an 
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informed choice. Complex, mixed claims will take advantage of the persuasive 
possibilities afforded by the respective strengths of the emotions linked to 
those claims. 
The opportunity to sequence and build on the emotions evoked with the 
exploration of each successive claim becomes a real possibility. We also 
recognize that the arguments advanced in deliberation can be divided into 
those that directly confirm the thesis and those that refute or undermine the 
arguments of the rival position. While the satisfaction conditions necessary 
for the argument from pathos to work will be discussed in detail later, it will be 
helpful to make several brief observations now. Emotional appeals that form a 
part of one's argument must conform to some principle of relevance; as a 
normative matter we do not want irrelevancies and premature closure to 
influence a deliberative decision. This relevance is complicated by the fact 
that these arguments are, as a matter of logic, weak; they typically participate 
in fallible reasoning because they are based on presumptions. Fallibility is 
not always the crucial issue when we consider these arguments. The questions 
of one's agency, one's ability to respond, and the manner of that response, are 
crucial issues to be clarified as a part of the satisfaction conditions that govern 
the normative use of the argument from pathos. 
The agreement on the functions of the conclusion, like the lore 
concerning introductions, has remained stable for centuries. We should strive 
to do four things in a conclusion: We should inspire the audience with a 
favorable opinion of ourselves and an unfavorable opinion of our opponents. 
--- ----
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We should amplify the force of the points made earlier and diminish the force 
of the points made by the opposition. We should arouse the appropriate 
emotion in our audience. We should enumerate in summary fashion our 
arguments and facts. As these recommendations suggest. the emotional appeal 
that forms a pan of one's conclusion is a matter of timing one's climax. The 
issue of trust. begun in the introduction. comes to its climax as the bridge that 
joins the several appeals of pathos made throughout the essay and the ethos 
the author has created. The audience will feel that trust as result of the 
author's candor and fidelity to the audience's well-being. These two conditions 
are constituent pans of the virtue of honesty. Both candor and fidelity will be 
experienced as a pan of the author's emotional appeals. Amplification of one's 
own points can be achieved in various ways. but it is necessary to invest one's 
expression of that position with the imponance it deserves. This may be 
achieved through register by matching the level of one's diction to the 
gravity of the situation. or it may be achieved through figurative resources of 
language. Perhaps the most obvious use of emotional appeal in a conclusion is 
an appeal that affects the temper of one's audience. In his famous "blood, toil. 
tears and sweat" speech to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940. Churchill 
could count on the ad populum appeal in the face of the evil of the Nazi threat 
to arouse his audience. Although these are the most obvious types of emotional 
appeals that appear in a conclusion. they are the ones most fraught with 
danger. As Cicero sardonically notes. we should save these direct emotional 
appeals for the end because nothing dries faster than the tears of sympathy. 
We can now tum to the six functions that the emotions serve to see in 
more detail how they work. 
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This issue has been the subject of much recent inquiry. Several 
crucial arguments debunking the importance of 'feelings', necessary for 
making way for the cognitive issues can be found in Gilbert Ryle, The Concept 
of Mind (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949) chap. IV. One of the most important 
and pathbreaking studies of the cognitive nature of the emotions in this 
century is Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will (London: Routledge & 
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major and quite clear study is William Lyons, Emotion (New York: Cambridge 
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CHAPTER II 
PERCEPTION AND JUDGMENT 
The passions are the only orators who always convince. They 
have a kind of natural art with infallible rules; and the most 
untutored man filled with passion is more persuasive than 
the most eloquent orator without. 
La Rochefoucauld 
When we deliberate well we bring to bear all of the relevant concerns 
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commensurate with the importance of the situation. These relevant concerns 
frequently include emotional considerations. In this chapter and the next I 
will explore the six broad ways in which the emotions function in good 
deliberation. In this chapter I will focus on the emotions as perceptual 
sensitivities and as constituent elements of judgment. In some cases I will 
explore the conditions necessary for that function to have persuasive force; in 
others I will explore various ways these functions operate as sufficient 
conditions to effect the writer's persuasive end. 
Before turning to these interdependent functions. I need to make two 
observations. The first observation is a commonplace about emotional 
persuasion. Emotional persuasion works in two possible ways. A writer can 
evoke an emotion. Evocation can be explained in terms of spech act theory. 
Evocation requires a deliberate illocutionary act that produces a particular 
perlocutionary effect. Evocation produces that perlocutionary effect whose 
achievement is direct in the sense that the audience need not be consciously 
aware of the author's explicit intention to play on the targeted emotion. The 
power inherent in the emotion is such that it can affect the audience's 
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sensibilities directly. The functions of perception, judgment and motivation 
are evocative strategies of persuasion. An emotional argument's 
perlocutionary effect can also be expressive. An expressive effect is one 
where the audience is conscious of some aspect of the manner of the appeal. 
The audience recognizes that some persuasive resource--meaning, tone, 
syntax. illocutionary force or the locution itself--is consciously used. The 
devices that help comprise figurative language, particularly the schemes, are 
expressive in this sense. Matters dealing with the writer's sense of agency, 
decorum and attitudes are, typically, expressive functions of the argument 
from pathos. The techniques of emotional expression are successful when the 
writer's intentions and judgment are represented through language so that 
the audience can evaluate those manifestations as signs of the writer's ethos. 
In order to be able to generate a set of topics, whether they are 
principles or tactical maneuvers, one must be able to specify the success 
conditions necessary for an appeal to work. and one must be able to specify the 
satisfaction conditions that guarantee that the appeal is normatively 
appropriate. We know, as a formal matter, that every instance of an argument 
from pathos can be described in one of four ways. An argument can be 
successful or unsuccessful. The criterion of success names those conditions 
which must obtain if the argument is to be efficacious. We also know that an 
argument can work, in the sense that it produces the desired end, but we may 
also recognize that the argument is not normatively satisfactory. An 
argument can be satisfactory if it meets the truth conditions or some set of 
normative conditions that make the appeal legitimate. 
Third. it is possible for an argument to be normatively legitimate and 
thus satisfactory but also be unsuccessful; it fails to produce its desired end. 
Finally. we can have an argument that is both unsatisfactory and 
unsuccessful. This failure can occur in one of two \\ays. An argument may 
not succeed because it is unsatisfactory. and an argument may fail 
independently of the fact that it is unsatisfactory. 
The Success Conditions Necessary for an Emotional Appeal 
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An argument from pathos is successful if it meets four necessary 
conditions which are jointly sufficient to make the argument efficacious. 
First, an argument is successful if the targeted emotion serves its intended 
function in terms of the deliberative aim. We judge these arguments in terms 
of their effects. The content of the appeal must be rationally related to the 
deliberative aim. Emotions have identificatory and causal beliefs and 
evaluations that structure them. The identificatory beliefs pick out the 
relevant properties; the causal beliefs cause us to undergo the emotion. It is 
tempting, but mistaken, to think that the success of an appeal corresponds to 
the arousal of the causal beliefs present in the cognitive structure of the 
targeted emotion thereby eliciting the emotion. In this case. 'success' means 
efficacious causation through this belief; thus, the satisfaction conditions 
would correspond to the identificatory beliefs that cause one to focus on the 
relevant properties of its object. 'Satisfaction' would obtain if the 
identificatory beliefs appropriately map onto the deliberative situation. While 
these two conditions must obtain for an appeal to be successful. this account 
does not explain how an emotional appeal works. This idea fails because none 
of the functions that the emotions serve in a deliberative search correspond to 
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such a conceptual division of an emotion. Furthermore, an emotional appeal is 
successful if it attains its formal object. The formal object of an emotion is the 
evaluative category in the form of a description that justifies the selection of 
the particular properties of the actual object of the emotion. The evaluation 
present in the formal object of the particular emotion must serve the intended 
function of the argument which is defined in terms of the deliberative aim. 
The higher order evaluation in the emotion's formal object also allows one to 
more adequately judge the content of the appeal. The beliefs and judgments 
operating at both levels within the targeted emotion are necessary for that 
end to be served. 
We not only judge these arguments by their effects, the author's 
purpose in using the targeted emotion must match its function. This condition 
is required because there must be a connection between the author's purpose 
and the argument's function. We do not want an argument's success to be a 
matter of accident. An argument's perlocutionary effect must be attributable 
to the argument's content. Yet it is not enough to say that an argument is 
relevant to the situation for it to be successful; this condition is necessary 
because we need to be able to explain an argument's success. 
Overdetermination, the explanatory embarrassment of having more than one 
acceptable account of an effect, must be avoided. 
Although we have described the roles of the emotions within the 
deliberative search as serving some function, it is a commonplace of every 
discussion of this form of argumentation to recognize that a successful appeal 
depends on timing. The notion of timing can be refjned in two ways. Timing 
manifests itself as a dispositional strategy; successful, overt appeals usually 
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occur as a part of the conclusion. Quintilian was the first. I believe. to argue 
that the ground for an overt appeal must be carefully prepared. The audience 
must be prepared for the use of the emotional appeal. Thus. the audience must 
also be disposed to experience and accept the emotional appeal. and this 
happens when their attention. interest and sensitivities have been directed 
towards the targeted emotion. The third condition necessary for an emotional 
appeal to be successful is the necessary exercise of these preparatory 
conditions. The first condition addresses the cognitive and evaluative content 
of the appeal: the second condition addresses the need for its strategic use to be 
intelligible; the third condition prepares the audience for the appeal. 
Finally. what I want to suggest here is that there must be an economy of 
effort in the argument that is related to its effect. An argument must be just as 
strong as it need be to achieve its aim. The extent to which an appeal is 
relevant will correspond to the extent of effort that is required to process it is 
small. The idea here is related to Paul Grice's cooperative principles of 
quantity and manner. but the relation of effort specified is one of the 
necessary conditions for establishing the logical relevance of the appeal 
(Grice, Logic and Conversation 28; Sperber and Wilson I 25). 
We can now tum to a discussion of the success and satisfaction 
conditions necessary for the emotions to serve as a perceptual capacity and for 
an emotion to be an element of judgment. 
Emotion as a Perceptual Capacity 
First, some emotions, like compassion, pity and concern, serve a 
perceptual role in deliberation. I These emotions make us sensitive to certain 
features of the particular deliberative situation by focusing on the relevant 
properties possessed by the objects of our concern. These properties are 
targeted through the act of emotional perception and are brought into relief. 
Pity, for example. focuses on the properties of significant and undeserved 
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misfortune. Thh perceptual sensitivity inherent in the cognitive structure of 
the emotion itself enables us to discern what is salient. Salience is achieved 
when some feature of the deliberative situation is understood in terms of the 
requisite emotion. 
Some perceptual matters deliver 1\emselves to us. Imagine that a 
student comes to your office to explain why he doesn't have his essay. The tale 
is told the first time complete with facts and details. A question is asked. The 
student's intentions are rehearsed. A second comment is made and the student 
tells the tale a third time. Here the question of feelings arise. Is it regret, 
embarrassment, or disappointment he feels? We sense that the student's 
feelings don't fit the situation. and there is something here we mistrust. Since 
there are no feelings to suppress in the relating of facts, and we have, since 
childhood, considerable practice in manipulating expressions between 
apparent and actual intention, nothing appears amiss in the first two accounts 
of the problem. It is, however, difficult to suppress an actual emotion or to 
simulate the appropriate emotion, either of which are necessary for the third 
account to be successfuL Such simulation is difficult to achieve because the 
ability to express and recognize the emotions is natural and prelinguistic. 
Candor is the spontaneous, frank, and open expression of one's emotions. As 
such, candor is an emotional quality that is difficult to dissemble. We sense 
that the student is lying about his paper. In this case, the sensitivity we 
experience is grounded in the emotion of trust. The emotion of trust grounds 
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the relationship. and a deviation from those expectations which are grounded 
in another's good will generates the perception of mistrust. 
On other occasions the exercise of the perceptual capacity is dynamic. 
Imagine that it is the first week of schooL Your daughter. a first grader. 
boards the overcrowded school bus with her first art project. a paper puppet, 
an accomplishment of which she is proud. Two fourth grade boys take the 
puppet. play with it mockingly and shred it before her. She is devastated and 
angry. The comfort and sympathy we express as parents is cued in part by the 
emotions of our daughter; the anger we feel on her behalf is likewise 
governed in part by her own. To respond properly we must understand not 
only the facts of the situation but also the significance those facts hold for our 
daughter. The parent's sensitivity to the situation is dynamic; the parent's 
specific perceptions change as the girl works through the implications of her 
emotional response to the situation. 
These two examples reveal the two functions of salience in an occurrent 
setting. First. the deliberative problem is discerned. initially at least. in terms 
of an emotional perception. We begin to see what is at stake. and to do this we 
must be able to perceive sensitively the situation in all of its particularity. 
These emotions concentrate and direct the mind's attention. Second. salience 
serves as one of the starting points for deliberation. The perception implies, 
however vaguely. that there is some opportunity for acting for good or for ill 
in this situation. 
But the starting point is affected by another consideration. In both 
cases the perceptions are directed. in part. by the role the perceiver plays. 
The example involving the first grader is instructive. Significantly. one need 
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not be a parent to share the perceptions in this case. Cruelty and injustice are 
the subjects of moral judgment. and if a child relates this story and resentment 
is felt on the girl's behalf it is because we believe that no one should be treated 
this way. If. however. you are the girl's parent and anger is felt. it is because 
this person. my child. should not be treated this way. If the story concerns a 
child you know and is related second hand. anger or resentment may be felt. 
But if the story concerns a child not known to you and is heard second hand, 
then the emotion of indignation will be experienced on the child's behalf. The 
relationship specifies which retributive emotion will be felt. 
The teacher example reveals a different aspect of how role can affect 
perception. As Lawrence Blum argues. teachers serve a role characterized by 
a set of obligations and permissions that apply to anyone serving that role. 
These obligations exist independently of the personality and interests of the 
individual occupying that role. Although those expectations are objective 
they do not extend to everyone. they only apply to persons occupying that 
role. Thus, a teacher's individual perceptions will be filtered through those 
commitments and obligations. Many choose an occupation because the 
commitments. obligations and ideals that role embodies speak specifically to 
the individual. These people have chosen a vocation. A vocation is a role 
where one feels a greater sense of moral force in the obligations than one 
simply occupying a role.2 A vocation also differs from a role in that the 
individual's well-being is partly constituted by successfully exemplifying the 
excellences of that role ("Vocation" 173-197). Roles are species of the genus of 
relationships and these include familial relationships (father. mother, child. 
brother. sister and so on) as well as friendships. Our perceptions can also be 
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communally based. Robert E. Lee fought for the South because he saw himself 
as a Virginian first and an American second. Communal identifications are 
not just geographic; they can be political, ideological, religious and racial. 
When the features of a deliberative situation become salient, they do so 
through what we take to be our relevant sense of agency relative to the 
situation. This sense of agency is, in part. characterized by our sense of 
identity; and that sense of agency further characterizes us as an individual. as 
a moral agent, or as acting from some role or relationship or through an 
identificational sense of membership. Thus our perceptions. judgments and 
motivations may emanate from a personal sense of the good or from an 
impersonal sense of duty. 
Furthermore, our perceptual capacities are not limited temporally. 
Frequently, part of the deliberative search requires us to reflect on what has 
gone before. Regret. with its use of counterfactual considerations, is past 
looking. Reflection, along with reasoning and imagination. has long been 
recognized as a relevant consideration in deliberation. Through our 
reflections the present and the future (within the scope of our deliberative 
aim) should 'fit' with what has gone before. In fact, we find ourselves in 
deliberative situations where our discernment of the particular situation 
matches our considered judgments concerning the governing principles that 
should apply there. This match is discovered through the processes of critical 
reflection and self examination where we test both the particular perceptions 
and the larger principles that are relevant. John Rawls has argued that we 
can give a name to the correctly discerned and desired end of the deliberative 
search, a search that includes such reflections. 'Reflective equilibrium' is that 
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state one reaches "after a person has weighed various proposed conceptions 
and he has either revised his judgments to accord with one of them or he has 
held fast to his original convictions" (48). I am, clearly. ~mly mentioning this 
crucial idea here. Different aspects of it wiii be argued for in each subsequent 
chapter. 
On occasion, however, we find that there is a mismatch between the 
particular and the universal. Significantly, the emotions can play one of two 
roles here. While both beliefs and emotions are intentional. the structure of 
intentionality in the emotions is not the same as the structure of intentionality 
in one's beliefs. Changes in the structure of this intentionality in the 
emotions do not immediately follow changes in the structure of our beliefs. 
Emotions possess a kind of tenacity and inertia that beliefs lack. When we 
revise our beliefs about some principle. the emotions linked to those beliefs 
resist immediate revision. Quite generally, what now looks fair may still feel 
foul. Conversely, a change in the intentional set of the emotions can precede a 
change in our beliefs. What now feels fair may still look foul. While these 
general characterizations are, I believe, correct, achieving a state of 
reflective equilibrium in an occurrent setting is highly individual. Some of 
these individual features can be illustrated by the deliberations of Huck Finn. 
Huck Finn's decision to steal Jim out of slavery is a particular 
illustration of how salience can operate reflectively. Huck begins his 
deliberations with an evaluation concerning Jim's plight, "Once I said to 
myself it would be a thousand times better for Jim to be a slave at home where 
his family was, as long as he'd got to be a slave." predicting what Miss Watson's 
and the community's emotional responses to Jim would be, Huck immediately 
45 
decides against this. Miss Watson's anger and disgust towards Jim's conduct 
would lead her to sell him down the river. Society would despise Jim for being 
ungrateful. and this judgment would have deleterious consequences for his 
daily equanimity. Huck posits these emotional responses as reasons. and they 
are reasonable ones. They are reasonable inferences for two reasons. Miss 
Watson's anger and the community's hatred are intelligible because we can 
expect that sort of a response from members of a slave society. What they 
expect is governed by what they would appeal to· to justify those emotions. For 
example. when someone commits a sin or a crime, say. there are certain 
emotional responses that are considered appropriate. These emotions are 
appropriate. in part. because they help to organize or disrupt our experience 
of that situation. Emotions not only guide our experience. they constrain us in 
ways that are seen as helpful to ourselves or to society. But we also know that 
their appropriateness is also governed by the truth or rightness of the beliefs 
which ground the response. A false or wrong belief is still a belief. As we 
know. Huck will deny the propriety of society's response. 
Huck feels the force of these expectations when he considers how his 
own participation will be viewed. He characterizes those judgments in terms 
of the response he is expected to feel: 
It would get all around. that Huck Finn helped a nigger to get 
his freedom; and if I was to ever see anybody from that town 
again. I'd be ready to get down and lick his boots for shame. 
That's just the way: a person does a low-down thing and then 
he don't want to take no consequences of it. 
Thinks as long as he can hide it. it ain't no disgrace. (28 I) 
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Huck's thinking is governed by what is expected. Actually, his thinking is 
deeper than his expressed reasons. He confuses two kinds of expectation. He 
conflates the conduct he knows society expects from him with what he thinks 
society expects oj him. 
Fearing that people like him go to hell. Huck decides to pray; but he 
cannot pray. That Huck cannot be a hypocrite is evidence of the honesty of 
his moral center. Huck then writes to Miss Watson. He sits thinking, 
--thinking how good it was all this happened so, and how near 
I come to being lost and going to hell. And went on thinking. 
And got to thinking over our trip down the river; and I see 
Jim before me, all the time, in the day, and in the night-time. 
sometimes moonlight, sometimes storms, and we a floating 
along, talking, and singing, and laughing. But somehow I 
couldn't seem to strike no places to harden me against him, 
but only the other kind. I'd see him standing my watch on top 
of his'n, stead of calling me, so I could go on sleeping; and see 
how glad he was when I come come back out of the fog; and 
when I come to him again in the swamp, up there where the 
feud was; and such-like times; and would always call me 
honey, and pet me, and do everything he could think of for 
me, and how good he always was; and at last I struck the time I 
saved him telling the men we had small-pox aboard, and he 
was so grateful, and said I was the best friend old Jim had in 
the world, and the only one he's got now; and then I happened 
to look around and see that paper. (282-283) 
The character of Jim and his future is made salient in these reflections. Huck 
finds that the fate of his friend is more important than what he takes to be 
society's principles. The moment of deliberative decision has arrived: 
It was a close place. I took it up, and held it in my hand. I 
was a trembling, because I got to decide, forever, betwixt two 
things, and I knowed it. I studied a minute, sort of holding my 
breath, and then says to myself: 
"All right, then, I'll go to hell" --and tore it up. (283) 
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Huck decides to save his friend. believing that he has yielded to emotional and 
moral weakness. His decision is actually an act of moral and emotional 
defiance. It is an act of emotional defiance because he refuses to submit to the 
emotional double standard that requires that compassion for slaves be morally 
discounted. 
The perceptual capacity inherent in the emotions actually involves two 
steps. First. the emotions in question are a form of perceptual sensitivity. 
Feelings and emotions are intentional perceptual capacities that inform and 
affect the character of good action. To see that a friend needs kindness. for 
example. is to perceive the situation via the feelings of friendship long before 
any articulated inference is expressed. In fact, the inference is informed by 
the feelings which help to direct the thought. To help a friend without any 
feelings at all would be to perform an act that is less praiseworthy than one 
done with sympathy. The emotions, in this sense, deliver what is salient to us. 
The beliefs and judgments in the emotions make us sensitive to and help us to 
recognize the important features of the situation. Second, these beliefs help us 
to assess the actual significance of those features (Blum, Moral Perception 58). 
The explanatory challenge here is not to show that this capacity 
functions in these two ways; rather, the challenge lies in giving an account 
detailed enough to explain the complexities of what is at work here. There is a 
skeptical challenge whose answer reveals much of what is at stake here. Just 
as visual perception can be subject to hallucinations. say. emotional 
perception may be subject to the charge of projection. What we experience, it 
is said, are not the properties of the situation; rather, they are reflections and 
echoes of our own desires. fears, pleasures and pains. It is possible for one to 
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project an emotion onto a situation because this perceptual functioning 
depends on the antecedent structure of the beliefs and evaluations that make 
up the emotion. Perception is a kind of impulse whose good functioning 
depends on both the structure which articulates the perceived situation and 
the actual features to be perceived. They are potential forms of awareness that 
can be actualized through our own agency. We must also, therefore, be able to 
account for the problem of relativity. People's perceptual equipment, both 
physical and emotional, are in various states of health and working order. 
Perspective is the idea that we stand in relation to situations. Our distance 
from. as well as our familiarity with the situation, our depth of insight, and 
our attitudes all inform our perspective of the deliberative situation. 
A practical insight of deliberative judgment will necessarily involve 
the emotions because a full recognition of the deliberative situation will be 
constituted not only by an appropriate response (which includes the feelings). 
but the discernment of a particular situation will also be guided, in part, by 
emotional and imaginative perception (Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge 78-79). 
To use a visual metaphor, these feelings provide depth of field; without them 
what we could see would be flat, and flatness has the tendency to distort the 
image or the appearance. Emotion, along with reason, renders our perception 
stereoscopic in a way that either without the other would not be. Furthermore, 
we have a certain power here; the ability to be affected by some experiences 
and to be resistant to others is the capacity to be discriminatingly receptive 
and resistant. 3 
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Emotion and Judgment 
Salience is achieved when we see the deliberative situation in terms of 
the judgment of some emotion. One sees the situation as having significance 
of a certain sort. If the situation is significant in the right way or to the right 
degree, this judgment leads the deliberator to consider whether it is possible to 
act or not; if it is possible to act, then the agent judges whether one should act 
or not. Deliberative discourse has an analogous set of choices. If the situation 
has salience, the writer considers first whether it is possible to and then 
whether one should deploy an argument from pathos. 
One of the central commonplaces common to all theories of the passions 
is that one's emotions involve evaluative responses to situations that are 
conceptually distinct from, yet related to, the evaluations that motivate us to 
act for some end. To experience an emotional response like pity, exhilaration 
or jealousy is to be affected in some way, and this is qualitatively different 
from the desiderative power of emotions like anger, hatred and wrath. 'Being 
affected' and 'doing' are contraries, and they admit of degrees. This distinction 
is plain enough, but there are further distinctions within the domain of 'being 
affected' that need to be made if we are to understand its persuasive potential. 
The global or holistic theories of the emotions proffered at different 
times in the history of western thought have taken this distinction as a 
starting point. These theories tend to group themselves into causal 
explanations and classificatory schemes. Aristotle and Aquinas, for example, 
explained the emotions in terms of their causes; and this approach led them, as 
it does all others offering a causal explanation, into pairing particular 
emotions with their contraries. Spinoza also offered a causal account. He 
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argued that there are three primitive passions--desire, joy and sadness. All of 
the other passions are complications of these three, and they are 
comprehended, in part, through their contraries. The heuristic power of 
conceiving the particular emotions in terms of their contraries was and is a 
powerful insight into the possibilities of persuasion. 
In A Treatise of Human Nature David Hume divides the passions into two 
classes. the direct and the indirect passions. More recently, Roben Gordon 
offered another two-fold classificatory scheme; there are the factive emotions 
and the epistemic emotions. Perhaps the most sophisticated, modern 
classificatory scheme of emotion types is that offered by three psychologists, 
Andrew Ortony, Gerald Clore and Allan Collins in The Cognitive Structure of 
Emotions (chapter 2). They argue that there are three major aspects of the 
world: events, agents and objects. We can focus on the consequences of events 
as they affect others or ourselves. Consequences for others are judged 
desirable or not. Consequences for ourselves focus on our relevant or 
irrelevant prospects. Actions focus on ourselves or others as agents. The 
judgments here focus on attributions of character or on matters of well-being. 
Objects are comprehended in terms of their power to attract. As admirable as 
this scheme is, and it is a powerful conceptual tool, it ignores crucial aspects of 
the role of time in the emotions, and it obscures issues of voluntary control in 
the desires as well as the causal dynamics present within the emotional 
episode. These problems make their model unsuitable for rhetorical analysis. 
We need a scheme that emphasizes the cognitive structure of the 
emotions, what is voluntary in the emotional experjence, and the causal 
dynamics of the emotional episode. The Stoics offer a classificatory scheme 
that is theoretically powerful and is also directed at those dimensions of the 
emotions that are of direct concern for deliberation and rhetorical analysis. 
Yet the term 'Stoic' has long been linked with their philosophical therapies 
for the emotions. Actually, we must remember that the Stoic analysis of the 
emotions pursues two theoretical concerns. They were interested in the 
psychology of the emotions, and they were interested in developing 
philosophical therapies for those emotions. We may accept their analysis, or 
parts of it, without having to accept their therapies. 
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The Stoics took the distinction of being affected and doing from Aristotle 
and made a signal contribution to our understanding of the passions. They 
argued that we can make a four-fold classification of the passions. There are 
four basic passions: desire, fear, pleasure (or delight), and pain (or distress). 
'Desire' names the most general impulse of appetition for future and apparent 
goods; 'fear' names the most general impulse to avoid future and apparent 
evils. The category of 'desire' includes such emoti(lns as anger and its 
relatives. sexual desire, love, hatred, and spiritedness, among others. The 
category of 'fear' includes emotions like dread, hesitation, timidity, shame, 
panic, hysteria, and agony. 'Pleasure' (or delight) and 'pain' (or distress) 
name impulses of expansion or contraction in the soul (pneuma) (Long and 
Sedley 410-411 ). Pleasure includes such emotions as enchantment, enjoyment, 
rapture, malice and schadenfreude. Pleasure is an emotional state whose term 
is used descriptively; the moral rightness of the pleasure is distinct from one's 
experience of it. Pain includes grief, envy, jealousy, sorrow, depression, 
anguish, exasperation and vexation.4 The emotions of delight are inherently 
good. An inherent good is one whose experience of or the contemplation of its 
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object is rewarding in itself. Conversely, the emotions of distress are 
inherently evil. One's experiences of these emotions, considered in isolation, 
have no rewarding characteristics; they are painful. 
Their descriptions of the passions reveal three aspects of these 
emotions. The Stoics described these emotions phenomenologically, and these 
descriptions correspond closely to what we currently call affective reactions. 
Like the Stoics, we commonly describe our emotional responses in terms of 
physical states. Depression is a pain "which weighs one down." Exasperation 
1s a pain "which crowds one and makes one shon of room" (Diogenes Laenius 
7. 111-112). It is important to emphasize that classical Greek and Latin, like 
current English, use 'pleasure' and 'pain' to refer to both bodily sensations and 
emotional states. They, like us, were not concerned with the physical; rather. 
they were concerned with the classes of emotions called delight and distress. 
Second, they describe these emotions as cognitive evaluations of those objects 
which are valuable to us. Our emotions are directed at the goods in our lives 
whose voluntary control is problematic. 
Finally, they are concerned with the internal dynamics of the emotion. 
An emotion is an impulse, possessing its own internal motivational aim. 
Although each impulse is a kind of motivation, the particular impulses vary 
widely. These impulses are partially understood temporally. Anger has a 
definite starting point, and it culminates in the act of retribution. Its temporal 
manifestation suggests that it is a kind of performance. Love, on the other 
hand, is a state. It is continuative, not perforrnative. The emotions of delight 
are temporally indexed to the present moment. While this is not problematic, 
reflection on the emotions of distress suggests potential problems. Guilt, for 
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example, is problematic. It is tempting to think of guilt as a temporal 
counterpart to anger. We may think that the climactic point in guilt is the act 
that initiates the emotional episode. It is, thus, past looking; but this notion 
overlooks two features of the emotion. If I feel guilt in a deliberative context. it 
is this present tense impulse that is important. If we are to focus on what is 
voluntary, we must be concerned with our present condition and the actions 
open to us. Second, we are concerned with the reparative potential in the 
emotion, not the destructive power that is there. The normative dimension of 
the emotion is prior in importance to its potentially crippling power. 
Both Aristotle and the Stoics argued that desire and fear are primary 
passions; pleasure and pain are subordinate to them. Desires and fears are 
directed at getting or avoiding the apparent goods in question; in fact, they are 
defined by reference to the agent's expectations. Desires and fears are also 
primary because they can strategically influence the content and character of 
one's deliberative decision. Pleasure and pain follow as a result of the success 
or failure of the primary passions. Their asymmetric relationship can be 
explained by borrowing a distinction in speech act theory. The primary and 
secondary passions have different directions of fit. The aims of our desires 
and fears work to fit the world to our minds; the aims of the emotions in the 
classes of delight and distress work to fit the mind to the world (de Sousa 163 ). 
The decision whether to deploy an emotional appeal or not depends in 
part on the character and agency of one's audience, and it depends on the 
nature of the situation. Questions relating to one's audience will be discussed 
in Chapter VI; I will consider several issues concerning the deliberative 
situation now. 
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Five Formal Patterns of Emotional Persuasion 
When we deliberate about decisions that admit the use of the argument 
of pathos, we recognize that there are, broadly speaking, two types of 
deliberative situations that invite this form of argument. We can be 
concerned with a future good or harm, or we can be concerned with a problem 
that is now before us. This temporal division of problems corresponds to the 
temporal division that classifies the passions. Yet that correspondence is not, 
by itself, sufficient to explain the use of an emotional appeal. If we think of a 
deliberative decision as a mere choice between some claim and its 
contradictory (and some situations are of this sort), then the argument from 
pathos will not occur. The argument from pathos depends on the presence of 
some uncertainty that is inherently present in the deliberative situation, and 
this uncertainty is usually sufficient to warrant the use of an emotional 
appeal. 
The domain of the objects of one's desires and fears are obviously large. 
We want many things. We want to perform certain actions. These may be seen 
as achievements: I want to build a tree house; I want to keep my promise; I 
want revenge. They may be seen as activities: I want to exercise regularly; I 
want to be healthy; I want to teach. The objects of one's desires can also be a 
mental state: I want to be amused, feel safe, be happy. Because the mental 
states that one desires are achieved through performances or activities, one 
can stack, so to speak, the desires that one has relative to the deliberative aim. 
When we are concerned with a future good or harm the argument from 
pathos can be represented most clearly as a series of formal patterns that 
exploit the asymmetric relationship between the primary passions of desire 
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and fear and the secondary passions of delight and distress. Each pattern 
selects one emotion to serve as the dominant vehicle of persuasion and which 
will license the use of other emotions to situate and make articulate the 
dominant emotion. The secondary emotions that accompany the primary 
passions serve two possible functions. The secondary emotion can 
psychologically prepare the audience for the dominant emotion, and this is 
often effected through the techniques of surprise or foreshadowing. A 
secondary emotion, governed by the contemplated success or failure of the aim 
of the dominant desire or fear, will follow the dominant passion as a result. 
For example, longing is a desiderative emotion which, when its object is 
successfully achieved, is pleasurable. Some desires, however, are not 
pleasurable. Indignation, for example, is a painful desiderative emotion. Its 
success produces a sense of satisfaction, but that satisfaction is not experienced 
as pleasurable, and indignation's failure to achieve its object is painful. 
When a primary emotion is targeted as the dominant emotion its 
prospective success or failure will produce a pleasurable or painful emotion as 
a result. One can focus on the consequences of acting on a desire by 
imagining a felicitous conclusion, producing an emotion of delight. 
Conversely, the prospect of a failed desirable end can be made salient through 
an emotion of distress that will undermine the expectations inherent in that 
desire. In cases involving fear, for example, one can strengthen one's resolve 
by focusing on a decision that will negate the harm that produces the fear and 
thus produce a pleasurable result. By focusing on this felicitous consequence 
one can strengthen the attitudes and judgments that justify belief in the 
proposed action in order to counter the force of the fear. Conversely, one can 
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strengthen the threat of a harm by focusing on the attainment of an 
unwanted result which is made salient through an emotion of distress. 
Similarly, one can undermine the belief in a proposed action in fearful 
situation by focusing on a painful emotion that will make salient the 
consequences of a possible failed action. 
While the need to use an emotion as a preparatory condition depends on 
the deliberative situation, the choice of the desire or fear and its result is 
necessary and usually sufficient for the appeal's success. Thus we have four 
possible patterns: 
1. Desire + a pleasurable emotion 
2. Desire + a painful emotion 
3. Fear + a painful emotion 
4. Fear + a pleasurable emotion 
Two observations deserve mention. First, the uncertainty inherent in 
deliberative situation licenses the choice of the prospective resultant emotion. 
The targeted resultant emotion will depend on the causal efficacy of the 
antecedent desire or fear and can affect its motivational strength. Second, 
when we focus on the desiderative or the fearful we are making, broadly 
speaking, a motivational argument; yet we can also focus on the rightness or 
qualitative worth of the desire and this is a matter of justification. 
We also deliberate about problems that are present before us, and this 
presents us with the fifth formal pattern. 5 The fifth pattern utilizes the 
emotions concerned with a present evil, for example, pity, regret, guilt or 
shame. The emotions of distress are important because their invocation will 
imply, as a consequence, the presence of some higher order desiderative or 
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fearful attitude that can occur as a consequence. We use these emotions of 
distress in one of two ways. Pity and compassion communicate what is 
significant about the deliberative situation. and the character of our actions 
will be specified through that salience. We can also use these emotions 
prospectively to foresee the adequacy of our proposed actions. Regret. for 
example, is concerned with judgments about what we have done or failed to do 
where some standard of rightness or goodness has not been met or was violated 
in some way. By examining the contemplated action as if were completed and 
seeking instances where regret may be felt, the deliberating agent can more 
adequately assess the proposed action. 
Significantly, these patterns of salience or prospect share the formal 
qualities of theses discussed in the introduction. Theses are simple or complex. 
mixed or unmixed. The patterns of desire + delight, and fear + distress work 
with complex and unmixed theses; the patterns of desire + distress and fear + 
delight work with complex and mixed theses. Prospective emotional 
arguments typically correspond to simple theses. By discerning the 
persuasive potential inherent in each emotional structure relative to one's aim 
and audience, the writer can see what opportunities for persuasion are 
potentially present in that case. 
The formal patterns also structure the potential ways one can deploy 
counter arguments. If an opponent deploys the pattern of desire + pleasure 
one has three possible lines of counter argument. First, one can deny that the 
desire will be successful. Acting on this desire will lead to failure; the 
unhappy result will be painful. Second, one can deny that the targeted desire 
is the right one, and this denial yields two options. We should fear our 
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prospects because something harmful will actually result; or, third, while we 
should fear these prospects, we can overcome the danger one's opposition has 
not seen and pr0duce a felicitous result. The choice of any of these patterns, 
likewise yields the other three patterns as possible lines of counter argument. 
In cases involving the prospective emotions of distress. three possible 
lines of counter argument are also open. First, one can accept that 
opposition's salient emotion but deny the efficacy or propriety of the 
consequent attitude. One can deny that the emotion is in fact salient, offer 
another and still accept their consequent attitude, which will be better situated 
in light of one's own sense of salience. Finally, one can deny the salient 
emotion and the consequent attitude or action and offer in its stead a wholly 
new pattern in its place. 
Reasons To Act and Reasons For Actin~ 
The emotions central to deliberative judgment (emotions such as grief. 
anger, regret, fear and pity) contain beliefs and evaluations which act as 
reasons and posit value or wonh to cenain external goods in our lives. An 
emotion like pity, for example, has three beliefs. We pity individuals who have 
suffered significant misfortune, and we recognize that misfortune is 
undeserved. These two beliefs are called identificatory beliefs. These beliefs 
pick out and make salient the relevant propenies of the object of the emotion. 
They are, obviously, subject to judgment. We evaluate the object to determine 
whether the propenies so identified are, in fact, the actual propenies of the 
object. The third belief necessary for pity requires us to see that the situation 
we have focused on is also possible for us. This belief is a casual belief; it 
triggers the emotion. 
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Our desires and fears have two kinds of beliefs and evaluations that 
structure them. Let us assume, for example, that John is afraid to drive to work 
in the snow. There are two kinds of reasons operating in one's fears. John 
can be afraid because these driving conditions are usually hazardous, or he 
can be afraid because he doesn't want to have an accident. The hazardous 
conditions and the possibility of an accident are epistemic reasons for being 
afraid. He can also be afraid because he doesn't want to have an accident or to 
risk an injury. These are attitudinal reasons (Gordon 75-76). 
The identificatory and epistemic beliefs that help structure the 
emotions are forms of judgment; and those constituent beliefs and evaluations 
may serve, along with other judgments, like probability, plausibility and so on. 
as matter leading to the deliberative decision. the conclusion of our search. 
The beliefs which constitute the emotion may be judged true or false; it is 
descriptive matter whether these beliefs properly map onto their objects. 
These (true) beliefs that form a part of the emotion itself can serve as shared 
presumptions between the author and the audience. When we identify the 
relevant property of a particular object of an emotion, that property becomes 
the object of some normative evaluation. Significantly then, the evaluations 
that structure the emotion can be assessed for their normative status.6 
The causal beliefs in our emotions, however, are a bit more complex 
than I have just distinguished them. Broadly speaking, these causal beliefs 
and attitudinal evaluations can present themselves in one of two ways. 
These causal beliefs can be 'reason states' which are understood as 
'wanting', 'fearing', desiring', and so on. Or, they can be understood as the 
contents of those states, one's intentions, desires, goals, and so forth. Reason 
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states differ from the latter. Reason states are psychological and causal; the 
latter are the abstract contents of those states and are justificational in nature. 
The goods that are the objects of the emotions may be individuals or groups of 
people. states like wonder, performances like racing, or activities like 
friendship that are necessary for and constitutive of our well-being. 
Significantly, we sometimes find that the opportunity to participate in these 
goods and the exercise or supervision of them lies outside our control. We 
grieve for the loss of a friend; we regret failed or lost opportunities for 
effective or proper action, and we pity the undeserved and significant 
misfortune of others. This issue of vulnerability is crucial to the deliberative 
emotions because it helps to explain the conceptual relationship between the 
two kinds of reasons operating in these emotions. 
There are three claims being made here. First, we have reasons to act; a 
reason to act refers to and derives its content from t.he normative rightness or 
wrongness (as in envy) of the emotion. These reasons are, in principle, 
agent-neutral; they are reasons for anyone. Second, the normative nature of a 
judgment indicates the importance of the good at stake. But not all reasons 
involving importance are normative in the public sense just mentioned. Our 
judgment can be made relative to our sense of agency in the deliberative 
situation. The relativized reasons are reasons for acting. Finally, a reason for 
acting refers to and exemplifies the reason state; it is a causal reason (Audi 16 ). 
We commonly call this one's motivation. 
Quintilian recognized the interdependence of these three elements and 
argued for the efficacy of pathos as part of one's proof. He observes: 
Proofs. it is true. may induce the judges to regard our case as 
superior to that of our opponent. but the appeal to .the 
emotions will do more. for it will make them wish our case to 
be the better. And what they wish. they will also believe. 
(Book VI II 5) 
Quintilian does not have in mind here a 'readiness to believe'. which is a 
preparatory condition for good deliberation. He is thinking about reason 
states. and he argues that emotion used this way has the ability to forestall 
good judgment. No one will deny that the emotions can induce premature 
closure. but we must also recognize that emotional appeals that involve 
causally efficacious reason states may also be used legitimately. Attitudes of 
approval and disapproval. for example. are often reason states; and the 
judgments of approbation and disapprobation that arise from the sentiments 
are also reason states. In one way. the danger of premature closure in 
persuasion is a local. albeit important. concern. To focus too closely on this 
problem is to ignore a larger issue crucial to good deliberation. Each of us is. 
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in some important sense. responsible for one's character. The question is not 
whether part of one's character and emotional life is within one's control; the 
question of responsibility turns on whether one has taken the responsibility 
to cultivate the dispositions that constitute who one is. 
Desideratjve and Fearful Judiments 
The successful evocation of a desire requires an understanding of the 
structural complexity of those desires. In his recent essay. "Freedom of the 
Will and the Concept of a Person." Harry Frankfurt argues convincingly that 
persons have desires or wants working at two levels (5-20). We have first 
order and second order desires. First order desires can be expressed by the 
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statement, "A wants to X." where X stands for doing an action. The statements, 
"Joe wants to eat a sandwich," "Sally wants to read Mansfield Park," and "Sam 
wants a little night life," are examples of first order desires. 
Obviously, there are occasions when we want the first order desire to be 
satisfied, just as there are occasions when we don't want the first order desire 
to be satisfied. To explain this common occurrence we need only to recognize 
that another desire is present in the emotion. Frankfurt calls these 'second 
order desires'. A second order desire can be expressed by the phrase, "X wants 
to want to X." A second order desire makes its first order counterpart 
intelligible. Yet the domain of second order desires is large. We can 
meaningfully say that "A wants to want to X" in four contexts: 
1. when A does something else; 
2. when what motivates A is, in fact, something else; 
3. when what motivates A is this desire; and 
4. when A will, in fact in the future, be motivated by this desire. 
Frankfurt's interest in his essay lies in with the character of those second 
order volitions that, in fact, lead to action. 
There are. in all, four possible relationships between first and second 
order desires that are relevant to understanding the argument from pathos. A 
person can have a first order desire to do some action and not want that desire 
satisfied. Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which this situation can 
occur. We can have two emotions towards the same situation and the desires 
present in those emotions conflict. When the desires present in two emotions 
cannot both be satisfied, then those desires are conflicted. Conflicted desires 
are like inconsistent beliefs in that they arise from some contingent matter of 
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fact. If I want to be famous and I want to retain my privacy, then my desires 
are conflicted. When, however, the two desires within one emotion are at 
loggerheads, then the desiderative wants are conflicting. Second order desires 
can explain conflicting desires. If I am on a diet and have the desire to graze 
in the refrigerator (my first order desire) I don't want that desire acted on. 
My not wanting the first order desire acted on is my second order desire. The 
second order desire is successful when it effectively blocks my acting on my 
first order appetitive desire. 
The case of resisting temptation to cheat on my diet suggests a second 
kind of relationship between first and second order desires. A continent 
action is one where we do the right thing but we do it for the wrong reason. A 
high school student is tempted to cheat but doesn't want to, not because she 
knows cheating is wrong, but rather, because she fears she will get caught. 
Not cheating is the right action, but we can fault her refraining because she 
does it for the wrong reason. Continent behavior recognizes that one's second 
order desires may be causally efficacious yet normatively deficient. 
Conversely, incontinent behavior and akratic action require an explanation of 
how one can knowingly do what is wrong. Second order desires can be 
practically successful without being normatively satisfactory. 
Third, there are important situations where one wants to understand 
and evaluate the second order desire of another person. That is, we want to 
understand the desires of another in the sense that we want to know what it 
means to have that desire, but we do not, in any way, want to act on that desire. 
The psychological analysis of literary characters, for example, presupposes 
this capacity; and it is almost certainly a practical necessity for good 
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psychological counseling. The interest and power of empathy as a conceptual 
tool rests in the! exercise of this capacity; and it is this capacity which makes it 
possible for som~one to feel sympathy for others who are, at least partly, 
responsible for the plight they are in. 
Finally, a person can have a first order desire and want that desire to be 
satisfied. In this case, the second order desire is the agent's effective desire. 
More precisely, A wants her will to be X, or she wants her desire to be the 
desire that will move her to do X. An effective second order desire is what the 
agent wants to want. 
The second order volitions or judgments can be qualitatively assessed in 
separate but related ways. First, the outcomes of those judgments can be 
qualitatively evaluated. Quite simply, the outcome must fit the deliberative 
aim. One must remember, however, that just as manufacturers must have 
tolerances of fit for the goods they manufacture, our outcomes have tolerances 
of fit that work with the deliberative aim. Not every problem possesses an 
ideal solution. Moreover, one can evaluate the volition by seeing whether 
acting on that judgment is directly or indirectly self-defeating. 
The outcome itself can be assessed for the kind of good that is aimed for. 
The success and satisfaction conditions for moral goods, for example, differ 
from those for nonmoral goods. Furthermore, nonmoral goods can be ranked. 
Utility goods like efficiency and expediency are less valuable than extrinsic 
goods. Extrinsic goods are necessary or sufficient means to intrinsic goods. 
Exercise is an extrinsic good because it is conducive to health, an intrinsic 
good. We pursue intrinsic goods for their own sake; they are good in and of 
themselves. Some goods, like knowledge, health and happiness, are not only 
intrinsic goods; they are contributory goods as well. Contributory goods are 
constituent elements in a good life. 
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The example of the high schooler who declines to cheat but does so for 
the wrong reason points to the second kind of qualitative judgment. The 
character of second order volitions can be evaluated for the worthiness of that 
particular motivation. While continent action is qualitatively preferable to 
incontinent action, virtuous action is more praiseworthy than continent 
action. Our motives can be judged in terms of degree; our motives can be more 
or less noble or base. wise or foolish, just or unjust, and so on. 
It is this kind of qualitative judgment that is explored in the Anglo 
Saxon poem, The Battle of Maldon. The Vikings have come to raid a coastal 
village and the local defense force is on the beach to resist them. When asked 
to surrender, Birhtnoth, the local leader, refuses. Birhtnoth's motivation 
springs from a sense of honor. but he desires glory through his refusal and 
the consequent fight that will ensue. Glory is proportional to the risks taken 
and the recognition of this fact motivates him to make the rash and foolish 
decision to allow the raiders to cross the bridge. He dies as a result. Both the 
outcome of his decision and his particular motivation can be evaluated. 
Birhtwold, on the other hand, knows that he and the remaining fighter are 
doomed; but he decides to continue fighting. We judge Borhtwold not on the 
certain outcome of his decision; we judge him on the nobility of his motivation 
which is expressed in his final exhortation to his men, "purpose shall be the 
firmer, heart the keener, courage shall be the more, as our might lessens." 
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tta.r 
The argument from pathos that involves one's fears arises out of the 
uncertainty surrounding the potential harm to one's good. The uncertainty 
and motivational direction fit partially structure this form of the argument 
from pathos. In The Structure of Argument Robert Gordon argues that our 
deliberations about fear have the logical form of conditional or hypothetical 
arguments (75-76). Imagine that while taking a walk in the park a large. 
menacing dog steps into John's path and begins to snarl. John feels fear. The 
situation that elicits fear may be expressed as a conditional argument: if the 
dog attacks, then I (John) will be hurt. Of course. John may act out of fear by 
panicking and trying to run away. but that is not his only course of action. 
John may act otherwise because he feels fear. Thus, he wishes that the dog not 
attack him because if the dog attacks him, he will be hurt. The wish that 
articulates one's fear may be expressed positively or negatively. On occasion, 
the positive expression of a wish will indicate a relative degree of confidence 
that the agent has in the face of that harm. If the wish is expressed 
negatively, it will express one of two degrees of modal strength. One can say 
that X should not happen; or one can say that X should not exist, or that it 
should never happen. The judgment that one should not drink sour milk name 
something that should not happen. The judgment that child molestation 
should never happen is a much stronger claim. 
The focus of one's wish will depend on the kinds of reasons operating in 
it. Being hurt is an epistemic reason; John may also have as a reason an 
attitudinal judgment that he doesn't want to be hurt. The epistemic reason 
allows the agent to specify a desired outcome that will prevent the harm from 
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occurring. Epistemic reasons are expressions of judgment; they invite 
questions concerning the reasonableness, degree of harm, probability or 
likelihood of the prospective harm. The attitudinal reason provides the agent 
with the motivation to act on that desire. In any event, one is uncertain about 
the dog's intentions. John assesses this uncertainty in light of his desire to not 
be hurt. His desire that it not be the case that 'if the dog attacks, I will be hurt,' 
(ie., not (if p, then q)) leads to a belief that some action, staring down the dog 
say, will bring about this desire. The ability to see that some specified desired 
outcome is possible allows the agent to act from fear; it allows us, in short, to 
act deliberately. We then decide to take that course of action. 
Expectation 
Both desires and fears involve one's expectations, and the nature of that 
expectation is a matter that affects the kinds of judgments that can be used as a 
matter for persuasion. Expectation is a judgment about the likelihood of a 
future action or event. It is usually grounded in a judgment about a causal 
condition (either necessary or sufficient) that will bring about that future 
state. That judgment may be grounded in convention, presumption. some 
criterion of reasonableness, or a nonnative principle. Expectation is also 
relational. Our sense of agency is seen as causally involved in the attainment 
of that state. In The Faces of Injustice, Judith Shklar argues that much of the 
conceptual structure of 'expectation' can be revealed through its grammar 
(89). We expect that something will happen because it has happened that way 
in the past and should do so in the future. This predictability can be one of 
cause and effect. More often however, the expectation is the product of 
statistical frequency. Insurance companies, for example, use actuarial tables 
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to set their rates. These statistical frequencies license causal regularities in 
nature and in society. We expect that it will be colder in the winter than in 
the summer. There are also causal regularities in social life. and these can be 
sociological or psychological in nature. Finally. we exercise the abilities to 
plan and schedule our lives. and these capacities add immensely to the 
predictive accuracy of our judgments. 
We also have r!xpectations from or of each other. As Shklar says, "we 
expect fairness from our elected officials. fidelity from our friends. and the 
delivery of goods and services from those we have paid for them. We feel 
betrayed. not just upset. when these expectations are not met" (Shklar 89). The 
phrase, 'what we expect of another', names a normative obligation defined by 
the role that individual is serving, and that expectation can differ from what 
we expect from that person. To expect something from another can refer to 
that normative expectation or to some predictable response. The gulf between 
these two kinds of expectation can be made more emotionally vivid by the 
suddenness or the surprising nature of that breach. We can also build tension 
through foreshadowing. 
Aspect 
The character of one's second order desire, the nature of one's 
expectation, and the prospective success or failure of attaining one's desires or 
avoiding what is fearful are partially governed by the role that time plays in 
one's desires and fears. This role of time is distinct from the issue of timing 
one's appeal. The intentional content of the desire or fear makes it intelligible 
and, in some cases, appropriate. With acute insight. Ronald de Sousa argues 
that the intentional content of an occurrent desire has a temporal aspect, and 
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this temporal aspect will explain a crucial part of the nature of that desire's 
content (208-215). Aspect does not refer to the onset or completion of a desire 
which is. in principle. a datable event in the past. present or future. The 
temporal aspect refers to how the desire is envisaged in time. de Sousa 
identifies three conditions concerning the role of time in one's desires. The 
first condition concerns how time affects how the desire manifests itself as a 
part of one's character. The second condition explains how time operates in 
and thus affects the focus of one's desires. The third condition identifies the 
category under which the object of the desire is to be understood (212). 
de Sousa argues that we can begin to understand this temporal aspect by 
looking its grammatical counterpart. 'Aspect' is a feature of the grammar of 
our language. Events can be envisaged in one of four ways: as continuous. 
punctual. perfect. and frequentive. 1) An event may be viewed as occurring 
through a period of time. Time is the continuous aspect of Mary's kindness in 
the statement. "Mary is kind." 2) An event can have a specific temporal 
location. The statement. "and on the third day He rose again from the dead," 
has the punctual aspect. 3) An event that can be considered complete. finished 
or accomplished can be expressed through the perfect aspect. The perfect 
aspect is accompanied by the imperfect and both can be used with the past. 
present and future tenses. "I had finished the test five minutes before you 
asked." "I have finished the test in the time allowed," and "I will have finished 
the test before you return" are typical examples. 4) Finally. we have events or 
actions that take place frequently or habitually. "He runs." or "I swim each 
week" are examples of the frequentive aspect (208-210). 
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We commonly differentiate our desires by saying that some are 
dispositional while others are occurrent. Like events, one's dispositional 
desires have temporal aspects. Love has, standardly, a continuous aspect. 
Dispositional liabilities like irascibility and fickleness are frequentive. 
Occurrent desires are viewed as punctual or perfect (de Sousa 210). The role of 
temporal aspect also explains the transformation of some emotions into others. 
Jealousy is often a frequentive emotion; certain conditions can tum it into 
spite. Likewise envy can be transformed into malice. Importantly, the failure 
of an important punctual desire to have its purpose completed may transform 
itself into a desire that is frequentive. Repeatedly failed resentments may 
transform themselves into ressentiment. 
de Sousa argues that the aspectual dimension of time plays two roles in 
how we experience occurrent desires. There is a temporal dimension in the 
fol.t=S of our desires, and there is a temporal dimension attached to the focal 
property of the desired object. We can view the focus of our desires by 
differentiating between immediate and time-indexed desires. Some occurrent 
desires are immediate. When my five year old says. "I want a cookie," his 
desire is immediate. He wants the cookie right away, and he believes that 
getting the cookie will satisfy his desire. Other desires are time-indexed. 
Time-indexed desires are understood in reference to some particular time (de 
Sousa 210). When we tell a student, "I want that paper finished by noon 
tomorrow," the success conditions for the object of the desire has a specifiable 
temporal location. More importantly, we can intend to realize these kinds of 
desires; they are subject to planning and execution. The focal property of the 
object has, in principle, some feature of time or timing that is relevant for 
making the object intelligible. 
The desire targets an object that should be, potentially. a satisfying 
event. We can explain how the object of a desire participates in the 
satisfaction of that desire by borrowing a set of distinctions proposed by 
Aristotle. In the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle draws distinctions among 
states. achievements and activities. Being phlegmatic, temperamental or 
irascible are states; they are viewed as passive. Winning a race, building a 
house, and writing a novel are achievements; seeing. contemplating and 
playing are activities. Achievements have starting points and specifiable 
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ends; they can be completed, but they are only achievements at the moment of 
successful completion. Activities and states, on the other hand, can last for 
periods of time, but they have no precise point of completion. Every actual 
object of a desire will fall into one these three categories (de Sousa 212). 
States can be experienced in all four aspects. The continuous aspect can 
be illustrated by, "I want to be feeling amused;" the punctual aspect. "I want to 
be amused (at some precise moment in the future);" the perfect, "I wanted to 
have been amused;" and the frequentive, "I want to be amused often." 
Activities can be experienced in all four aspects. The continuous aspect can be 
illustrated by "I want to be cycling;" the punctual, "I want to ride my bike;" the 
perfect, "I want to have had my bike ride;" and the frequentive, "I want to ride 
(daily, weekly, regularly, etc.). Achievements can experienced in three 
aspects. It is not possible to view an achievement in the continuous aspect. 
The punctual aspect can be illustrated by, "I want to finish this essay (at time 
T);" the perfect aspect, "I want to have finished this essay (at time T);" and the 
frequentive, "I want to have finished all of my essays (in a timely manner, 
etc.)" (de Sousa 213-215). 
de Sousa's analysis of aspect clarifies many confusing issues 
concerning the relationship between desiring and the object desired. It also 
provides a heuristic for quickly comprehending that relationship. One can 
construct a simple table by placing the aspects on the horizontal axis and the 
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three categories in the vertical column. Sentence frames will quickly test the 
nature of the satisfaction sought for the desire targeted and one can which 
resultant emotions will fit which aspect. But perhaps its stronger use lies in 
avoiding one dimension of the so-called hedonistic paradox: satisfaction to be 
got must be forgot. When we directly pursue pleasure we often fail to attain it. 
By recognizing the actual category where the object of desire resides, one 
recognizes the manner in which that satisfaction will occur, and the writer 
can better target one's desiderative appeal. 
Deli~htful and Distressin~ Jud~ments 
If we can target the requisite subordinate passion (or passions) 
appropriate to the relevant desire or fear directed at the matter at hand, we 
will achieve an important part of the task of articulating how pathos is 
achieved. We have already mentioned two uses for the secondary emotions. 
They may be used to create preparatory conditions for a targeted desire or 
fear, and they follow a desire or fear as resultant emotions. In fact, we have a 
class of occurrent emotions that we use to these ends. We possess a large group 
of anthropocentric emotional terms that can be explained as property-
response pairs.7 (See Table 1.) 
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For a joke to be amusing, someone must be amused by it. For the 
garbage to be disgusting, someone must feel disgusted in or by its presence. 
The property-response paired emotions can be identified by a simple 
grammatical test. All the verbals can take 'to' and all the verbs can take 'by'. 
We do not use these property terms (appalling, startling, etc.) independently 
of the responses they evoke. The conceptual relationship that operates 
between the primary and secondary passions make a difference to the 
qualitative character of the whole emotional episode we experience. That 
evocation is a crucial event when the writer wants the audience to commit to a 
particular reason in an emotional argument. 
TABLE I 
PROPERTY -RESPONSE PAIRS 
Pain or Distress 
aggravated discomforted flustered revolted 
agitated discomposed frightened scared 
alarmed disconcerted frustrated shocked 
annoyed discouraged horrified sickened 
appalled disgusted infuriated startled 
beguiled disheartened irritated stultified 
bewildered dismayed loathed stupefied 
bored distracted mystified surprised 
confounded distressed nauseated troubled 
confused disturbed perplexed unnerved 
daunted embarrassed perturbed upset 
discomfited exasperated puzzled vexed 
Pleasure or Delight 
amused contented fascinated pleased 
aroused delighted funny ravished 
beguiled diverted gladdened satisfied 
bewitched engaged gratified surprised 
captivated engrossed heartened tantalized 
charmed enticed inspired thrilled 
comforted exhilarated interested touched 
Second. we can use these emotions to further refine our apprehension 
and judgment, and these enhancements are partially internal to the 
perceptions of the participants. We can do this because we can judge the 
propriety of one half of the pair in terms of the other. Suppose a mother and 
child witness a shopper slip on the floor of the market. The child is amused 
and the mother is embarrassed by her child's reaction. In the car (if she can 
wait that long) the mother discusses what things are and are not amusing as 
well as what caused her embarrassment. Through this conversation the 
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mother hopes to improve the child's ability to discriminate what is amusing 
from what is embarrassing for another. The mother's success also depends on 
the potential funher enhancement of the dom:1in of these terms. 
The juxtaposition of an object's propenies against one's psychological 
response is not the only way to control the judgments here. We can have 
emotions about our emotions. In his first inaugural address, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt argued that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself. In a similar 
way, we can enjoy being frightened at the movies, or we may find that we are 
too afraid of being afraid. We are dismayed by our jealousy. All too 
frequently, we regret becoming angry. Part of the practical wisdom inherent 
in our proverbs exploits this kind of relationship. Proverbs frequently 
express the relationship between a second-order emotion and its target. The 
proverb, "The fear of death is to be more dreaded that death itself," works 
through comparison and degree. The proverb, "If you fear to suffer you 
suffer from fear," is an example of antanaclasis that exploits a central 
ambiguity in emotional experience. We suffer the emotions; they happen to 
us; but we also allow ourselves to undergo (suffer) them through the values 
75 
and choices we make that affect the formation of our characters. When an 
emotion is used this way it is called a second-order emotion (Rorty, Explaining 
Emotions 126). A second-order emotion exploits the attitudinal stance of one 
emotion to affect the judgments in the targeted emotion. The technique is 
simple but effective. 
Furthermore, we experience the particular emotions found in the 
genera of delight and distress in different degrees of vividness. An emotion is 
vivid in one of two ways. Being 'peeved' is less intense affectively than 
feeling 'wrath'. Being 'excited' is more intense that feeling 'amused'. 
Vividness refers to the felt intensity of the emotional episode. Eighteenth 
century writers recognized this when they refer to the 'lively passions'. Yet 
the degree of intensity, the quality of the felt response, is distinct from an 
emotion's degree of strength. the power of an emotion to make itself 
cognitively present in our perceptions and judgments. 
An emotion's intensity, its phenomenologically presented agitation or 
turbulence, is an important facet of one's affective experience. Certainly, 
emotional experiences are often recognized by their affective tone, and they 
can be marked off from one another by the relative degree of pleasure or pain 
they contain. The degree of an emotion's intensity is a function of its focus, 
that part of the emotion that turns the mind towards the object. Strength is a 
judgment about the evaluative significance of the properties of the object that 
the emotion focuses on. I want to argue that, from the point of view of 
persuasive potential, an emotion's strength is what matters. 
When we say that one acts out of fear we suggest that fear has overcome 
that individual, yet we can also say that one acts from fear (Gordon 77). It is 
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this capacity that allows us to say that fear has the ability to concentrate the 
mind. and that it does so through the strength of our judgment about the 
prospect of a future evil. The pleasurable and painful feelings that are a part 
of many emotions are an aesthetic result of the dynamics operating in the 
emotion. While they can be powerful. they are, at best, unreliable. The 
pleasure one derives in anger from imagining a future act of retaliation is, 
certainly. ambiguous. The pleasure felt in schadenfreude is no justification 
for experiencing the emotion. More to the point, however. is an idea first 
suggested by Gilbert Ryle. Curiosity, for example. is an emotion that inclines 
us to act in certain ways. Yet curiosity does not have occurrently felt qualities 
that tell us we are curious nor do they appear when we act from curiosity (93-
98). When we refer to the strength of an emotion we may refer to its causal 
ability to incline us to act in a certain way. and that capacity can be evaluated 
for its propriety, which involves a judgment about the object's significance. 
The Stoics rightly recognized the importance of an emotion's strength 
and made it a criterion in the definitions of the passions of delight and 
distress. Andronicus. a fourth century Greek anthologist. reports that "distress 
is an irrational contraction. or a fresh opinion that something bad is present, 
at which people think it is right to be contracted. "Pleasure "is an irrational 
swelling. or a fresh opinion that something good is present. at which people 
think it is right to be swollen" (Long and Sedley 411) We need not accept the 
Stoic's evaluation that distress and pleasure are categorically irrational. There 
is, certainly. a danger here; but they confuse an intrinsic judgment about an 
experience's propriety with its aesthetic function. 
The Stoics recognized another dimension of the emotional episode that 
has profound implications for persuasion involving the emotions of delight 
and distress. They called the pleasure and pain that we feel 'fresh' when that 
opinion has a certain kind of force for the agent. This freshness is usually 
thought of as temporal. In Tusculan Disputations Cicero offers an especially 
clear discussion of freshness when he argues that: 
distress is the idea of a present evil with this implication in it, 
that it is a duty to feel distress. An addition to this definition is 
rightly made by Zeno, namely that this idea of a present evil is 
a 'fresh' one. This word, however, his followers interpret to 
mean that not only, according to their view, is that 'fresh' 
which has taken place a short time previously, but that so 
long as the imagined evil preserves a certain power of being 
vigorous and retaining so to speak it greenness, it is termed 
· 'fresh.' For instance, the famous Artemisia, wife of Mausolus. 
King of Carla, who built the celebrated monument of 
Helicarnassus, lived in sorrow all her days and wasted away 
under its enfeebling influence. The idea of sorrow was 'fresh' 
for her every day, and this idea only ceases to be termed 
'fresh' when it has withered away by length of time. (3. 74-75 
While 'freshness' has temporal limits, it refers to the vigor of the evaluations 
that form a part of that emotion and are experienced as pain or pleasure. 
Grief is the emotion most frequently used in both ancient and modern 
discussions to explain the idea of freshness. When we grieve over someone 
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close to us who has died, we recognize that the fact of the death is only a small 
part of the grief. Someone of central importance, someone irreplaceable, is 
gone. Grief is the tumult we experience because all of the hopes and desires 
bound to that person are upset. The freshness of grief manifests itself as the 
evaluative belief that this death is a present evil. The loss has cognitive and 
evaluative implications that affect our judgment. The cognitive implications, 
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drawn from different parts of our lives. are those that affect our possibilities 
for a flourishing life. Thus. the propositions of what this loss entails are a part 
of our grief. and their perceived presence determines the strength of our 
grief (Nussbaum Therapy 375). 
Over time. the keenness and tumult of the loss lessens. Martha 
Nussbaum offers two interesting explanations for this loss of freshness. Just 
as memories become vague with the passage of time. the particular value of 
the lost person becomes vague. When there are no experiences to sustain and 
nourish the memory of that person. that sense of that person's presence fades 
for lack of sustenance. The second idea is more complex. Time affords us the 
opportunity to shift and restructure the values upset by that death. To the 
extent that we are able to reorder the goods and goals of our lives. the 
propositions that warrant grief lose their centrality in our thinking. The 
grief-propositions of that centrality shift their temporal persp~:::tive from a 
present evil to a past tense one (376-377). 
The power inherent in an emotion to sustain the impulse of freshness 
and thus affect the audience's judgment depends on the centrality of the good 
for one's well-being that is harmed. on the valuational importance of its 
goodness. and on the internal complexity of the emotion itself. Grief. pity and 
depression. for example. exhibit all of these criteria. Boredom. stultification 
and alarm are. by contrast. comparatively simple; and their capacity to sustain 
a sense of freshness is much weaker. In persuasion. the weakness manifests 
itself temporally. and it is this empirical observation that led Cicero to counsel 
orators to place their emotional appeals late in one's discourse. 
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Some Methods of Emotional Persuasion 
The rhetorical technique of enargia, bringing the image before the 
eyes. works by exploiting one of two features present in the targeted emotion. 
Enargia delivers the impression of a complete description. It is crafted 
through the careful selection of details. the apt use of repetition, and an 
artistic revelation of these details through precise timing. Yet enargia is more 
than clear and vivid representation; Quintilian argues that it "thrusts itself 
upon our notice" (VIII iii 61). When enargia is used as a technique to create 
salience. it exploits the perceptual potentiality of the targeted emotion. The 
audience focuses on the relevant properties of the object of the emotion so that 
the situation becomes intelligible. All of the properties necessary for creating 
salience must be presented, and each detail manifests one of those qualities. 
The properties necessary for salience are figuratively possessed by the images 
used. We say these properties are denoted by the predicative form of the 
emotion term; that is, the image is 'sad', 'pathetic', or 'disgusting'. With good 
reason, Quintilian recommends that enargia used to achieve salience should 
appear early in a text, usually as a part of the partitio. Through the technique 
of enargia the audience sees the deliberative situation, potentially, as a case of 
pity say, or one calling for anger. The salience achieved through this sort of 
enargia will serve as a starting point for deliberative concern. 
Enargia can also exploit the 'freshness' of an emotion. 'Freshness' 
refers to the force of the judgment in that emotion. When enargia exploits 
freshness, it targets the judgment. We not only see the situation as malicious 
or contemptible say. we contemplate the correctness of evaluating the 
situation through the judgment inherent in that emotion. The correctness of 
that judgment requires a further judgment about its importance or 
significance. We recognize that a judgment may be correct but peripheral to 
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one's deliberations. When enargia is concerned with freshness, it reveals the 
significance of that emotional judgment to one's deliberative aim. Like its 
perceptual counterpart, this technique requires the representation of all of 
the properties necessary for the emotion, but each image not only denotes a 
necessary property, each property also refers to the particular situation; and 
the properties selected for representation will be those that are crucial for 
seeing the significance of the emotion's judgment. With pity, for example, we 
would focus on the size of the misfortune as well as the emphasizing how 
undeserved the misfortune is. This sense of enargia can be confused with 
presumptive persuasive strategies like the ad populum and ad misericordium 
arguments. While one may use the strategy of enargia to create one of these 
arguments, it is distinct from them. The technique delivers a judgment about 
the significance of some feature of the deliberative situation that is crucial to 
the correct deliberative decision. 
The significance of an emotion is determined by its formal object. 
Although I will discuss formal objects in Chapter IV, we can say now that the 
formal object of an emotion is a secondary quality of that object, stated as a 
description, that must be apprehended as applying to the particular object of 
the emotion (Kenny 189; de Sousa 341 ). For example, the formal object of fear 
is the dangerous; the formal object of shame is truly apprehending oneself in 
situations of disadvantage as others rightly see us. William Lyons argues that 
the formal object of an emotion names an "evaluative category under which 
the appraisal or evaluation of a particular object. . .falls on a particular 
occasion"(l00). The character of this evaluation bridges the emotion and its 
object to other appropriate values by providing a sufficient conceptual link 
between a judgment delivered through an emotion and another kind of 
judgment. Thus, this technique is also used when some virtue, that has the 
targeted emotion as a part of its contents, is invoked as part of an agent's 
proper response to the deliberative goal. 
We have seen that these judgments make certain features of the 
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deliberative situation salient and important. A judgment about the importance 
of the object will, in tum, affect how we perceive the object. A judgment of 
salience or one concerning the importance of an object can be affected 
through two other approaches. Emotions have paradigm scenarios. A 
paradigm scenario is a kind of dramatic scene or image that makes the emotion 
present for the individual. More precisely, the pattern of beliefs and 
evaluations intrinsic to the emotion are often exemplified by an image or 
tableau. Guilt, for example, carries the image of a victim or an enforcer; 
shame carries the image of a watcher. Like enargia, the deliberate use of the 
imagery suggested by the paradigm scenario of the targeted emotion can help 
to invoke that emotion. This technique requires, however, an understanding 
of the audience's emotional sophistication to be effective. Clearly, we 
experience and understand the emotions at different levels of sophistication. 
As our understanding of an emotion becomes deeper, we are able to articulate 
the various attitudes present in the emotion in different ways. Bernard 
Williams observes that in cases of guilt the attitude of the internalized figure 
first appears as anger. A primitive understanding of guilt will begin as fear, 
fear at anger. Fear of anger is a later stage of development (Shame and 
Necessity 219). 
Paradigm scenarios are causally efficacious because they dramatically 
enact the several stages present in the impulse of an emotion. An emotion's 
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'impulse' is its internal motivation and this aspect has a characteristic aim. It 
orients one's stance to the object. One's stance that is present in the 
desiderative or fearful emotions moves to shape the world to one's mind. One's 
stance in the secondary emotions is brought into line with the world. The 
scenario can be used, obviously, to select or create a narrative of some kind. 
The internal dynamics of the emotion are effectively depicted through the 
narrative mode. Most commonly, perhaps. we use these scenarios to structure 
exempla. 
Rhetoricians have long recognized the two roles of perception and 
judgment. When we think of the term, ·argument from pathos', we know that 
it is a term of convenience. There is, obviously. no single pattern of 
argument. But we do typically think of a family of strategies and arguments, 
consciously extant since the classical period, which target specific emotions 
and incline the audience's feelings more or less directly. More importantly, 
these strategies work to effect a change in judgment as a consequence of the 
targeted emotion. Some of these strategies are dispositionally manifested. It 
has long been a piece of rhetorical lore that one's introduction must serve 
three functions: to make the audience attentive, to make them well disposed to 
what will follow, and to establish a sense of good will towards the writer. Each 
of these inclinations is a device of pathos. Cicero and the anonymous author of 
the Rhetorica ad Herennium offer strategies to arouse other specific emotions: 
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indignatio is the arousing of scorn or indignation; conquestio is the arousing 
of sympathy; and deprecatio is a plea for pardon, which involves the 
suspension of the causal role of indignation, anger or blame (de lnventione I 
100-109; Herennium ii 48-49, iv 66). Finally, the discussion of each of these 
strategies contains detailed advice on how to amplify or diminish the force or 
significance of the particular beliefs necessary for arousing the targeted 
emotion. This persuasive task is not so much one of motivation, even though 
the argument is motivational; these arguments appeal to a judgment about the 
audience's capacity to act. 
We also have a set of argumentative strategies that target classes of 
emotions or some specific emotion, and these arguments work to alter 
judgments as a constituent of the emotion. The ad misericordium argument 
appeals to pity. The ad baculum argument appeals to force hoping to arouse 
either fear or anger. The ad populum argument appeals to popular sentiments 
like patriotism. The normative success of these arguments depends, in part, on 
objective considerations. We can judge whether the particular object of the 
targeted emotion has the requisite properties or not. We can also judge 
whether those properties, when present, are relevant or not. Yet these 
arguments are presumptive. 8 Their pragmatic success depends, in a crucial 
way, on the beliefs and attitudes of the audience, and these may be false, biased 
or prejudiced. Even when bias is not an issue, the audience's relationship to 
the deliberative situation and their possible evaluative or participative role is 
crucial. 
We can critically evaluate presumptive arguments. These arguments 
are prone to the common fallacy of begging the question by confusing the 
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strength of the emotion with its justification. or strength can be confused with 
the fallacy of loaded questions. In his discussion of the ad misericordium 
argument. Douglas Walton argues that there are several factors that we can 
use to evaluate non fallacious emotional appeals. First. the appeal to pity must 
be examined in light of the rhetorical aim it is supposed to serve. A charitable 
appeal differs from a plea for clemency in a court of law. Second. we 
recognize that the various arguments deployed carry different weights; some 
arguments are more important than others. An appeal may be central or 
peripheral. The strength of an appeal is a measure of its potential success. but 
our evaluation must consider how satisfactory the appeal is. Satisfaction is 
measured by an argument's relevance. A practical test here involves 
imagining how difficult it would be to counter the appeal. More peripheral 
appeals. on the other hand. may be weak arguments. and this weakness may be 
measured by ranking it against the other more important issues at stake. 
When the appeal involves an argument from consequences care must be taken 
to insure that the appeal cannot be counterbalanced by considering opposite 
consequences. The final consideration is related to the first one. The need for 
enough information to evaluate the relevance of an emotional appeal carries 
with it an expectation for openness (Walton. Place of Emotion 141-142). An 
emotional appeal that is tacitly open to full public scrutiny as opposed to a 
private mailing from an interest group carries greater ethical force. 
Finally. the role of trust is crucial for deliberation. Trust involves 
reliance on someone. but it is more than mere confidence. Trust is a reliance 
placed in someone's good will. good judgment. and good decision. Thus. trust 
entails granting liberty of action to another. The trust we place in another's 
good will and judgment has a double focus. We trust them not only to do the 
right or good action, we trust them to not misuse the liberty accorded them. 
Trust or mistrust, then, grounds deliberative judgment. 9 
Two Questions of Explanation 
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The attempt to offer a theoretical explanation of how the passions and 
the emotions work rhetorically (and what · the satisfaction conditions actually 
are) has been more speculative. Although it is brief, Aristotle's analysis 
remains one of the most sophisticated. Aristotle employed a functional 
explanation to account for the change in judgment that passions effect in the 
audience. The functioning of an emotion is explained through a three-fold 
analysis: a discussion of one's state of mind, a discussion of pertinent 
considerations about the agent towards whom the emotion is directed, and an 
explanation of the role of reasons present in the emotion. Aristotle is 
concerned with the relationship between reason states and reasons in 
occurrent settings. But he is also concerned with what the occurrent emotions 
and emotional states say about the agents involved. The emotions are (fallible) 
signs of one's character and, as such, point to the voluntary aspects of one's 
character that can affect decision. He is only concerned with the operation of 
particular emotions. 
Writing in the eighteenth century, George Campbell attempted in The 
Philosophy of Rhetoric to identify those general conditions or circumstances 
which instrumentally operate on the passions. Passions are, for Campbell, 
reason states. While their force is causal, the passions are. he argues, 
amenable to normative judgments that will evaluate the significance of these 
passions as well as determine their significance. He identified probability, 
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plausibility, importance, temporal proximity, place, the persons involved, and 
the interest in the consequences as relevant conditions (77-90). His brief 
discussion is an important contribution for three reasons. First, he saw the 
possibility of offering a set of necessary conditions that would explain the 
successful use of the argument from pathos regardless of the emotion in 
question. Second, his causal explanation allowed reasons to serve an important 
role in the presence of reason states. Finally, he saw that the passions 
themselves were crucially important. In fact, he argues that the passions are 
causally involved with what he took to be our inherent concerns, self 
preservation, benevolence and sympathy. 
Campbell's claim that there are passions that embody or express our 
inherent concerns and are. thus, fundamental is his most daring claim. I want 
to suggest that there is one passion that may, in principle. serve an executive 
function within an agent's capacity to deliberate. When we deliberate we try 
to give particular answers to the more basic question of how to live. 
Deliberation is a process grounded in, guided by, and giving substance to our 
hopes. The general object of hope is a good life. Hope can be both the ground 
for our judgments and an emotion. As an emotion it is the rational expectation 
and confidence that one's life will be as rich and fulfilling as possible. Hope is 
the judgment that grounds the particular desires and ends that comprise that 
life. Hope, in this sense, is the discernment of an actual pattern or plot 
present in the aims and ends of one's life that will help bring about that good 
Iife.l 0 The particular object of hope is that good end, expressed as a decision, 
that forms the conclusion of the deliberative search. 
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But the end of our deliberations are not always hopefuL In a panicular 
situation the deliberative judgment we make may or may not recommend itself 
to an overt course of action. Often enough we judge a situation as wrong or 
unfortunate but any possible action we could take would only make matters 
worse. Other situations are judged wrong but are seen as having nothing to do 
with oneself. Our sense of agency or our willingness to engage in some kind 
of response is influenced greatly by the importance of the situation or the 
principles at stake. 
Conclusion 
The name. 'the argument from pathos'. is a term of convenience. It 
refers to a coordinated set of strategies that may be used evocatively or 
expressively to achieve one's deliberative aim. The 'argument from pathos' is 
actually a complex pattern of interdependent functions that exploit the 
cognitive structures of the emotions as well as the inner dynamics of the 
emotional episode. 
When we deliberate we begin. typically. with a problem; and the nature 
of that problem can be apprehended through the perceptual sensitivities of 
some emotion. That initial perception serves as the starting point for the 
several roles that emotion can serve in deliberation. In deliberative discourse 
this capacity for sensitive appraisal is enhanced by the traditional 
preparatory functions of one's introduction. Attentiveness serves an obvious 
operational role; being well-disposed prepares the audience's emotional 
stance. making them receptive to what will follow. But the establishment of 
good will helps to create trust. and trust is the ground of good communal 
deliberation. 
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Emotional salience, the process whereby we discern a particular feature 
of the deliberative situation in terms of some emotion, can be achieved 
through enargia. But salience involves two other functions. We perceive the 
problem from some point of view, and point of view is one dimension of 
deliberative agency. A judgment of salience also implies that there is some 
choice for good or ill that can be made. In deliberative discourse, this choice is 
conventionally presented in the thesis, and the emotional pattern of the 
argument from pathos to be deployed will be coordinate with the thesis. This 
emotional pattern utilizes the asymmetric and intrinsic connection between 
the primary emotions in the classes of desires and fears and the secondary 
emotions in the classes of delight and distress. 
The choice of the thesis and emotional pattern reflects the writer's 
appraisal of the deliberative situation, but one's choice also depends on the 
nature of the persuasive conflict. Obviously, we can and do disagree with 
others in deliberation. These conflicts are called symmetric when the 
persuasive obligations of the participants are the same; a conflict is 
asymmetric when the persuasive obligations of the participants differ. If one 
intends to argue the opposite these of her opponent the positions are strongly 
opposed. When one merely needs to raise doubts or questions about the 
opposition's thesis, but does not need to prove its opposite, then they are 
weakly opposed. It is tempting to think that this set of distinctions will map 
onto the emotional patterns in deliberation. 
They do not map this way. The persuasive obligations just distinguished 
invoke necessary conditions that conceptually demarcate one's commitments. 
In deliberation. the emotional patterns use two sets of satisfaction conditions 
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which jointly map the targeted emotions onto the world. What I have in mind 
here can be explained by borrowing a distinction from speech act theory. The 
primary and secondary emotions have different directions of fit. The aims of 
our desires and fears work to fit the world to our minds; the aims of the 
emotions in the classes of delight and distress work to fit the mind to the world. 
The pattern we find most appropriate will be the one that best fits the 
situation, and the 'best fit' will be determined by judging the sufficient 
conditions for the emotions that ground that fit.ll Those sufficient conditions 
will be evaluated through the offices of the audience's reflective equilibrium, 
and the executive emotion governing this equilibrium is deliberative hope. 
The writer typically targets one emotion for its persuasive potential to 
serve as the keystone of the total emotional appeal. If the deliberative 
problem is in the present then the writer targets one of the secondary 
emotions. When the problem is in the future, the writer targets a primary 
emotion or chooses a secondary emotion that will be used prospectively. In 
either case the writer must consider the deliberative aim as well. When 
matters of interpretation are the crucial issue one can target a secondary 
emotion. When questions of worth or action are crucial, the primary emotions 
of desire and fear become prominent. And in all cases, the nature of the good 
in question becomes a matter for persuasive appeal. Thus, the particular 
emotion to be targeted for its persuasive appeal will be chosen, in part, by its 
fit with the deliberative situation. Yet this choice also depends on one's 
audience. Because emotional persuasion is particular, the writer needs to 
understand the audience's role in the deliberative situation. The nature of this 
role may be impersonal or personal, or this role may be one of judge or active 
participant. Their potential for possible action and the kinds of agency open 
to them are further considerations that must be assessed in determining the 
nature of one's appeal. 
These complex considerations will determine the kind of appeals that 
90 
are available to the writer. their potential force. as well as offering indications 
about their most efficacious timing. These considerations can be translated 
into the success conditions that are sufficient for the appropriate use of 
evocative strategies like enargia, exempla. and presumptive arguments as well 
as for the appropriate use of the several expressive strategies open to the 
writer. 
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of Character (New York: Oxford UP, 1989) 44-50. On the idea of emotion as 
power see, L. A. Kosman, "Being Properly Affected," Essays on Aristotle's Ethics 
(Berkeley: U of Calif P, 1980) 107. 
4 In Books ill and IV of Tusculan Disputations. Cicero offers what is 
perhaps the most detailed list of the passions that the Stoics were concerned 
with. Richard Henry presents in tabular form all of the passions discussed in 
Book IV 5 in his 1905 Latin edition of the text. I reprint this list in a modified 
form: 
Desire (libido, epithumia); its opposite is rational longing 
anger 
irascibility 
hatred 
personal enmity 
contentiousness 
insatiability 
longing 
ira 
excandescentia 
inimicitia 
odium 
discordia 
indigentia 
desiderium 
Diseased Cravings (morbi, nosemata) 
avarice 
lust for fame 
ambition 
avaritia 
fixation on women 
gloriae cupiditas 
ambitio 
mulierositas 
Vicious Habits (aegrotationes, arrostemata) 
lasciviousness 
gourmandism 
alcoholism 
finickiness 
pervicacia 
ligurritio 
vinolenia 
cuppedia 
Fear (metus, phobos); its opposite is prudence 
indecisiveness 
shamefacedness 
terror 
timidity 
trembling 
hysteria 
nervousness 
faintheartedness 
A versions (offensiones, 
misogyny 
misanthropy 
inhospitality 
pigritia 
pudor 
terror 
timor 
pavor 
exanimatio 
conturbatio 
formido 
proskopai) 
odium mulierum 
odium generis humani 
inhospitalitas 
Pleasure (laetitia, hedone ); its opposite is joy 
malice 
rapture 
ostentation 
malevolentia 
delectio 
iactatio 
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Distress (aegritudo, lupe) 
envy 
competitiveness 
jealousy 
pity 
torment 
mourning 
dolefulness 
sense of tribulation 
mental anguish 
lamentation 
brooding 
annoyance 
disquiet 
hopelessness 
invidentia 
aemulatio 
obtrectatio 
misericordia 
angor 
luctus 
maeror 
aerumna 
dolor 
lamentatio 
sollicitudo 
molestia 
adflictio 
desperatio 
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5 We do not deliberate when things are going well in the present and 
for the foreseeable future; hence, there is no formal pattern for the species of 
delight. 
6 Actually, there are justificatory questions operating at two levels. 
The first level concerns whether the beliefs and judgments properly fit the 
situation towards which they are directed. This presupposes that a more 
fundamental question has been answered. Is the emotion in question itself 
justified as a feature of judgment? For a discussion of the latter sort of 
question as it relates to pity see, Martha Craven Nussbaum, "Pity and Mercy: 
Nietzsche's Stoicism," Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's 
Genealogy of Morals ed. Richard Schacht (Los Angeles: Univ of Calif P, 1994) 
139-167. 
7 An informative discussion of these emotions can be found in David 
Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?" Needs, Values, Truth ( Cambridge: Basil 
Blackwell, 1991) 185-214. 
8 These arguments and the issues or relevance and presumption are 
usefully explored in Douglas Walton, The Place of Emotion in Argument 
(University Park: Penn State UP, 1992). 
9 For an interesting and insightful discussion of the nature of trust see, 
Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1994). 
1 0 I am indebted to John Kekes for the insight that hope is temporal, 
that it is a part of the plot of our lives. See, Facing Evil (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 1990) 28. 
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II I am reasonably certain that it is a matter of sufficient conditions 
here. Is it, however, a matter of two sets of sufficient conditions, one for the 
targeted desire or fear and one for the targeted secondary emotion? This 
answer has the advantage of accounting for the fact that we can get one 
emotion right and one wrong, both right, or both wrong. This possibility 
highlights the relational power of the argument from pathos. Or, is there just 
one sufficient condition that is transitive for the pattern as a whole? The 
argument from pathos is judged by how well it maps onto the world. This 
possibility judges the cumulative power of pathos. Near misses count in 
horseshoes, but not in emotional persuasion. Or, is it a case where two 
sufficient conditions are thus jointly necessary? This approach makes the 
satisfactory use of the argument from pathos depend on its pragmatic success 
conditions. 'Necessary' here means causal necessity. 
CHAPTER ill 
IMPORTANCE, MOTIVATION, THE AESTHETIC AND THE EXPRESSIVE 
Be careful of what you wish for: you 
just might get what you wish for. 
-American proverb 
When one reflects on the nature of deliberative decision, it appears to 
be self-evident that we, in fact, do what we have the most reason to do. It 
appears plausible to express the claim this way because we want to capture 
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both the psychological and the normative nature of deliberative decision. The 
six functions of emotional persuasion can be seen as the potential ways this 
form of persuasion makes articulate the accuracy of this claim. In this 
chapter I will continue the exploration of these six functions by exploring the 
importance of what we care about, several issues of motivation, the aesthetic 
dimension of the emotions, and the expressive capacities of emotional 
experience that are open to rhetorical emphasis. Before proceeding with 
those issues we need to explore a moment what is implied by this general 
claim. By doing so, I hope to better situate the exploration of these particular 
issues. 
The claim that what we do is what we have the most reason to do appears 
to be strong because it is a formal and categorical claim. Its formal nature 
avoids the problems of substantive content at this level of articulation. Thus, 
the question of mistaken belief and self defeating principles do not arise. The 
categorical nature of the claim appears to be broad enough to account for a 
broad range of psychological explanations. The distinction between conscious 
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and unconscious reasons and motivations, for example, can be easily 
accommodated. 
Yet the claim is problematic at this formal level. One simple and 
extremely common explanation of this claim deserves comment. It is tempting 
to look at the chosen deed as conclusive evidence for the claim. Imagine that 
Marge is a teacher and mother. She has (good) reasons to teach well, and she 
has (good) reasons to care for her children. One day she faces a conflict 
between these two aims in her life. She has an important presentation at work 
that will advance her career, but shortly before the presentation she learns 
that one of her children has become painfully ill. According to this 
explanation she will do that action according to that which she has the most 
reason to do. She decides to care for the child. Two of her friends, John and 
Jane, discuss her decision: 
Jane: Why did Marge do what she did? 
John: She had the most reason to do it. 
Jane: How do you know? 
John: Look, she did it didn't she? 
John argues that what Marge does is what she has the most reason to do. What 
is actually claimed is that she has the most reason to do what she has the most 
reason to do. The claims are logically substitutable; and hence, the argument 
is circular. 
A tautologous 'explanation' is, obviously, unacceptable. Part of the 
plausibility of this claim comes from the fact that we have aims. Some of our 
aims are final aims. Final aims are normative claims of practical rationality, 
and they can be expressed formally. The desire to be rational, for example, is a 
formal aim of this sort. I want to suggest that one final aim is sufficiently 
general to be present in the various substantive theories of practical 
rationality. The philosopher Derek Parfit argues that this aim can be 
expressed as a want: 
Each person wants his or her life to go as well as possible.l 
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This aim is present in the various ideals of eudaimonia as it is made substantive 
in the classical world; it is present in the ideals of self-fulfillment, self-
actualization or self-mastery; and it is present in deontological or 
consequentialist moralities. Furthermore, every substantive theory of 
practical rationality must offer some explanation of the roles the emotions 
must play in that theory. That necessity can be felt by posing a simple 
thought experiment. What would someone be like who had no faculty of the 
emotions at all? Any answer would recognize that the emotions are necessary 
for practical rationality to function at all. Although I will make substantive 
claims that are compatible with various substantive theories, I will restrict my 
discussion of these functions of emotional persuasion to those issues that are 
compatible with matters of the formal aim. 
The Importance of What We Care About 
The third area in which the emotions play a role in deliberation 
concerns the importance of what we care about. 2 What we care about is a 
fundamental concern of our lives. As Plato has Socrates declare at the end of 
Book I of the Republic, "It is no chance matter we are discussing, but how one 
should live." To ask 'what is important' is not always to ask 'what is important 
to us' nor is it always to ask 'what we care about'. Certainly, things that are 
fundamental are important because they are primary. In short, we have 
needs. Some needs are objective; we cannot do without these goods without 
being seriously harmed.3 We need air to breathe, adequate nutrition, and 
water to drink. We still need these goods even when we have them; need does 
not always imply a lack of what is necessary. Justice. liberty. wisdom and 
courage have long been viewed as important in this sense. 
But not all important things are fundamental in this sense. We care. 
sometimes deeply, about things that are not primary; but are, nonetheless, 
those interests. projects and concerns that guide and shape our conduct. 
People care deeply about different matters; some care about family honor; 
others, their research projects or winning yacht races. 'Importance' is a 
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relational term. Obviously, one can and should ask questions about the relative 
or absolute value of the object deemed important, and these are proper and 
pertinent questions. 
We should also recognize that part of the justification for caring about 
something lies in the activity of caring itself. A crucial part pf our assessment 
here can be found by asking whether a person is justified in making 
something important to him by caring about it.4 The durative power of 
caring, being devoted to, loving, or being interested in some activity or value 
raises an important question about the role of these emotions in that activity. 
Do we care about X because it is important, or is X important because we care 
about it'? If something is valuable because we care about it we can confuse the 
telos or purpose of that value with the expression of that care or concern. Yet 
these emotions should not be viewed essentially as a means to a desired end. 
They constitute, in some significant way, a part of the importance of what we 
deem valuable. On certain occasions. 'caring' or 'loving' may name a specific 
intention or motivation. But the idea of 'caring about something' is also 
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distinct from it. If I care about two important and conflicting goals and choose 
one over the other. my care for the unchosen goal is not diminished by acting 
on my intention. 'Caring for something', in this sense. is desiderative; but the 
specific intention of caring is only an instantiation or manifestation of the 
larger concern. That is, the emotion of caring provides a partial ground for 
the desire we choose to act on. It provides the psychological and conceptual 
'bridge' between the particular desire and what is important. We desire it 
because we care about it, and we care about it because it is important to us. 
Resolving the partial circularity of this conception is a crucial question for 
giving a complete account of this aspect of our emotional life. 
Pride is one of the emotions self-assessment; it helps to coordinate the 
relationship between what we desire and those things we care about. Because 
a part of pride directs its attention to the relationship between the object and 
our evaluation of ourselves as agents, it will illustrate some of these 
complexities. To be proud may or may not involve having proud feelings. We 
can feel proud without being proud of anything in particular during that felt 
experience. To be a 'proud man' is to possess certain character traits. It is not 
just a sense of confidence in one's abilities; it is a sense that one is worthy in 
some respect. There may be a tendency in this individual to think that if he 
had to accept help from another would be to admit that he was deficient in 
some way. To be a proud man in this sense is to take pride in one's pride. 
Second, we can take pride in an accomplishment, skill or practice. One can be 
proud of having walked the Appalachian Trail nonstop; one can be proud of 
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one's skill at golf, or be proud of one's ability to read poetry with 
discrimination. That we are responsible for the achievement. skill or practice 
grounds our pride. Third, we can be proud of something or take pride in 
something. People are proud of many things: their homes, cars, boats, 
children, their community, their heritage and their nation. To take pride in 
one's home, for example, is to take pride in the fact that one owns it or is 
responsible for some property of the home (its beauty, say). What we must be 
sure about is the belief that we have the right property (being the 
homeowner) or having caused the property of the object we take pride in 
(decorating the house). 5 Fourth, 'proud' and 'proudly' can describe an action 
or gesture. Here the bearing or manner of expression carries the mark of 
pride, and we are licensed to draw an inference from the behavior to the 
emotion. 6 
One often suggested contrary for 'pride' is 'humility'. When we look for 
the contraries to these uses of 'proud' we find some slippage. A proud man 
differs from a humble one by a measure of degree between the two. But while 
we say we are proud of something we cannot say we are humble of 
something.7 The corresponding state would be one of shame. remorse, regret, 
or possibly guilt, but not one of humility. If we find we cannot perform a skill 
or practice to our satisfaction, the corresponding state may be one of humility; 
but that self valuation depends on other factors in addition to one's failure at 
competence. The failure may produce embarrassment, shame or regret. The 
failure may result in a determination to overcome the defect, borne in the 
confidence that one can achieve the requisite level of skill; and this response 
implies a pride in one's abilities, not a sense of humility. Finally, one's 
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gestures and actions need not carry any implication of one's self valuation. In 
fact, the mark of pride may serve as an indication of some insecurity on the 
part of the individual who feels it necessary to manifest such a self judgment. 
Amplification 
What we care about helps define our sense of agency in a deliberative 
situation. When we judge that we can act, we work to specify a course of action 
to take. Our emotions thus help guide us in determining not only what is 
important. but also help us discern what is the appropriate course of action to 
take. This sense of propriety is not only moral, it is aesthetic as well. The 
classical rhetoricians recognized the persuasive potential inherent in the 
issue of importance and offered several strategies to achieve this purpose. 
Aristotle argues that the topic of magnitude is one of the three topics 
common to all discourse. In deliberative discourse, for example, what is good 
is, pro tanto, more valuable than what is advantageous. The topic of magnitude 
provides those dialectical and ethical principles through whose appeal we can 
see the proportionate worth of compared goods. The several arguments in 
Plato's Gorgias that explicate the Socratic Proportion, for example, invoke 
these principles. The topic of magnitude is also closely related to the strategies 
of amplification and attenuation. 
The strategies of amplification and attenuation are those that 
strengthen or diminish the importance of an idea, argument or object. Yet the 
history of amplification is confusing and confused. In fact, T. V. F. Brogan 
warns that any discussion of amplification must explain the source of these 
confusions that have grown up with its use (Brogan and Halsall 66-67). 
Amplification can name the commonplaces of the epideictic genre, or it can 
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name the principles of inventio that govern its use. The blurring of these two 
uses is implicit in Aristotle. As Aristotle says, amplification can be form of 
praise. Praise shows superiority and superiority is one form of the honorable 
(l368a 25-28). When we praise something we commend it. Yet to commend 
something is distinct from showing the ground for that praise. Clearly, to the 
extent that one's praise cannot be justified one runs the risk of confusing the 
intensity of one's belief in something with the strength for one's belief that 
something is good. To really, really, really believe that health is good does not 
affect the truth value of the claim. To manipulate the intensity of one's belief 
in something is to affect one's adherence to that belief, but it does nothing to 
justify it. But amplification does not, standardly, work to affect intensity. To 
try to locate the source of the confusion in the ·distinction between the 
intensity of one's belief or desire as opposed to the strength of one's belief or 
desire is to mislocate the source of our explanatory problems. 8 That this, 
manifestly, is not the problem can be seen by looking at Cicero's arguments. 
Cicero recognizes the two-fold thrust of amplification in De Oratore 
when he argues that "the highest distinction of eloquence consists in 
amplification by means of ornament, which can be used to make one's speech 
not only increase the importance of the subject and raise it to a higher level, 
but also to diminish and disparage it" (Ill xxvi 104). Later in the same 
discussion, Cicero approves of Antonius' earlier discussion of laudation and 
censure, arguing, "for nothing is more effective for the development and 
amplification of a speech than to be able to use both of these [laudation and 
censure] in the fullest abundance" (III xxvii I 05). Praise and blame, laudation 
and censure do not target qualitatively different parts of the emotional 
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experience; rather, they target different aspects of the same experience. 
Amplification has two modes of achievement. It serves an expressive function 
when it is achieved through praise or blame. It also serves and evocative 
function when it works to affect a cognitive judgment about the importance of 
something. 
Both the expressive and evocative functions of amplification influence 
the strength of one's judgment in the importance of what is at stake, but they 
have different pragmatic goals. The expressive use works to affect the 
audience's attitudes towards something. The evocative use works to ground the 
audience's judgment in the importance of something. The expressive and 
evocative functions also target different aspects of the emotional experience. 
The expressive targets the focus of the audience's emotions; it directs or 
orients their reason states. Praise and blame animate and direct the attitude of 
caring towards the object of that praise. The evocative function targets the 
reasons for the audience's judgment about its importance. In short, we care 
about something because it is important. To see that importance allows the 
focus of the emotion to enlarge or shrink itself to the appropriate degree. 
In De Oratore Cicero notes that the techniques of amplification common 
to the epideictic aim can also be used with deliberative discourse. Praise and 
blame presuppose an argument from degree. Praise assumes that the good in 
question is good; blame assumes that the evil in question is eviL Praise and 
blame invoke a sufficient condition that differentiates the choice of goods or 
evils that are contemplated. An act of laudation, for example, can distinguish 
the desirable from the praiseworthy. David Hume champions this distinction 
in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals when he discusses the 
sentiment of approbation. He also follows Cicero here when he argues: 
that the sentiment of approbation, which those accomplishments 
produce, besides its being inferior, is also somewhat different 
from that, what attends the virtues of justice and humanity. But 
this seems not a sufficient reason for ranking them entirely under 
different classes and appellations. The character of CAESAR and 
that of CATO, as drawn by SALLUST, are both of them virtuous, in 
the strictest and most limited sense of the word; but in a different 
way: Nor are the sentiments entirely the same. which arise from 
them. The one produces love; the other. esteem: the one is amiable, 
the other awful: We should wish to meet the one character in a 
friend; the other we should be ambitious of in ourselves. ( 10 I) 
Home's argument is revealing. While appealing to a sufficient condition 
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within a class of judgments, it links the precise judgment with a certain sort of 
motivation. The causal role of the audience's reason state is inclined towards a 
practical aim. In a similar vein, we find more praiseworthy those traits that 
are beneficial to others over those traits useful to oneself. Mercy, justice, 
courage and fidelity are more praiseworthy than amiability, prudence, 
endurance and reliability. Censure works in a similar way. It is an attack 
against vices or offenses which must go unanswered or are unanswerable. 
Blame succeeds when it targets a vice that has an ideal type. One may also 
heighten the harms of vicious states by contrasting them with the virtues that 
serve as their contraries. Irascibility can be contrasted with gentleness; 
shamelessness, with modesty; cunning with wisdom, and so on. 
Quintilian formalized the methods for heightening the importance of an 
issue. He argues that we possess four principle methods of amplification: 
augmentation, comparison, reasoning, and accumulation. Quintilian's methods 
of inventio are not to be confused with the techniques of copia. Copia strives 
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for profluence, and profluence is not importance. Augmentation works by 
adding words, phrases or clauses that incrementally heighten the importance 
of an object by leading the argument to a climactic level. Climactic gradation 
can be enhanced by further controlling the pace of the phrasing involved. 
One may also present the issue as already being at the superlative level, only to 
superimpose a still higher degree. His fourth tactic involves claiming that it is 
impossible to conceive of a superlative condition beyond the one attained. 
Comparison seeks to manipulate the argument from degree within the genus 
in which the object is found. We saw this tactic earlier with the distinction 
between the desirable and the praiseworthy. What Quintilian calls reasoning 
is the use of arguments in such a way as to lead the audience to draw further 
inferences when the facts of the stated argument are joined with other 
arguments offered elsewhere in the text. Accumulation names the use of those 
schemes of repetition that work to focus the audience's attitude on its object in 
such a way as to reveal its importance (Quintilian VIII. iv. 1-27). 
Priority 
The strategies of amplification and, in fact, the whole issue of 
importance is governed by the topical principle of priority. The notion of 
priority is ancient and complex. I first saw the importance of priority as a 
topical principle for rhetoric in Paul Grice's discussion of its explanatory 
potential in the formation of concepts (Grice, "Reply to Richards" 92-93). His 
discussion of priority depends heavily on those of Aristotle. I have followed 
Terence Irwin's discussion of the concept of priority in his work, Aristotle's 
First Principles. 
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The concept of priority can be invoked in a wide variety of contexts and 
deployed in towards different ends. Perhaps the simplest use of the idea of 
priority is with members in a series. Spatial priority allows us to say, "Joe is 
second in line and Jack is fifth in line." and "Richmond is closer to 
Washington D. C. than Raleigh is." Temporal priority allows statements like "A 
occurred before B" and "each child has four biological grandparents." We also 
generalize the notion of priority. Priority of acquaintance partially explains 
why we move from the familiar to the unfamiliar and from the known to the 
unknown. This kind of priority also explains our movement from the similar 
to the dissimilar. 
Natural priority licenses generalizations like the whole is prior to it 
parts. Aristotle. for example. uses the concept to justify his claim that the polis 
is prior to the individual. The individual, he argues, is not self sufficient. 'Self 
sufficient' does not mean here that one is capable of survival; rather. it means. 
'able to achieve complete eudaimonia' (Irwin 122-125). The general idea of 
natural priority can be made more precise. We have cases of asymmetrical 
existential dependence: the existence of B depends on the existence of A. but 
the converse does not hold. One's rights as a citizen of the U. S. depends on the 
Constitution. but the rights of the Constitution do not depend on that 
individual's being a citizen. 
Natural priority is closely related to conceptual priority. Conceptual or 
explanatory priority is present when the explanans (the account) is naturally 
prior to the explanandum (the thing explained) (Grice 93 ). This is clearly 
present in cases of asymmetrical explanation: neither A nor B can exist 
without the other. but the existence of A explains the existence of B. and the 
converse does not hold (Irwin 81 ). Being fully human requires having the 
capacity for grammar; but having the capacity for grammar is explained by 
the fact that one is fully human, and one cannot have the capacity without 
being fully human. We also have valuational priority. Health is prior to 
exercise; exercise. an extrinsic good, is conducive to health, which is an 
intrinsic good. 
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There are several ways in which the idea of priority is relevant to 
emotional persuasion. It is here that Grice's observation about the role of 
priority in concept formation becomes relevant. Grice argues that the claim 
that A is prior to B in one dimension of priority may or may not allow for the 
possibility that B is prior to a in the same or another dimension of priority 
(93 ). The accuracy of this claim is demonstrated in the two ways in which 
priority can operate in the argument from pathos. The first way is 
comparatively simple, straightforward and, I think, obvious. By manipulating 
the temporal order of the presentation of beliefs relevant to one's assenting to 
an emotion, coupled with the matter and manner in which the audience is 
acquainted with that content, one can successfully arouse, control or dissipate 
an emotion. Whether the issue of timing or acquaintance is prior will depend 
on the emotion and the aim in question. 
The second way can be illustrated by adapting an example from Grice. 
The legal concept of guilt is conceptually prior to the moral concept of guilt. 
But we can view the moral concept of guilt as valuationally prior to the legal 
concept and argue that the legal concept ought to be couched in terms of the 
moral concept (93). 
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Semantic Depth 
Understanding the relationship between priority of acquaintance and 
conceptual priority is also vital for effecting emotional persuasion. The 
meanings of emotional terms. like moral terms. have semantic depth (Platts 
249). When we use emotion terms like pity, anger or compassion. we can do so 
because we have mastered their standard conditions of use. that is, the publicly 
accepted and consensual criteria that warrant and govern their use. Richard 
Arrington argues that because these criteria are the commonly accepted 
means governing their use, they point to the application of truth conditions 
for the situation in which the term is used. It may be that the situation does 
not warrant a judgment that A is angry (A may be irritated instead, say); they 
give us a purchase on the first step to truth conditions (138-139). 
Yet semantic depth is a broader concept that this. Two people can 
experience the same emotion directed at the same particular object. yet they 
can view it with different depths of understanding. Each can experience a 
different depth of understanding, both of the emotion itself and of the object 
viewed in terms of that emotion. A person may have a grasp of the standard 
conditions, but that grasp may be shallow or narrow. As we experience life we 
come to deepen our knowledge of what anger and pity, for example, really are. 
It is one thing to have a shallow experience of anger; it is quite another to 
have a shallow knowledge of what anger is (Arrington 138). The task of 
deepening our understanding of the emotions is not one of reinventing new 
emotional concepts for ourselves at each new stage of comprehension (these 
are different conceptions, not different concepts); it is, rather, one of 
deepening our knowledge of the public concept which gives us our 
understanding of each other (Platts 249). 
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If the conceptual depth of understanding of an emotion differs 
significantly between an author and the audience the possibility for emotional 
persuasion is correspondingly constrained. If the author's comprehension is 
far deeper than that of the audience, for example, the range of reasons 
available is shrunken and their domain of application is reduced. This 
phenomenon is a common one. Parents face this with their children; 
teachers, with their students. The possibilities for persuasion are not, 
however, eliminated. By knowing at what stage of conceptual sophistication 
one's audience is, the author can pitch the appeal to the level or to the one 
which is the next more sophisticated. The possibility of a more complex 
conception is important epistemically. If there are objective stages of 
increasing complexity, the grounds for one's appeal are not totally 
constrained by the limitations, biases and prejudices of one's audience. 
Whether the stage appealed to is adequate, or appropriate or not, relative to the 
aim in question, is, in principle, a decidable matter. 
Bootstrappin i 
Each stage of comprehension carries a different conception of the 
emotion in question. The conceptual structure of the emotion becomes 
sophisticated or complex at each successive stage. By understanding how an 
emotion moves through these stages we can develop a model which explains 
how an emotion allows itself to become progressively more structured by 
practical, social and moral concerns. 
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Although we, as rhetoricians. are not interested in constructing models 
of the emotions. we are interested in the process that produces these changes. 
The mechanism or process whereby an emotion becomes more complex (and 
thus more adequate for its purpose} is called bootstrapping. 9 It is imponant. 
initially. to distinguish the fact of one's experience from the mechanism that 
operates within it. There are experiences we undergo whereby we learn that 
our standing conception falsifies the situation under consideration; and 
furthermore, we recognize that we are now too experienced or sophisticated to 
continue to accept this conception as adequate. By reflecting on this event we 
recognize that what we previously took as the truth of that event is not its 
explanation at all. Bootstrapping is the cognitive mechanism which provides 
us with a more adequate conception of the concept in question (Williams, 
Shame 219). 
The experiences that occasion bootstrapping may or may not be some 
adventure or trauma that lies outside the normal course of one's life's events 
or is life-transforming in the sense that all of one's subsequent life organizes 
itself around that experience. Significantly, these experiences are viewed 
from some point of view or through some aspect of it. Our experiences can be 
seen, for example, as comic, tragic or farcical. Peripety, a tragic reversal 
within one's life. is life changing in this sense. In tragedy, peripety is 
accompanied by the experience of recognition (anagnorisis); this recognition 
refers to the movement from ignorance to knowledge. More precisely, it is the 
acquisition of knowledge which concerns or affects the success or failure of 
the characters in that tragedy. Another literary experience related to the idea 
of recognition is that of epiphany. An epiphany is a symbol of spiritual 
moment or state. Although Joyce does not insist on this possibility, an 
epiphany may be a moment of insight. Bootstrapping may or may not be 
involved in either kind of experience. Although it is pragmatically related, 
bootstrapping is conceptually distinct from these kinds of experiences. 
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Bootstrapping must also be distinguished from another aspect of our 
emotional experiences. Our emotions are typically comprehended in terms of 
paradigm scenarios. Emotion terms are learned by associating them with and 
using them to talk about characteristic situations where some or all of the 
objects of an emotion type are present and where some response, whether of 
pleasure or distress, desire or fear, are normal. These scenarios are obviously 
taught through our everyday encounters; but they are also taught through 
stories, the practices of one's culture and through literature (de Sousa 182). 
The idea and its consequent pedagogical power have long been recognized. 
Aristotle, for example, discusses the role of habituation so that one may learn 
how to be properly affected. What can be taught in and through a scenario 
depends on the individual's stage of development (de Sousa 183). 
Jealousy will serve as a good example to illustrate the idea of a paradigm 
scenario. Jealousy arises in a very determinant context. In his discussion of 
this emotion, Daniel Farrell asks us to suppose that at the company Christmas 
party Joe's wife, Sally, appears to be very interested in Sam. She flirts and 
teases lightly with him. Joe wants to leave, but his wife wants to stay and visit 
with Sam who seems to be playing the role of Prince Charming. It is possible 
that Joe would be jealous in this situation, but he may also be irritated, 
frustrated or even amused instead. The dramatic situation is not enough, by 
itself, to trigger the emotion. A scenario refers to the pattern of beliefs, fears 
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and desires which inform the dramatic situation. The content of the desires 
and fears can vary. Farrell asks us to consider another example. Joe, pleased 
with the publication of his new book, is part of a panel discussion at a 
conference along with Sam. Joe thinks it would be gratifying for the audience 
to acknowledge some part of his work. The attentions are directed, however. at 
towards Sam's work and ideas. Joe, the protagonist, is jealous of because a third 
person, (in this case, Sam) appears to be getting something the protagonist 
wants from a second person (in this case the audience). 
The protagonist in a jealous scenario has rather specific desire and 
beliefs. In the case of sexual jealousy, the protagonist desires to retain the 
affections of another and fears that those affections are being given to 
another. In the case of professional jealousy, the protagonist desires the 
esteem or admiration, say, of another, but fears that that esteem is being given 
to another (Farrell 527 -529}. We internalize the pattern of this scenario; and 
when that pattern is confronted in life, the emotion can be experienced. But 
not all situations fit the scenario we have adopted. The resultant dissonance 
experience can create the impetus for bootstrapping to alter the scenario to 
encompass new situations. 
In his work, Shame and Necessity, Bernard Williams discusses how 
bootstrapping works in the emotions of guilt and shame (219-223). The 
emotions of guilt and shame have paradigm scenarios, but they are not as 
determinate as jealousy. Guilt and shame work as they do because each 
involves an internalized figure. The internalized figure in guilt is a victim or 
an enforcer. At its most primitive level guilt presents itself in a certain way. 
The internalized figure has the attitude of anger and the subject's reaction is 
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fear. At this primitive level. guilt is fear at anger. Fear at anger expresses a 
consequential relationship. In time. we come to see that we can predict that 
consequence as following our actual or proposed actions. Fear at anger 
becomes fear of anger. Anger becomes personified at this point. When the 
enforcer is represented as an authority figure like a parent. this 
personification licenses the anger to appear as the possibility of a loss of love. 
As the conditions of anger are explored the internalized figure becomes more 
abstract. Guilt comes to be experienced as fear of recrimination. This stage of 
reaction then comes to limit its scope to justified recrimination. As the 
internalized figure becomes more abstract. the imaginative distance between 
the victim and the enforcer shrinks so that the enforcer in the emotion is 
experienced as the moral law. which has become a part of the subject himself. 
Shame also involves an internalized figure. The internalized figure is a 
watcher or witness. Shame lies in the recognition that we are seen at a 
disadvantage and this disadvantage is understood as a loss of power. Our 
consciousness of this loss is. early on. caused by the presence of a witness to 
the relevant situation. But the witness need not be actually present for shame 
to be felt. When the witness is literally absent. the sense of loss is still 
perceived through the eyes of another. The possibility for bootstrapping 
arises because ethical content can be present in the given situation. 
The internalization of the paradigm scenario explains how. in part. the 
mechanism of bootstrapping can move the individual into a deeper 
understanding of an emotion and its conceptual complexity. Bootstrapping 
explains how an individual alters the extension of the term and successively 
refines the intensional components of the term's meaning. 
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Motivation 
In the Elements of Rhetoric Richard Whately offered a psychological 
account to explain the relationship between reason and desire. He found that 
two conditions must be satisfied, "for in order that the Will may be influenced, 
two things are requisite: ( 1) that the proposed Object should appear desirable; 
and (2) that the means suggested should be proved to be conducive to the 
attainment of the object" (Part II chapter 1 ). It is not hard to see what is 
attractive in this account. Some form of calculation is possible only when the 
object is, in principle, attainable. But not all practical arguments depend on 
antecedent reasons in the way Whately's account suggests. It is one thing 
when we are hungry to desire fried chicken and know we can buy it at the 
grocery down the street; it is quite another thing to discover that it will satisfy 
our hunger because it is on the table before us. Not all satisfaction of desires 
will be antecedently determined. Whately also gives clear expression to a 
dominant conception of motivation. A desire is seen as a two-term relation 
between the agent and what is desired. This relation is explained in terms of 
an attitude that is present between the agent and the desired object. To explain 
one's desire is to offer a causal account. 
Many of the passions and the emotions are powerful determinants in 
motivation. At least two classes of emotions, namely, our desires and fears, are 
so understood because the potential inherent in their aim can move or induce 
us to act in a certain way. We can define 'motive' as "the deliberate cause or 
candidate for such a cause for human action" (Lyons 163). The term 
'motivation' denotes that set of possible causes of . voluntary human behavior 
(Lyons 163). To ask for a motive is to demand a causal explanation of an action. 
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It is tempting to think that it is legitimate to ask for a motive only in 
nonstandard cases. After all, some requests for motives are superfluous (Lyons 
163). We do not ask a thirsty runner why she removed the top of her water 
bottle not because the request is conceptually inappropriate; rather, it is too 
obvious to warrant such a question. Yet we should not ignore the pragmatics 
of asking this question. It is reasonable for people ignorant of a particular 
practice, football say, to ask why the quarterback passed on third and seven. A 
question concerning motivation in this instance can be an efficient strategy 
for understanding the strategic possibilities inherent in a particular offense. 
Likewise. to ask oneself about one's motive is a common initial test of 
presumptions. 
To ask the motive of an action is to request a cause, but not all causal 
statements name motives. The statement, "Sally fell because she broke her 
ankle," names a cause that is not a motive. Anthony Kenny argues that we can 
see the range and vagueness of this concept by recognizing that motive-words 
can be tentatively located by testing them in sentence frames. Motive words 
can complete: I) "She acted out of_," 2) "_ made him do X," 3) "She did X 
because she was _," and 4) "His motive in doing X was __ ." Some ideas can 
fill all four frames. Greed, gratitude, ambition, despair, anger, desire and fear, 
among others, can serve as motives. Carelessness may make me misspell a 
word, but we do not say that carelessness was the motive of my misspelling 
(Kenny 85-86). A motive names a sufficient cause; but it is a cause that is, in 
some important way, deliberate. 
The notion of 'deliberate action' is subtle because it does not require that 
we see motivating reasons as producing satisfaction in any conventional 
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sense. Suppose that Jane is driving down a steep hill with a deep embankment 
immediately adjacent to the road. A panel truck is in the opposite lane. 
Suddenly a deer jumps in front of the car. She can swerve right and drop 
down the embankment, swerve left and hit the truck, or she can hit the deer. 
She chooses to hit the deer. She does so deliberately, but it is not quite right to 
say that it was her intention to hit the deer. Her intention was to avoid both 
the truck and the embankment. Nor do we say she hit the deer on purpose, if 
purpose implies some kind of accomplishment or performance. She was not, 
after all, seeking provender. A motive offers a sufficient cause for an action 
in the sense that it names a particular kind of reason for that action. 
Motivational Specification 
In the Introduction I argued that one of the stages of deliberation 
involves specifying the action to be taken, and in Chapter II I argued that 
one's desires have two levels of articulation--first order and second order 
desires. The second order desire is the agent's effective desire, the desire the 
agent wants to want. For a second order desire to be effective several success 
conditions have to be satisfied. To claim that the agent wants to want to X 
implies that the agent is willing to bring that end about. To will to bring the 
end about is to coherently intend to do so. Immanuel Kant recognized the 
importance of willing with the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives: 
Who wills the end wills (so far as reason has a decisive influence 
on his actions) also the means which are indispensably necessary 
and in his power. So far as willing is concerned, this proposition 
is analytic: for in my willing of an object as an effect there is 
already conceived the causality of myself as a working cause--that 
is, the use of means; and from the concept of willing an end the 
imperative merely extracts the concept of actions necessary 
to this end. 
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Actually. the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives is only one principle of 
coherent intending. It takes more than willing the conditions necessary for 
the end. Onora O'Neill argues that there are at least five other principles that 
must be observed. It might be helpful to see these principles as the volitional 
counterpart to the topical principles of workability and feasibility in policy 
deliberation. The topics of workability and feasibility work to secure a 
coherent plan of action to reach a goal; these principles work to guarantee 
coherent intending. 
First. one must intend not only the means necessary, but one must will 
some sufficient means to what is fundamentally intended as well. I could 
intend to exercise for health, yet not intend to perform specific exercises 
because no exercise by itself is indispensable to becoming healthy. Second, 
one must seek to make those necessary or sufficient means available when 
they are not present. One can coherently intend form one's secondary 
students to learn to write well but do nothing on the grounds that there are no 
state approved rhetorics or effective guidelines available for use. Third, one 
must look not only for the means, but one must also intend all of the necessary 
and some sufficient components of that end. Fourth, one must see that the 
specific intentions present in our desire are mutually consistent. Finally, one 
must see that the specific intentions adopted are consistent with the 
underlying intentions (O'Neill 169-170). 
Certainly. these success conditions are necessary for insuring that a 
practical desiderative goal will be reached. When we consider the question of 
desire in deliberation we recognize that a two-term relation is explanatorily 
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inadequate because it is incomplete. Deliberation is of ends. To explain 
motivational desire in deliberation we need a three term relation between the 
agent, what is desired and the sake for which the object is desired. I 0 The third 
element in the relation specifies what kind of desire is present because it 
makes clear what the choice is for. 
We can better understand this three term relation by examining the 
kinds of desires we have. 
Kinds of Desires 
We have already mentioned that our desires and fears name those 
classes of emotions that can serve as motives for our actions. The term 'desire' 
names an appetition or striving for an apparent and future good, and 'fear' 
names the avoidance or shrinking from an apparent and future evil. One 
venerable way of understanding our desires is by classifying them by their 
objects. We have desires seeking the satisfaction of our appetites, and there 
are sexual desires. We also classify desires according to the characteristic 
quality of their motivations. One's motive may be honorable or dishonorable, 
noble or base, and so on. Emotions like pride and shame figure prominently 
here. We have desires for the good, where we are concerned with intrinsic 
goods like health, justice and courage. 
More contemporary classifications of our desires seek to classify them 
by more formal criteria rather than through their substantive content. We 
can classify our desires by the character of their reasons. We have subjective 
desires. Subjective desires can be characterized as preferences; they are those 
we do not mind thinking of as changing.ll One must not conflate 'subjective' 
with 'non cognitive'. Subjective desires can and do have reasons; non 
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cognitive desires have no reasons.l2 In the previous chapter these reasons 
were characterized as 'reasons for' acting. The reasons provided for these 
desires are agent-relative. By this we are claiming that the reason for this 
desire may not serve as reason for someone else. My reason for acting is tied 
to my aim; another person may have the same reason if his aim is coincident 
with mine. If my aim changes my reason disappears. 
Subjective desires are contrasted with objective desires. In these cases, 
the reason for a desire is not tied to any point of view. In the previous chapter 
these reasons were characterized as public 'reasons to' act. Derek Parfit 
illustrates this idea by asking us to imagine a case where we claim that there is 
a reason to alleviate another's suffering. I 3 This reason is objective if it is a 
reason for everyone; that is. if anyone is in a position to relieve that 
suffering. it is a reason to do so. These reasons are agent-neutral. Objective 
desires include desires for intrinsic goods, that is, those things which are good 
in and of themselves; moral goods such as courage. temperance and justice; 
and inherent goods, those things which are good because the experience of 
them or the contemplation of them is rewarding in itself. Before turning to 
the third kind of desire, it will be helpful to make two other points about these 
two kinds of desires. All reasons are tied to an agent, time and place. Thus. it is 
possible for two people to share a common aim, but only one of the two is 
capable of bringing about that aim. This kind of relativity is common to both 
agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons and is no objection to the distinction. 
Significantly. the second order desires in both subjective and objective desires 
can be expressed positively or negatively. One can want a first order desire to 
continue, and one can want a first order desire to end. 
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Ronald de Sousa argues that there are self-related desires. He argues 
that these desires have as their aims those things which are necessary for 
defining who we are, or our self concept will be undermined. The candidates 
for these desires are important because "of what having the desire means to 
our self concept." 14 Self-related desires can be objective or subjective. The 
vinues are objective desires; they desire the good, but they also help to define 
who one is. One's self-related desires can strive for a demonstrated quality of 
motivation and performance. This notion is expressed in Shakespeare's 
Richard /l: 
The purest treasure monal times afford 
Is spotless reputation; that away. 
Men are but gilded loam or painted clay. 
A jewel in a ten-times-barred-up chest 
Is a bold spirit in a loyal breast. 
Mine honour is my life; both grow in one; 
Take honour from me. and my life is done. 
(1, I. 1. 177) 
But not all self-related desires are of this sort. Self-related desires are 
manifested in the passionate pursuits of one's life. People are passionate about 
many things: birding, running, coin collecting, Elizabethan poetry. These 
desires are not objective in the sense above. They can be, nonetheless. vital to 
one's sense of well-being (de Sousa 180). Finally, the formal objects of a 
pattern of particular desires can be coordinated by an executive self-related 
desire. Arrogance, vanity and an insensitivity to others can suggest a desire 
that the sense of one's importance be made manifest and expressed to others. 
The Aristotelian Principle 
The concerns, wants. desires and fears invol_ved in deliberation are 
subject to another condition: the characters of the deliberating agents. 
Deliberation is not only practical; it is particular as well. The capacities and 
abilities of the individuals involved place limitations on each act of 
deliberation. Questions of physical. emotional and intellectual maturity. 
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education and skills must also be reckoned with. Deliberative discourse 
invulves more than one agent. The potential for cooperation and consensus is 
juxtaposed to conflicts of need or competitive interests. These contingencies 
constrain the range of options open to the deliberative search. Finally. the 
individuals who participate in the deliberative search do so from the point of 
view of their own conceptions of individual and communal goods. Each 
deliberative decision is judged for its adequacy in the particular search and 
for its contribution to one's destiny. 
The rational desire to see that the particular deliberative decision 
contribute to the larger question of how one should live must take into account 
one general principle concerning human motivation. This principle is 
implicit in several arguments in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. He argues 
that virtue is a kind of excellent functioning. What is good in the exercise of 
the particular virtue at a particular time is what is really good for that 
individual as an individual. This teleological account has a double perspective. 
The exercise of the virtues strives for external goods. achievements. successful 
performances and the like. and they strive for goods internal to the agent. 
Acting from or through these excellences is constitutive of the practice they 
form a part of. and these internal goods are only recognized by the experience 
of participating in the practice in question (Macintyre 188-189). Second. 
Aristotle argues that the pleasures and enjoyment one experiences are the 
result of appropriately and successfully exercising our developed capacities. 
Finally, he argues that our satisfactions increase as our developed capacities 
become more adequately developed. 
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John Rawls argues that there is a principle of motivation that can 
account for the structure and primacy of our desires and wants. He calls it the 
Aristotelian Principle, and he defines it as, "other things being equal, human 
beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained 
abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized" 
(426). The principle helps to explain several features of human motivation. 
First, the Aristotelian Principle provides a strong counter argument to 
Jeremy Bentham's notorious dictum that pleasure is merely quantitative. If he 
were right then we would agree that from this standpoint concerning 
pleasure playing pushpin is no different from playing chess. The principle 
helps to explain how qualitatively different kinds of pleasures and enjoyments 
possess different degrees of strength in one's activities. Chess is inherently 
more rewarding than pushpin because it requires the exercise of more 
complex and developed capacities. Skills are technical performances; 
practices are activities that incorporate those skills. To become a sawyer is to 
possess a technical skill in the accurate cutting of wood; to be a cabinetmaker 
is to practice a complex set of skills to a more inclusive end, where the 
attainment of the goal, a cabinet say, is an instantiation of the end of this 
practice which is rewarding in itself. The practices we participate in are more 
complex, possess more variety and are more satisfying than the simpler skills 
that form a part of that practice. 
As one's skills and abilities develop and are cultivated, the demand for 
greater satisfaction in the performance of those abilities develops as well. 
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Abilities become capacities for the exercise of the practices in which they are 
performed. This pattern is present in the technical and operational skills we 
develop, and it is present in our emotional life as well. It is present in our 
emotional life because one's emotions are interdependent. To see a change m 
the domain where pity is appropriate is to see a corresponding change in the 
domain of one's fears. This, in tum, affects the governing attitude of 
compassion making it more responsive to new situations. The new capacity 
inherent in the attitude of compassion realigns the other particular emotions 
coordinated by this emotion. It also works at a deeper level. One's objective 
desires change in priority as the motivational strength for them becomes 
more appropriate and thus more realized. One's self-related desires also 
become situated among the objective desires that we cultivate. 
Finally, the Aristotelian Principle helps to causally explain how the 
emotions can form a part of the virtues as well as the role the emotions play in 
the formation of that virtue. It also explains the causal role of one's 
governing emotional dispositions. I will explore these issues in the next two 
sections. I will discuss the role of fear in courage and then I will discuss 
several motivational liabilities that many among us are prey to. 
Coura~e 
That the emotions affect our sense of agency can also be understood in 
terms of the virtues or excellences that we cultivate. Aristotle argues that a 
virtue is a dispositional state of excellent practical functioning involving 
decision. These excellences may be ones of intellect or character. Each virtue 
possesses a distinctive range of actions, motives, feelings and capacities (1105b 
20). 'Feelings' denote the appetites, anger, pity, fear and the like; 'capacities' 
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denote "what we have when we are said to be capable of these feelings" (ll05b 
25). I want to explore a moment how this 'capacity' changes as we come to 
acquire a virtue because it has ramifications for the role the emotions have in 
defining both importance and motivation. 
Courage is a virtue manifested in action. Courage is a form of deliberate, 
practical reasoning occurring in adverse, dangerous and painful 
circumstances that ends in deliberate, sensible and appropriate moral action 
intended for some good end (Walton, Courage 2, 27). Frequently, what is done 
in courage is supererogatory. The action is voluntary, and it is neither seen as 
obligatory nor forbidden. We do not blame as wrong those who don't perform 
such actions. The act is morally good both m its intended consequences and as 
an intrinsically valuable action. Finally. the act is done for another's good and 
it is seen as meritorious (Walton, Courage 21 ). 'Meritorious' carries two 
implications: the act is morally meritorious. but it is also carries an aesthetic 
judgment as well. Aristotle's observation that an act of courage is done for the 
sake of the noble and is thus fine is echoed by Hemingway's characterization 
of courage as grace under pressure. 
The danger and difficulty of the circumstances out of which and 
through which the courageous deed is performed names one necessary 
condition for courage. The arguments of Aristotle are helpful here. He argues 
that courage lies in a mean between the two emotional capacities of fear and 
rashness that form its extremes.l5 Fear is a deficient state of perception and 
judgment that apprehends the danger as overwhelming and harmful and thus 
characterizes our capacity to act as too weak to be effectual. Overcoming one's 
fear when it is present may be seen as a kind of forbearance and is, thus, like 
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endurance. A focus on this condition can suggest that courage is a kind of 
endurance, but as Plato argues, endurance can be foolish.I6 The perceived 
need to overcome one's fear may manifest itself as a desire to avoid shame. An 
act done because one believes to not act so would be shameful may appear 
outwardly as courageous. Shame is an extraordinarily complex emotion and 
judgment, but the prospect of shame as a motivation fails because the impetus 
of the desire is grounded in the judgment of others and is not properly self 
originating. 
Similarly, a bold deed done from anger may also outwardly resemble a 
courageous one, but it is not courageous. Anger is a defiant protest against 
some act of contempt or belittling. As an emotion of self-assessment. anger is 
self regarding and thus fails as the proper motivation. Anger fails for another 
reason. A courageous deed calls for a careful presence of mind. As Douglas 
Walton puts it. the mind of the courageous person is the eye of the storm (2). 
Finally. the courageous action has a morally worthy intention as its 
good. Courage requires intentional action, and an act of great risk is not, by 
itself, courageous. Foolish risk taking is not courageous because it follows 
from the wrong kind of judgment. Temperament names part of our deep seated 
propensities and traits such as excitability and daring, and these are matters of 
temperament. An action emanating from bravery does not qualify. If bravery 
is an innate capacity, people can be more or less brave. Brave deeds are 
possible for only those who possess it. Unlike bravery, courage can be 
cultivated. Finally, courage does not arise from a bent for rashness. Rashness 
is a kind of false judgment that diminishes the risk inherent in the situation 
by falsely over valuing our capacity to act. 
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Aristotle claims that the virtues, including courage, can be cultivated. 
His comments on the habituation of virtue are, however, frustratingly vague. 
I want to explore for a moment the role of fear in the cultivation of courage 
because it bears heavily on the question of the importance of emotional 
perception and judgment. To do this I will adapt and modify an argument made 
by Eugene Garver about how we acquire virtues to explore the role of the 
emotions in the virtues. He argues that the acquisition of a virtue requires 
three stages. I 7 
Our popular use of the notion of 'courage' often conflates its meaning 
with two different concepts. An agent who takes scrupulous care to perform a 
difficult duty is sometimes called 'courageous'. Whether this judgment is 
legitimate depends on the supererogatory nature of the act relative to the duty 
in question as well as the circumstantial difficulty of its performance. More to 
the point, we sometimes call 'courageous' those acts that are performed in 
defense of one's self respect or well being. In its simplest conceptual 
expression, 'courage' in the defense of one's self respect or well being is 
deemed a valuable technical means to an extrinsic end. The middle schooler 
facing the bully shaking down kids for their lunch money wants to be left 
alone. The student who decides to stand up to the bully may reason in one of 
two ways. The student can say, "If I stand up to the bully tomorrow, I'll get to 
eat lunch." Here the student sees an individual act of 'courage' as sufficient to 
end the harassment. The student could also reason, "Standing up to bullies 
generally works, so tomorrow I'll stand up to him." Here the student sees 
courage as a likely means to ending harassment. This kind of reasoning 
involves the instantiation of a principle, a principle inductively arrived at. 
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The goal in both deliberative scenarios is to be left alone; an act of 'courage' is 
valuable only as a means to achieve that security. 
Similarly, the fear felt by the student is viewed extrinsically (Garver 
480). The fear 'happens' to the student; it is externally caused in the way we 
think that blisters are caused by ill fitting shoes. This stance towards one's 
emotional state allows the student to consider his fears as controllable by 
technical means, and the student's deliberative imagination allows him the 
opportunity to predict what the bully will do to intimidate him and how he can 
respond. The evaluation of one's fear is limited to its potential role in the 
performance necessary to achieve this goal. Two further observations need to 
be made. The misdescription of an act of self respect as an act of courage does 
not affect the character of how fear is handled. In fact, I think it is probable 
(but will not argue here) that a strong sense of self respect is a precondition 
for the capacity to behave courageously. 
Let us suppose that the middle schooler fails in the first attempt to stand 
up to the bully. After a period of anxiety and continued fear, the student 
decides to stand up again. If the goal in this reassertion is the same as before, 
then the student's desires remain instrumental. If, however, the goal is to 
overcome the fear felt; then a new stage has begun, and the process of 
internalizing the virtue of courage has commenced. The goal in standing up 
to the bully has ceased to be purely extrinsic, and a new goal has been added. 
The new goal, controlling one's fear, has become valuable in itself (Garver 
480). This new goal is possible because we have self-related desires. Self-
related desires are those that are concerned with who we are and who we wish 
to become. Being fearful is now seen as something we allow ourselves to 
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experience. As the character of the desire changes. the character of the 
action changes as well. The difference is most readily apparent in what is 
found satisfying. In the first stage the student successfully routs the bully by 
acting courageously. The action is a kind of performance. It is the sense of 
security that is satisfying, not the act of achievement. In the second stage. the 
student sees that in acting courageously two things happen. The bully is 
routed as a consequence of the action. and the student sees that he has 
overcome his fear as a result. Results are intrinsic to an action; consequences 
are extrinsic. We argued earlier that courageous actions are judged morally 
good for their intended consequences as well as being intrinsically valuable. 
This stage makes articulate that distinction. even though it does not specify its 
content. 
Significantly, fear has now become normative at this stage. The 
psychological state of being fearful is inherently bad; its experience is 
painful. Fear itself has also changed. It is seen as intrinsically bad because it 
is, by itself, sufficient to block an intrinsically good state. The normative 
value of fear changes the normative value of acting courageously. Courage is 
no longer solely an instrumentally valuable means to success; it is 
intrinsically valuable because it is sufficient to overcome fear. Acting 
'courageously' is now a kind of achievement. 
We are now ready to turn to the role of fear in courage. Cowardice is 
often thought to be the opposite of courage.l 8 Cowardice is a failure to 
overcome one's fears when one believes or knows that the action blocked by 
that fear ought to be done. This implies that courage must invoke an act where 
the agent overcomes one's fears. This excludes another class of 
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supererogatory actions where fear is not present. Are acts of fearlessness that 
fit the requirements of courage not courageous? Certainly, reckless and 
foolish acts that have happy outcomes are not courageous; such acts are lucky. 
But these cases are not the real problem. Fearlessness has two opposites and 
both are called 'fear'. We can be fearful or fearless when we face a dangerous 
situation. The circumstances can arouse fear. Courage calls for fortitude in 
the face of this kind of fear. The corresponding state in fearlessness is 
characterized as being 'resolute' or 'intrepid'. But we can also experience fear 
as a part of our deliberations. We fear that we may make the wrong decision. 
Courage calls for deliberate and careful action and fear here may be felt as an 
emotion or as a kind of attitudinal judgment. Audacity describes this capacity 
in a state of fearlessness; composure describes this capacity in courage. 
Courageous acts display a mastery of these fears, not just a control over them. 
Fear now constitutes a part of the structure of courage. 
Motivational Disabilities 
Not all kinds of motivation are desiderative as has been suggested above. 
Each of us is prone to susceptibilities or states that are seen descriptively and 
normatively as liabilities. These qualitative states are 'passive' in the sense 
that they happen to us. They can manifest themselves in one of two ways. 
Some are seen as part of our character. Each of us possesses some dispositional 
habits of temperament or mind that are morally or practically problematic. 
These dispositional qualities can and do cause harm to others and oneself. 
These habits are vices. A vice is an unchosen habit. We do not choose to 
develop the vice, yet we have developed them through the history of the 
situations we have encountered and through the choices we have made 
individually in each of them. Many vices are flaws in one's character. 
Cruelty, misanthropy, hypocrisy, snobbery, and treachery are common 
examples. I 9 
Others are patterned responses to the conditions of life we all face. 
Insensitivity is a vice concerning our emotional capacity to recognize how 
each of us is vulnerable to the fact that the goods of our lives are often only 
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contingently available. Insensitivity implies a lack in the capacity to discern 
what is salient. The insensitive person may be unkind, mean, uncaring, 
merciless. unmerciful, unsympathetic. or hardheaded. Insensitivity may also 
be social or aesthetic. The insensitive person may be unaware, uncultivated, 
uncultured. unsophisticated, or philistine. Selfishness, in part, is a 
commitment to expedient means of securing the goods of one's life. The selfish 
agent's commitment to expediency admits of degrees and takes many objects. 
The emotional states range widely. The selfish person may be egoistic and self 
indulgent; greedy, avaricious or grasping; covetous; stingy, ungenerous or 
uncharitable.2 0 
One of the classical senses of pathe names the symptomatic 
manifestations of how we respond to the circumstances we are confronted 
with. Phobias are clear cases of pathe as passive qualities. Many pathe, as 
dispositionally manifested passive qualities, involve the relationship between 
volition and emotional response. Peevishness, irritability, irascibility and 
petulance are emotional conditions that its owners are susceptible to in the 
proper circumstances. Failures of temperance can shade into willfulness. 
People who are unruly, intractable, willful or headstrong are liable to react in 
characteristic ways when some authority asserts itself. Not all dispositional 
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responses of this sort exhibit a fixity of response. Willfulness has as its 
opposite a failure of resolve. Some people are vacillating, irresolute, faltering, 
and fickle. While such conduct resembles moods, they are forms of 
dispositional or habituated reticence occurring at or around the moment of 
decision. All of these emotions are dispositional in the sense that those who 
possess these qualities tend to act in predictable ways. While they may be 
habits of mind or temper, they are not virtues; these qualities are not 
cultivated for their intrinsic worth. The more common types of these passions 
are listed in Table I. 
TABLE 1 
DISPOSffiONAL LIABILITIES OF Wll.L AND EMOTION 
bilious 
cantankerous 
captious 
choleric 
contentious 
churlish 
antagonistic 
belligerent 
froward 
headstrong 
imperious 
capricious 
desultory 
diffident 
dithering 
faithless 
Failures of Temperance 
dyspeptic 
fractious 
fretful 
high strung 
ill natured 
iracund 
irascible 
irritable 
malcontented 
moody 
peevish 
petulant 
Willfulness 
implacable 
inimical 
intractable 
merciless 
mulish 
obstinate 
pervicacious 
pitiless 
pugnacious 
quarrelsome 
Failures of Resolve 
fickle 
fitful 
flighty 
frivolous 
impulsive 
inconstant 
indecisive 
insecure 
irresolute 
mercurial 
querulous 
quick 
tempered 
shrewish 
splenetic 
thin skinned 
waspish 
rancorous 
refactory 
restive 
stubborn 
spiteful 
pixyish 
spasmodic 
unreliable 
unstable 
vacillating 
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While they are not cultivated for their intrinsic worth, we have long 
recognized the causal importance of these central traits of temperament. The 
literary genre of the 'character' has ancient beginnings. Theophrastus' 
Characters is the earliest example of this genre. Chaucer's character studies in 
the "General Prologue" in The Canterbury Tales are notable examples. Richard 
Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy, La Bruyere's Les Caracteres, John Earle's 
excellent Microcosmography, Samuel Butler's Characters, and Thackerey's 
Book of Snobs offer a range of this genre. Whether the study presents a 
psychological type (the pugnacious man) or a social type (the antiquary), the 
study's success depends on an idea best expressed by C. L Stevenson. Certain 
traits of temperament, he argues, are magnetic. Just as iron filings align 
themselves around and towards the poles of a magnet, dependent emotions 
align themselves in relation to this central trait. Not only does this 
observation help explain the relationships present between the central 
emotion and its subordinate emotions, it also helps explain how the 
subordinate emotions coordinate with each other. This observation helps to 
explain the degree to which the subordinate emotions depend on the central 
trait, which in turn explains the degree of freedom a person's emotional 
response possesses. These central traits have motivational force, sometimes 
dominatingly so. They are desiderative only in a formal sense. The trait is 
causally efficacious and the control it exercises over one's other practical 
judgments provides a simulacra of justification. Kenneth Burke's pentad is a 
particularly acute heuristic for analyzing these magnetic dispositions. 
Often these governing dispositions or traits .magnetize the purposes that 
that individual tries to keep hidden. Like a bar magnet, the trait has two poles. 
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One pole coordinates the agent's feelings and motivations towards others; the 
second pole further inclines and directs the motivations in those emotions 
towards the agent's own purposes. One can use this distinction to differentiate 
quite similar traits. John Earle's analyses in Microcosmography. arguably the 
finest work in this genre. do just that. We can illustrate this subtlety through 
an example of his analyses. With acute insight he discerns and articulates. for 
example. the characters of and the purposes hidden in three closely related 
character types: the complimental man. the partial man. and the flatterer. All 
are dishonest individuals who prey on the good will of people who seem to 
have power and influence. Each judges others for their benevolence; each 
manipulates language, in particular. praise; and each acts with calculated self 
interest. 
The complimenter is insincere and insubstantial. Amiable in manner 
and complimentary in praise. his words have no substance. His promises are 
general and empty. There is no connection between what is spoken and what 
is meant. Earle argues that "no man gives better satisfaction at the first. and 
comes off more with the eulogy of a kind Gentleman till you know him better, 
then you know him for nothing" (38). The partial man is the opposite of a 
defamer. A defamer speaks ill falsely; the partial man speaks well falsely. He 
constantly compares people and the weight that tips the scale is his own 
affection for one over the other. Yet his praise of others is but a vehicle for 
praise directed at himself. He appears affectionate towards others but only to 
be esteemed as affectionate. His affection and his praise are used to cozen 
others (Earle 78-79). The flatterer is one who deceives through seeming 
affection. calculated attention and manipulative laudation. By praising one's 
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excess of virtue he seeks that vice "of which he may make use." in order to 
"possess you from yourself' (Earle 49). Each of these individuals lacks a sense 
of completeness that is necessary for being a self-sufficient individual. This 
insufficiency is made up for through the need to ingratiate. In fact. they 
differ according to the purposes and manner of their ingratiation. 
Motivational Push and Motivational Pull 
Throughout the discussion of motivation in this chapter and the 
previous one. I argued that an understanding of the cognitive structure of the 
emotion in question will yield possibilities for effecting persuasion. These 
possibilities were explored through sets of distinctions that specified the 
relevant causal condition for that part of the emotional experience. These 
distinctions articulated different kinds of reasons operating in the emotions. 
Desires, for example. have a dual structure. One's first order desires are 
governed by one's second order desires. The causally efficacious reason 
instantiated in the second order desire can be a reason to act or a reason for 
acting. Thus. these normative reasons can be impersonal or personal. 
Likewise. we distinguished between the kinds of reasons operating in one's 
fears. Epistemic reasons appraise what is possible or likely in the situation; 
and attitudinal reasons focus on the agent's wishes and. thus. on the potential 
capacity of the agent to act in that situation. The use of second order emotions 
to evaluate the propriety of the targeted emotion also implicitly draws on the 
potential capacities of the agent to control or alter one's emotional response. 
The distinction between one's voluntary capacity to respond and the 
possibilities inherent in the situation was further explored in the two previous 
sections. normatively in the role of fear in courage. and non normatively in 
135 
the discussion of the motivational liabilities to purposive action. I employed 
the metaphor of magnetized dispositions to explain the internal dynamic 
operating in these liabilities. I want to argue that we need another distinction 
to account for this operational dynamic that mediates between the object and 
the agent's implicit capacity to control the emotional experience. 
I want to explain this internal dynamic through the introduction of 
another metaphor. borrowed from Robert Nozick's discussion of moral 
motivations in Philosophical Explanations. He discusses moral motivation in 
terms of the metaphor of forces that push and pull the agent. I want to expand 
his discussion of this dimension of motivation in what follows. The impulse 
present in the motivational aim of an emotion may 'push' us, or it may 'pull' us. 
Motivational 'pull' refers to those properties or values possessed by the object 
of the emotion that impel us to attend to and be responsible to or for that 
object. The (apparent) value of the object focuses our attention and attracts us; 
it 'pulls' us towards it. The 'push' of an emotion refers to that part of one's own 
motivation that is grounded in one's sense of appropriate agency. providing a 
warrant to act on the desire. The normative and appropriate conduct that is an 
expression of one's agency pushes the agent to act; it licenses the desire by 
making its motivation an expression of one's sense of worth or value in the 
deliberative situation. 
In the last chapter I argued that one's primary passions and one's 
secondary emotions of delight and distress have different directions of fit in 
relation to the world. One's desires and fears work to make the world conform 
to one's desires or implicit wish in the fear. and one's secondary emotions seek 
to have the mind conform to the world. Motivational push and pull articulate 
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how the internal dynamic operating in the targeted emotion works to achieve 
that strategic direction of fit. 
The motivational push of an emotion is more complex than its 
motivational pull. Push can take several forms. Consider: 
1. Jane pushed to win the race 
2. Jane pushed to keep up with the leader 
3. Jane pushed herself to win the race 
4. Jane was pushed too hard by her coach. 
The statement, "Jane pushed to win the race," captures the sense that in 
pushing one exerts oneself. That exertion is a manifestation of one's 
determination. The statement, "Jane pushed to keep up with the leader," 
suggests a conscious attempt to impel oneself forward, usually through force 
of will or persistence. The use of the reflexive pronoun in, "Jane pushed 
herself to win the race," introduces a further complication that is implicitly 
present in motivational push. 'Push' here suggests a kind of self 
determination that allows one to surpass others and, on occasion, oneself. 
The sense of self determination is still present, though reactive, when 
the 'pushing' comes from another. We are able to judge when the condition of 
'too hard' in the statement, "Jane was pushed too hard by her coach," by 
referring to Jane's physical or mental condition. Push here implies the taxing 
of one's abilities. We may also push another in the sense of testing or taxing 
one's patience or tolerance. Finally, we use 'push' to express blame, as in "You 
pushed me too far." 
These senses of 'push' imply a kind of determination. When the agent 
makes a conscious judgment about the character of her sense of agency to be 
137 
expressed in action. then self determination comes into play. 'Push' is non-
defective when it identifies what is sufficient to make one's agency effective. 
This sufficient condition is. in principle. under the agent's voluntary control; 
it is internal to the agent. Determination and a desire to surpass some standard 
must come from within. More importantly. motivational push requires a 
judgment or a decision on the pan of the agent. Furthermore. I want to 
suggest that this decision. when it is normative. is a manifestation of the 
agent's capacity for autonomous action. 
Because push and pull are understood as a matter of degree. they can 
manifest different degrees of strength within the emotion. When the pull of 
an object. is stronger than one's push. then we have a situation where what is 
(or appears to be) required is greater than what one's own sense of agency 
involves. If the gap is too great one's motivation can be conflicting. The 
agent feels compelled to do one thing while being inclined to dome something 
else. The push of one's motivation may be greater that its pull. This can occur 
in one of two ways. Workaholics and perfectionists often feel compelled to 
perform at a level or to an extent that is incommensurate with the worth of the 
task. but it is also possible for one's push to be greater that one's pull in ways 
that are praiseworthy. Supererogatory acts involve going beyond what is 
required or expected. To act with dignity is to have asymmetric judgments 
about the worth of external goods. A person who acts from a sense of dignity 
places less value on harms to one's own good than on the value of the harmed 
goods of another. Finally. it is possible to have the motivational push and pull 
within an emotion in a dynamic balance. The good or worth of an object is 
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commensurate with the requisite value within oneself that moves the agent to 
action. This balance is, for example, one of the hallmarks of acts of integrity. 
The Aesthetic Role of the Emotions in Deliberation 
The fifth observation, that the emotions participate in the aesthetic as 
well as the moral or practical, makes a family of related claims. The presence 
of the emotions in our experience of the arts is the most obvious instance of 
this role. Pity and fear, for example, are emotions crucial for the experience 
of classical tragedy, and the emotions of wonder and pleasure are bound to our 
understanding of literary experience as well.21 In the Orator Cicero 
distinguishes three levels of style and argues that they correspond to the three 
offices of the orator. The plain style teaches; the middle style pleases; the high 
style moves us (69, I 00-I 0 I). Cicero's insight not only articulates the 
relationship between style and rhetorical aim; it suggests that the emotional 
significance located here participates in and helps inform our larger practical 
capacities and ends. 
Hermogenes refines and transforms the notion of stylistic levels in the 
most sophisticated study of style in the ancient world. In his work, On the 
Types of Style, Hermogenes argues that there are twenty ideal stylistic forms 
or types. Each form is a convergence of three sets of concerns. Each form 
involves a consideration of the authority of the speaker in relation to subject 
and audience; a consideration of diction, provenance and tropological 
techniques appropriate to that authority, subject matter and aim; and a 
consideration of the tone, the manner of effective expression, relative to that 
audience and subject. 'Asperity' (trachytes ) is a s.tylistic form used when the 
author wishes to criticize an opponent who is more important than the author 
(26-32). Vehemence (sphodrotes) is deployed against an inferior opponent 
(36-41). Florescence (akme) is used to make a criticism, but its attack is less 
harsh (97-101). Wooten argues that Hermogene's indignation (barytes) is 
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reserved for situations where a frank and candid relationship exists between 
the author and audience ("Introduction" xiv, xvi). 
Longinus emphasized a different dimension of the notion of 
significance when he argued that the experience of 'sublimity' was not 
primarily a technical achievement but a certain quality present in our 
aesthetic apprehension of the greatness in literature. The neoclassical period 
revived the idea of sublimity. Edmund Burke, for example, argued that a 
proportion of the value accorded to sublimity is found in its capacity to make 
people more sociable.22 By the middle of the eighteenth century another (and 
controversial) concept arose. 'Sensibility' is more than sensitivity, although 
that is certainly part of the idea here. Sensibility was concerned with the 
cultivation of certain capacities of awareness. It came to suggest not only a 
kind of openness to feelings but also the experience of those feelings. The 
openness to feeling led to considerations of sentiment, the sentimental and 
sentimentality. The idea continues to have life in this century as a term which 
bridges the distinction between emotion and reason in judgment without 
reducing the 'emotional' to the emotive.2 3 
We have long recognized that the aesthetic can play a pedagogical role. 
Pleasure and pain have long been recognized as instrumentally efficacious 
tools in both the learning process and in the inculcation of virtue. Pleasure 
works this way because it is a consequential attitude. When we do something 
because it is right, we also (typically) find pleasure in its rightness. Pleasure 
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is the instantiation of a standing attitude that one ought to find it satisfactory 
that doing the right thing is good. Another eighteenth century writer. Adam 
Smith. made other observations about pleasure that deserve mention. Smith 
discerned the relationship between what is agreeable and the emotions of 
pleasure, joy, enjoyment. and fancy. We have already discussed in the 
previous chapter this part of the aesthetic dimension of emotional experience. 
Satisfactions are aspectual. and they involve the experiential category under 
which they fall. We enjoy activities which are performed in a certain 
manner. Some pleasures function as a criterion of success; enjoyment. on the 
other hand. is continuative. To enjoy some experience is to focus one's 
attention or pay heed to some dimension of that activity. Enjoyment may also 
be distinguished from fancy. When we fancy something we have an attitude 
that is not only prominent as a preference. taste or inclination. that attitude is 
antecedently present. To enjoy something. however. does not require that the 
attitude be antecendently present. it only requires a sustained focus of 
attention. The directed attention helps shape the experience by specifying 
our relationship to that activity. 
In Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres Adam Smith makes three 
observations on the role of attentiveness in these emotions. He argues that a 
"mind not ruffled by any violent passions. . . filled with some degree of joy not 
so great as to withdraw the attention. is that state of mind in which one is most 
disposed to admiration." Joy. and by extension, the related psychological states 
are presumptive evidence for certain kinds of evaluations. The second 
observation he makes assigns further specific. attention directing emotions 
that will follow from the joy. He observes, "the affection he feels is mixt with 
some degree of desire and hope towards the object and this inclines to draw 
nearer towards it, imagining that coming nearer towards it he will enjoy it 
greater perfection" (68). The final observation is related to the first. While 
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the persuasive role of joy in the first two instances is evocative, the persuasive 
role of joy can also be expressive. Not only may we judge the object of joy to be 
admirable or whatever, we judge the speaker to be agreeable (55). With this 
insight Smith makes articulate the relationship between the aesthetic role of 
the emotions of delight and decorum. 
Perhaps no idea involving the aesthetic role of the emotions in 
deliberation is more central than that of decorum. Decorum is one of the four 
graces of style in classical rhetoric, along with correctness, clarity and 
ornament. Significantly, decorum is seen as serving an executive role. The 
aesthetic and formal concerns of the other graces compete for display and 
their manifestation is judged appropriate or otherwise through the 
application of the criteria inherent in the idea of decorum. Decorum's 
function is thus strategic. Propriety and fittingness (both moral and 
aesthetic) governed one's self dramatization in the rhetorical situation.2 4 
Significantly, Cicero raises this stylistic grace into an action guiding principle 
for one's public and private conduct in life. In De Officiis, a work on practical 
ethics, Cicero argues that there are four cardinal virtues: wisdom, justice, 
greatness of spirit and decorum.25 Some of his teaching borders on advice 
about social manners; he discusses personal appearance, one's house and the 
art of civilized conversation. Decorum is far more than etiquette, however. 
Decorum is the strategic manifestation of the virtue of temperance, the 
expression of one's worthiness (one's dignitas) and the seeking of justice and 
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the avoidance of shame. Decorum is not merely the specification and doing of 
what is appropriate, although that is a necessary condition; it is what he calls 
moderateness. Moderateness is a sense of orderliness, the proper act in its 
proper place. Moderateness is also a sense of opportuneness, which involves a 
sense of timing. The importance of the virtue of temperance (and its 
importance in the life of the passions) through the vehicle of decorum is thus 
given a central role in his view of one's duties. 
The Expressive 
The emotions help specify our course of action in one other way. The 
emotions are naturally expressive, and frequently what is important about the 
emotions in deliberation is expressive. A doctor who is technically proficient 
but cold as a lizard may aid a patient's physical condition; but if he fails to 
show he cares, by failing say, to sympathize, reassure or console the patient 
when that is warranted, we say that he is unfeeling. The attitudinal aspect of 
an action, its tone or tenor, can be an important feature for assessment. Part 
of the task of helping others in professions like medicine, teaching and 
counseling is to show we care. Yet knowing when and in what manner to be 
thoughtful, generous or tolerant in our attitudes on a particular occasion can 
be difficult. We know it not just the expression of an attitude that is requisite 
here, it is the manner in which we respond to people that is crucial. These 
nuances are quite subtle. This expressive capability implies a sensitivity to 
both the psychological cues and social context. The psychological ability to 
register small differences in tone does not imply the concomitant necessity to 
overtly react to these differences as a proof of that capacity. The social context 
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regulates and constrains our responses. Politeness, courtesy and tact are 
sensitivities no less subtle than being solicitous, considerate or kind. 
The rhetorical potential in the expression of emotions and attitudes has, 
historically, manifested itself as the matter and manner of style. Attitude can 
be expressed through diction. Connotation, the implications or suggestions 
evoked by a word, along with register, the level of a word's formality, are 
obvious devices. Provenance, the collocation of diction and idiom as a 
characteristic of a particular group, forms another part of one's persuasive 
arsenal. These devices are some of the resources available to create tone. Tone 
is the projection of attitude. This quality of a work may be apprehended as the 
author's intention in writing the work or as the projection of the author's 
attitude towards the audience itself. 
We also recognize that the phonemic, auditory and textural properties of 
shaped language work to incline an audience's attitudes. These resources are 
often called, with only partial accuracy, 'non-cognitive' techniques. These 
techniques are considered non-cognitive because they do not deal directly 
with issues of propositional content and any conscious judgment about their 
use is only of secondary importance. They may, however, be called 'cognitive'. 
but only indirectly. The emotions are voluntary to the extent that we can 
develop cognitive capacities that, in principle, can and do control the attitudes 
and reason states which are influenced by these techniques. Because our 
emotions are felt as if they were kinetic experiences, we often discern a 
formal equivalence between the dynamic properties present in the sound and 
rhythm of shaped language and the dynamic harmonies and disharmonies of 
the emotional state. The techniques of sound and rhythm help structure these 
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phenomenologically apprehended dimensions. Tone-color. the emotional 
texture of language in discourse. is achieved through the manipulation of the 
resources of sound. Timbre. the characteristic quality of pitch and stress. is 
crucial here. Pitch, a musical term indicating the frequency. duration. 
loudness. and stress of phonemic tones. are comprehended as lying on a series 
of ascending scales. Alliteration. assonance. and consonance are techniques 
that exploit the values of pitch. 
Classical and Renaissance theorists recognized that certain utterances 
typically evoked predictable responses in the audience. These schemes and 
tropes became part of the rhetorical instruction proffered at those times. 
Oaths (e.g .• orcas). curses (e.g .• euche). and imprecations (e.g., ara) as well as 
prayers (e.g., deeisis). pledges (e.g., eustathia) and wishes (e.g., optatio) were 
performative gestures. Some schemes express a predicational attitude towards 
the issue at hand. Aporia expresses real or feigned doubt about an issue; 
antirrhesis rejects an argument because of its insignificance, and 
amphidiorthosis hedges or qualifies a charge made in anger. Other devices are 
blatantly ad hominem. Categoria reproaches an opponent with his own 
wickedness. and sarcasmus is a bitter taunt. 
Conclusion 
One may grant all that I have argued for thus far and still have doubts. 
We may grant that the argument from pathos names strategies that are judged 
by their success. Yet. four claims that are necessary for us to be able to say 
that this form of argumentation is rational has not yet been established. 
First. the arguments about the six functions of the emotions in 
deliberation must be grounded in a formal account of the cognitive structure 
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of the emotions. A formal explanation of the various objects of an emotion is 
required if we are to be able to explain how this persuasion works. Second. we 
may grant that the emotions are purposive. but the nature of that 
purposiveness has not been established. The emotions must be purposive in 
ways other than saying they are had for some purpose; we must be able to 
name which emotions work in deliberation. ·and we must see in more detail 
how they work in deliberation. Third. the claim that the judgments inherent 
in these emotions are coordinate with our other deliberative capacities has not 
yet been shown for particular deliberative cases. All that has been offered so 
far is a promissory note. Finally. while some advances into the issue of 
deliberative agency have been offered. we still lack a perspicuous account of 
these problems. Nor have we explained how the role of the audience in the 
deliberative situation determines what arguments may be used and how their 
uses are justified. 
These challenges will be met. I will address the first challenge in the 
next chapter. the second two challenges in Chapter V. and the final challenge 
will be addressed in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTERN 
ON TIIE COGNITIVE S'IRUcrtJRE OFTIIE EMOTIONS 
For consider: is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy? 
Or is it holy because it is loved by the gods? 
Euthyphro lOa 
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The deliberative emotions are perceptual sensitivities that make certain 
features of the deliberative situation salient. To function this way these 
emotions must actually tell us something about the world. To effect salience 
the emotion shifts some features of the situation into the background and 
moves others into focus. By directing our attention, the sensitivity isolates 
these features, mapping them into a coherent picture of significance. It is 
tempting but mistaken to think of salience as, essentially, a matter of 
rearrangement. On this conception, the deliberative situation is viewed as 
being like the pieces of an unassembled jigsaw puzzle. With a puzzle we have 
two sets of pre-existing internal relations we can use to assemble the picture. 
We have the printed image on the face of the puzzle, and we have the 
geometric shapes of the cut pieces. The task of rearranging a puzzle is, thus, 
pragmatic. 
But deliberation is not an activity of this sort. Deliberative situations do 
not come pre-made but unassembled. Salience is the discovery of the internal 
relations of those beliefs, evaluations, desires and fears and their appropriate 
mapping onto the deliberative situation. Those beliefs and evaluations which 
constitute the emotion identify the relevant properties present in the 
situation. These properties are important because they have evaluative 
significance. Proper salience is achieved when we see that some feature of 
the deliberative situation is understood in terms of the requisite emotion. 
The notion of salience implies that some crucial aspects of emotional 
experience are objective. Intuitively, we view this capacity as objective 
150 
because we explain its failures that way. Not all perceptions are veridical. Our 
view can be blocked or altered by the environment, thus producing a partial 
picture that is inaccurate. The act of selection can be confused for one of 
extrapolation. Instead of picking out those features which are relevant, we 
actually infer or hypothesize about what should be there. Our selection of 
signs and features can be too selective. Instead of attending to all of the details 
we choose only a small subset. Our desires and perceptions are interrelated. 
All too frequently, what we attend to is what we want to attend to; in short, we 
see what we want to see. Finally, perception can become a matter of habit. If 
our perceptions in the past have succeeded pragmatically, then we are 
inclined to trust those pragmatic success criteria in the present instance. 
While these failures can be explained in terms of objective success conditions, 
another class of problems may not be so explained. 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, many claim (rightly, if vaguely) 
that emotional experience is, in some important sense, subjective. The issues 
here are complex, and the growth of the scholarly literature on what is 
subjective and objective has expanded and altered our understanding of these 
concepts significantly over the course of the century. In clarifying these 
concepts we have articulated at least two separate issues which can be 
confused with the idea of the subjective. First, it is easy to confuse cognitive 
and non cognitive experience with objective and subjective experience. We 
have been and are concerned throughout this study with cognitive 
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experience. Second, we recognize that there are important distinctions to be 
drawn between what is particular and what is subjective. In clarifying the 
idea of the particular we will see how and in what ways an emotional 
experience is objective and how it is subjective. 
There are numerous senses of 'subjective' that purport to explain 
emotional experience. We are concerned at present with only four senses. 
These four senses of 'subjective' carry no philosophical commitments about 
the nature of how we experience the world; moral and epistemological 
objectivists and subjectivists accept these senses as legitimate uses of the term. 
The first sense of subjective refers to private feelings, usually of an intense or 
personal nature. No one would deny the existence of these feelings. More 
importantly, we recognize that there is a crucial difference between the 
intensity of an emotional episode and its strength, whether strength is 
construed as the emotion's freshness or its motivational force. The second 
sense of subjective is contrasted with one sense of objective; 'subjective' refers 
to illusory experience, and 'objective' refers to veridical experience. 
·subjective' means mistaken. The third sense is a variant on the second. 
'Subjective' means we take the figment of a psychological state that purports to 
be an experience of something as real when it is not; and this is contrasted 
with another sense of 'objective', that the object is actually there to be 
experienced. Mirages are subjective in this sense. The fourth sense of 
'subjective' refers to some experiences which are denoted in such a way that 
the explanation of that experience is reciprocal in terms of a property's being 
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present along with a response in the agent. Neither part of the pair can be 
explicated without reference to the other. For a joke to be amusing, the person 
hearing the joke must be amused; and to be amused, in this case, is to find the 
joke amusing. It is possible to argue that these senses of 'subjective' have 
objective success conditions. 
But demonstrating an explanatory possibility is not as strong as 
demonstrating a conceptual need for objectivity. The first and fourth senses 
of subjective are sometimes seen as jointly providing a partial basis for a crude 
version of subjectivism. This crude subjectivism argues that the collection of 
mental and emotional states we experience from the inside is the sole or 
primary point of view from which our well-being is to be understood. 
According to this view, only states of mind contribute to our quality of life. 
Something is harmful if it deprives us of a desirable state of mind. Typically, 
these desirable states are seen in terms of pleasure, happiness and enjoyment. 
The manifold problems of the inner view are highlighted by Robert Nozick's 
thought experiment called the experience machine. In his work, Anarchy, 
State and Utopia. Robert Nozick asks us to: 
Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any 
experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate 
your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great 
novel. or making a friend. or reading an interesting book. All the time 
you would be floating in a tank. with electrodes attached to your 
brain. Should you plug into the machine for life, preprogramming 
your life's experiences'? If you are worried about missing out on 
desirable experiences. we can suppose that business enterprises 
have researched thoroughly the lives of many others. You can pick 
and choose from their large library or smorgasbord of such 
experiences. selecting your life's experiences for. say. the next 
two years. After two years have passed. you will have ten minutes 
or ten hours out of the tank. to select the experiences of your next 
two years. Of course. in the tank you won't know that you're there; 
you'll think it's all actually happening ... Would you plug in? 
What else can matter to us. other than how our lives feel from the 
inside? Nor should you refrain because of the few moments of 
distress between the moment you've decided and the moment you're 
plugged. What's a few moments of distress compared to a lifetime 
of bliss (if that's what you choose), arid why feel any distress 
at all if your decision is the best one? (42-43) 
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Nozick argues that surely this sort of offer is unacceptable. First. things other 
than states of consciousness matter to us. We want to do certain things. not 
merely have the experience of having done them. The act of doing certain 
actions explains why we want the experience of doing them. Furthermore, we 
desire many pleasant things for their own sakes and not simply as a means to 
that pleasure. One's emotional experiences are bound to their modes of 
achievement. We want to achieve certain goods that may be seen as 
performances. Winning a game or a championship, publishing an essay on 
Montaigne, or building a tree house for one's children are performances in 
this sense. We also want to achieve certain goods which do not have 
specifiable achievement dates. The sense of satisfaction that comes from 
playing chess well or from being an accomplished cabinetmaker, for example, 
may arise out of the activity of playing chess or successfully exercising the 
skills necessary for cabinetmaking. The delight felt in specific successful 
performances is distinct from and subordinate to the satisfactory exercise of 
these capacities. We also want certain conditions of well-being to be realized. 
We want to be healthy, we don't want to be subject to cruel misfortune, and we 
want to act with wisdom. What is desirable in this sense is the satisfactory 
exercise of those goods seen as activities that contribute to one's well-being. 
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To reduce the value of the emotions to the experiencing of mental states 
is to imply that they are valuable in the way tourists tick off the sights they 
have visited. ("I saw the Coliseum, the Pantheon, and the Vatican, all in two 
days!") de Sousa rightly points out that to trivialize emotional experience this 
way is to deny how they function in determining who we are (218-220). We 
want to be a certain sort of person. As Nozick says, "Someone floating in a tank 
is an indeterminate blob." It is irrelevant to ask what sort of person someone 
is lying in a tank; he is not a person in the relevant sense of person. The 
emotions are crucial in the coordination of as well as one's appraisal of the 
different personae that one's identity consists of. We not only judge people for 
what they do, we also judge them for who they are. Third, we are limited to 
man-made reality. no deeper and no more important than that which people 
can construct (Nozick, Anarchy 43-44). To be sure, mental and emotional 
experiences do matter. Although pleasure, for instance, occurs 
consequentially, it is not merely a consequent mental state; it qualifies our 
experience. The emotions, in short, are an integral part of our well-being. 
They are not, however, something merely added to who we are and what we do. 
If these observations are correct, we must be able to meet one other 
skeptical challenge to the claim that the emotions can tell us something about 
the world. The emotions are sometimes thought to be the antithesis of rational 
thought in a very particular way. This antithesis takes the form of a question 
first posed by Socrates in the Euthyphro. "Do we want X because it is good, or is 
X good because we want it?" The Euthyphro Problem. as it has come to be 
called, raises several questions about the epistemological status of emotional 
knowledge, assuming there is any. One could, after all, discuss the propriety of 
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an emotional expression without having to accept that the cognitive appraisal 
delivered by that emotion is correct. One could come to know or evaluate the 
object of that emotion by means other than emotional perception and 
judgment. The !!motion would be epiphenomenal. a secondary and incidental 
addition to a different process. 
If one is to claim that the emotions can serve the cognitive functions of 
perception and judgment. then one must answer a difficult question: How do 
the emotions come to 'know' their objects? An answer to this question is 
offered in the next section. Some of the groundwork for answering this 
question was laid by Aristotle and the Stoics. David Hume made a singular 
contribution when he articulated the complexities of the relationships 
between the causes of an emotion and its object, particularly for the emotions 
of self assessment. But the greatest advances in analyzing the cognitive 
structure of the emotions have been made by four scholars in this century. 
Anthony Kenny contributed greatly to our understanding of these issues in 
Action, Emotion and Will. William Lyons further clarifies several issues 
concerning the status of an emotion's object in his work. Emotion; and Robert 
Gordon introduces the idea of the propositional object of an emotion in The 
Structure of Emotion. Finally. Ronald de Sousa offers a more complete analysis 
of these complex interactions in The Rationality of Emotion. I draw heavily on 
their analyses to explain this cognitive structure. 
The Objects of Emotions 
We can begin to see the necessary success conditions for this kind of 
objectivity by examining the relationships that exist between an emotion and 
its objects. We say an object is that which the emotion is about, directed at or 
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towards, concerned with, or that which the emotion concerns itself. When we 
speak of the object of an emotion we are reictting to one of four possible 
objects. First, emotions have particular objects and these are those particular 
individuals. situations, or circumstances relevant to the deliberative aim and 
are either immediately present or in the proximate future. Second. the 
particular object has some focal property that is the focus of our attention and 
serves as a source of motivation within that episode. The several causal 
conditions that define the relationship between one's focus and the focal 
propeny is called the motivating aspect of the emotion. This focal propeny 
can, in principle, be expressed; and the term, propositional object, covers all 
such objects of expression. The success conditions necessary for an emotion to 
be appropriate are understood in terms of the emotion's formal object, the 
emotion's evaluative criteria that defines the emotion itself. These criteria 
help explain the semantics of emotion statements. The focal property can be 
expressed. The semantics of adjectival constructions derive part of their 
content from these success conditions, and we use the term propositional 
object, to cover the objects of expression that can be expressed with a that-
complement. 
Particular Objects 
Emotions have particular objects. A particular object is that particular 
item (a person, situation, state of affairs, thing, attribute, etc.) which serves as 
the particular focus of that emotional episode. We frequently refer to these 
objects when we make first person emotion repons, "I love you;" when we 
ascribe emotions to another, "She hates Joe;" when we explain our behavior, "I 
turned him in to the IRS because I hate him;" and when we interpret the 
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behavior of others, "Huck decided to save Jim because he loves him." The 
particular object may be designated in different ways. The reference may use 
a proper noun, "New York is dangerous," or "Joseph Stalin was cruel." It may 
be a non-count noun, "Sally hates elevator music," or "His limited intelligence 
frustrates me." It may be by singular reference, "She is irritating," or "He is 
boring." Finally, it may involve a definite description, "The theft of the 
painting upset me," or "The reek in here is horrible." 
When an emotion picks out or locates its object, it refers to that object. 
But that act of reference can go wrong in numerous ways. Suppose I enter the 
laundry room and find a snake. I fear it because it is within striking distance 
and I believe it to be a copperhead, although it turns out to be a cottonmouth 
instead. My fear still has an appropriate object, even though I have 
misidentified the species of snake. The proximity of the snake causes my fear 
and makes that fear partially intelligible. Even though I am not correct in 
specifying the exact nature of that danger, the fact that the bite is poisonous 
consequentially justifies my fear. 
A second case reveals more complications. Joe is angry with the person 
who broke his lawn mower. That the mower is broken precipitates or causes 
the anger. Yet the anger is directed at someone, and the referent of 'person' 
in the statement is ambiguous. The statement can mean that Joe is angry with 
that person, whoever he is, who broke the mower; or more precisely, Joe may 
believe that his neighbor, Sam, is that person. As in the previous example, Joe 
may be correct that someone broke the mower, but he may be incorrect in his 
belief that Sam broke it. Joe's beliefs are, obviously, fallible. But both 
versions depend on the mower's being wrongfully broken by some person. 
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The belief that the mower was wrongfully broken makes the anger's being 
directed at that person intelligible. If the breakage is the result of some non 
culpable accident. then the anger fails to be justified because anger requires 
the act to be intentional. If the mower is broken as a result of metal fatigue. 
say, then Joe's belief and its object, are illusory. 
One's particular object may have too wide a focus. George is 
unaccountably depressed; everything seems black. Ignoring the question of 
whether the emotion is pointless, there is a problem with George's ability to 
give expression to the object of his depression. The objects of George's 
depression are those things which seem black (Kenny 61 ). People suffering 
from phobias experience a similar problem. A phobia is a morbid fear of some 
object. Hydrophobes, for example, fear water. Yet the hydrophobe cannot 
focus on an appropriate property of water in each instance which will explain 
(other than identifying) the causal relationship between the water and the 
fear felt. 
In his study. Emotion, William Lyons argues that the particular object of 
an emotion is understood in terms of two pairs of contrasting criteria. The 
first pair of criteria concerns the existential status of the object itself; the 
second pair concerns the relationship between the psychological state and its 
beliefs comprising the emotion and its object (1 04-112)_1 A particular object of 
an emotion can be 'material' or 'intentional'. A material object is one that 
actually exists; an 'intentional' object lacks actual existence (Lyons 106-1 09). 
The gratification I feel eating a second piece of cheesecake has the cheesecake 
as a material object. If I fear that the snake in the laundry room is dangerous 
and that snake turns out to be a rattlesnake, then my fear has a material 
object. Yet the material object of an emotion need not be made of matter. A 
person's attitude. an agent's abilities or capacities. and the power of one 
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person over another can be material objects if they exist and are acted on. The 
term 'material' carries the implication of 'being materialized' (Lyons 107-108). 
The particular object of an emotion may also be 'intentional'. The grief 
we feel at the death of someone we love has a material object; the death is real. 
But the character of some of the emotions we experience in the face of that 
death have intentional objects. I still love my father even though I know he is 
dead. Intentional objects form a part of our aesthetic experience as well. We 
care about what happens to characters in literature even though we know 
they don't exist in the same way our friends and family do. 
Even though the object is not 'material' in· the sense used above. the 
relationship between the emotions and their objects in the two previous 
examples are non-illusory; we know the existential status of the objects. Yet 
we also speak of intentional objects to identify another class of objects. If the 
snake in the laundry room example above turns out to be a hognosed snake 
that will not bite. then my fear is an intentional one. I have misidentified the 
object of my fear. The object in this example is intentional because the 
purported relationship between the emotion and its object is not real. The 
particular object of an emotion is thus further characterized by the 
relationship between the object and the emotion itself. That relationship can 
be an illusory or non-illusory one. An illusory object is one the agent takes to 
be real but is not; a non-illusory object is real (Lyons 109-112). 
The distinction drawn between an object's ex~stential status is. thus, a 
necessary but not sufficient distinction for characterizing the particular 
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objects of an emotion. Lyons argues that the illusory, non-illusory distinction 
will help to account for two aspects of the conceptual relationship between an 
emotion and its object: l) how we ground an emotion upon those beliefs, and 2) 
the need to have correct beliefs about the objects of one's emotion ( lll-112). 
The grounding of an emotion requires an understanding of the relationship 
between an emotion's focus and focal property and the success conditions that 
must obtain for that relationship to be the motivating aspect of that emotion. 
These conditions are also necessary but not sufficient for one to have correct 
beliefs about the object of the emotion. 
Focus and Focal Property 
When we are confronted with a particular object of an emotion, we 
typically focus on some feature or property of that object. The term, 'focus: 
names that directed attention we have towards some (real or illusory) object; it 
is part of our psychological stance. The 'focal property' is what the emotion 
picks out about the object; it is a (real or illusory) property of that object (de 
Sousa 115-117). The property-response emotions are identified by their focal 
property. 
property). 
To be frustrated is to find something frustrating (the focal 
Suppose Sam is breaking in a new pair of hiking boots. Despite his 
best precautions, a blister forms on his heel. He becomes irritated. The blister 
is the material object of his irritation. The soreness of the blister is the focus 
of his attention. He finds the soreness irritating; it is the focal property of the 
blister. 
Motjvatin~ Aspect and Causes 
Despite his best efforts to the contrary, Sam is irritated because a sore 
blister has formed. The because-clause in this statement explains the 
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relationship between the focus and the focal property. For such an 
explanation to be successful, the grounds for emotional episode should, if true, 
be relevant and adequate. Ronald de Sousa suggests that we call the standard 
case that obtains between the focal property of the object and one's focus the 
motivating aspect of the emotion (116-117). The motivating aspect of an 
emotion has several success conditions that must be met for that object to be 
non-illusory. 
Suppose that a neighbor, burdenl!d with undeserved woes at work, 
comes home and tries to unlock his front door. The lock is jaded; the key 
doesn't work. He begins to rail and kick at the door in a rage. The case 
implicitly carries an important distinction. The cause of the neighbor's rage 
is not its motivating aspect. The lock is the focus of the rage, and the failure of 
the key causes or precipitates the rage. Neither, however, qualifies as being 
the motivating aspect of the rage. What the example does illustrate is that the 
causal connection between the focal property and the occurrence of the 
emotion is a necessary condition for the former to be a motivating aspect (de 
Sousa 117). This causal condition has an important corollary. Since we can be 
mistaken about the causes of our emotions, we have no privileged access to the 
motivating aspects of our emotions(de Sousa 117). 
A motivating aspect of an emotion is rationally related to the emotion it 
causes. A motivating aspect is intelligible if it can serve as the premise of an 
intelligible inference (de Sousa I 18). A person who envies another wants 
something the envied has. Envy focuses on some attribute that the envier 
believes that object exemplifies. To envy another's wealth is to want it for the 
status wealth affords; to covet another's office or honors is to envy the success 
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of that rival. If Sam envies Joe's wealth. the wealth is the particular object of 
that envy; but the status that wealth is believed to offer Sam is that envy's 
focal property. The focus of Sam's envy is made intelligible by the belief that 
the envied wealth will accord him the status he desires. The case of envy is 
important because it is intelligible even though it is not normatively 
legitimate. Intelligible reasons are like breath. Bad breath does not cease to 
be breath simply because it stinks. A reason can be intelligible even though it 
stinks as well. 
There is another potential problem that can occur between the focus 
and property that we must face. Suppose again, that I fear the snake in the 
laundry room. believing it to be a copperhead. It is. actually. a hognosed snake 
that will not bite. This case exhibits a causal connection between my focus and 
the purported object; and it is intelligible. I can give a reason for my fear. The 
reason, however, is false. The actual state of the world is relevant to the 
justification of my emotional state. For a focal property to be a motivating 
aspect. it must be an actual property of the particular object (de Sousa 119-
120). 
We can classify the particular object of an emotion in four ways. 
Particular objects are identified by the their existential status: they are either 
'material' or 'intentional' objects. These objects can be illusory or non-
illusory, yielding: 
l. an intentional and illusory object 
2. a material and illusory object 
3. an intentional and non-illusory object 
4. a material and non-illusory object. 
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Particular objects have some focal property that serves as the focus of the 
emotional episode. The standard relationship between the focus and the focal 
property is called the motivational aspect of that emotion. The relationship 
between an emotion's focus and the focal property is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, causal condition. Because we can be mistaken about that 
relationship, our beliefs are fallible. The beliefs which comprise the 
motivational aspect must be rationally related to the object so that they can 
serve as inferential reasons which make the belief intelligible. These 
conditions ground the beliefs about a particular object. For a focal property to 
be a motivating aspect, it must be an actual property of the particular object of 
the emotion. 
Formal Objects 
The particular objects of envy are many. People envy another's money, 
status, fame, preferments and opportunities, and so on. Trivially, we can say 
that anything that is enviable is a possible object of envy. Intuitively we 
recognize that. although this phrasing is uninformative, a non trivial 
description of what is 'enviable' would name some general characteristic(s) 
that makes the use of this emotional term in a particular case appropriate. The 
formal object of an emotion provides this general description. 
Anthony Kenny borrows the medieval distinction between material and 
formal objects of actions and extends it to the emotions, thereby introducing 
the notion of the formal object of an emotion. He begins by arguing that "to 
assign a formal object to an action is to place restrictions on which may occur 
as the direct object of a verb describing the action" (189). This restriction, he 
argues, specifies the emotion's appropriate object. To say, for example, that Joe 
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envied the fame of his colleague. is fitting if 'fame' is an appropriate object of 
envy. Conversely. we do not feel joy at our own undeserved misery nor do we 
take delight in our own chronic physical pain. These characterizations are 
descriptively inappropriate. 
The idea of a formal object is made more precise by William Lyons when 
he argued that "the formal object of an emotion seems to be the evaluative 
category under which the appraisal of or evaluation of a particular object falls 
on a particular occasion" (I 00). The relationship between an emotion and its 
formal object is a logical one, not a contingent matter of fact. The formal 
object of envy specifies the qualities that must be present for that emotion to 
be so evaluated; the formal object of envy is the desirability of some 
unobtainable good which signifies merit and is enjoyed by another. The 
formal object of belief is truth; the formal object of a want is desirability (de 
Sousa 122). The formal object of fear is a future harm or evil. usually seen as 
destructive or painful. The formal object of pity are those individuals 
suffering undeserved and significant misfortune. The formal object picks out, 
at some level of generality. those qualities or properties that can or should be 
ascribed to the particular object of the emotion. 
The nature of the logical relationship between the properties of the 
formal object and the particular object has been the subject of some 
speculation. Kenny suggests that the relationship is a semantic one; formal 
objects are intensional concepts (199-202). Lyons argues that the formal 
object names an evaluative category which serves as a template for the 
particular occurrence of the emotion (103). It expresses a non contingent 
relation between the evaluative category and the concept of the emotion itself. 
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This idea has one very attractive virtue. It implicitly predicts the locus of the 
connection between an emotion and other normative ideas. like moral or 
practical principles. 
But one may still object that that the link between the formal object and 
the particular object is still not clear. How is the evaluative category linked to 
the particular emotion? de Sousa argues that the notion of appropriateness, 
mentioned above, is not precise enough. He argues that the formal object of 
an emotion must help to explain the intelligibility condition discussed earlier. 
He defines the formal object of an emotion this way: 
For each emotion. there is a second-order property that must 
be implicitly applied to the motivating aspect if the emotion 
is to be intelligible. This essential element in the structure 
of an emotion is its formal object. ( 122) 
The properties of a formal object supervene on the first order properties of 
the particular object. The first order properties are such in virtue of the 
second order properties of the formal object (de Sousa 122). 
Denominative Meaning Relations 
The deliberative emotions are those whose properties are capable of 
producing salience. Once we have targeted a specific emotion it is necessary to 
identify that particular property which will achieve this goal or explore the 
manner in which these psychological states can be described. To describe the 
situation and appeal to the targeted emotion is to draw on the resources of the 
language we possess. If the language of the emotions is. as J. L. Austin puts it, 
"the inherited acumen and experience of many generations" then the 
distinctions thought necessary will be refll!cted in the complexity of our 
language for the relevant concept (133). These terms are capable of such 
work because they have semantic depth. 
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Part of the subtlety of the semantic depth of these terms is reflected in 
two kinds of meaning relations present in the emotion terms themselves. The 
paronymous forms of a word provide a kind of schematic of the meaning 
relations implicit in the concept. (For a discussion of paronymous meaning 
relations, see Appendix A.) The denominative meaning relations found in the 
attributive and predicative uses of the adjectival forms of these terms reveal 
much that is important about the semantic depth of these public concepts. 
We commonly use adjectives and adjectival constructions to characterize 
emotional states, episodes and events. Many of the justificatory issues present 
in the argument from pathos should be illuminated by an examination of the 
semantic values present in these constructions. We distinguish adjectival 
meanings through a series of semantic scales. Adjectives can be noninherent 
or inherent. stative or dynamic. gradeable or nongradeable. A noninherent 
adjective modifies a noun by extending the basic sense of the noun. The term. 
"old," in "an old friend of mine," is a noninherent adjective. An inherent 
adjective modifies the referent of the noun directly. For example, "old," in the 
clause, "my friend is old," is inherent. Inherence allows for that 
characterization to pick out a property of the referent. An adjective may be 
stative or dynamic. The adjective "tall" in "Sally is tall" is stative. "Irritable" 
in "he is irritable" is a dynamic adjective. Dynamic adjectives denote qualities 
that are thought to be subject to control by the agent. They can thus be 
restricted temporally. Interestingly, dynamic adjectives can also take the 
imperative mood. Adjectives can also be gradeable or nongradeable; a 
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gradeable adjective admits of comparison. Nongradeable adjectives do not 
admit of degrees. "Pregnant" is a nongradeable adjective. 
The Predicative Use of Adjectives 
Emotional states and events can be expressed predicatively. The 
predicate can refer to the object it is supposed to be true of. Consider the 
following situation. Joe has carefully and diligently planned a proposal for a 
new program at work. During the presentation of his proposal Sam, who is 
opposed to the idea, contemptuously insults Joe. After blanching momentarily 
storm clouds form on Joe's brow and his jaw sets. During the break Joe 
announces to another colleague, 'Til show him." We may say that Joe is angry. 
When we say this we have chosen the predicate "angry" from a lexical field of 
predicates. This field includes 'resentful', 'riled', 'irate', 'ireful', 'wrathful', 
'raging', 'furious', 'fuming', 'enraged', among others. 'Angry' is a gradeable, 
dynamic adjective. 
Despite its grammatical simplicity. the predicate "angry" is semantically 
complex. "Angry" b. a gradeable adjective; it can take the degree modifiers 'so', 
'too' and 'very', among others; and it admits of the positive, comparative and 
superlative degrees. Although psychological predicates are dynamic 
adjectives, they share a semantic value with stative adjectives like "tall" 
"large" and "heavy." Consider the commonly cited example, "Theo is a large 
flea." If the statement were a one-place predicate then the statement could be 
analyzed as: 
1. Theo is a flea 
2. & Theo is large 
This analysis is false because fleas are not large. 'Large' is a two-place 
predicate (Platts 162-163). There is a coordinate in the semantic value of 
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'large' that allows it to be applied correctly to the individual or object it is 
predicated of. The application of 'large' is also warranted because its semantic 
value carries a standard for determining when something is large and when it 
isn't. This standard is called a delineation. The delineation warrants the 
comparative and superlative uses of larger and largest. It will also warrant 
the comparative and superlative uses of 'angry' (Larson and Segal 130-131}. If 
Joe responds to Sam and Sam takes offense. we can. in principle. say either 
that Sam is angrier than Joe or that Joe is angrier than Sam. Stative adjectives 
like large and heavy are vague. and the standards present in their 
delineations may be governed by their comparative forms. The comparative 
form of these adjectives implies some generalized arithmetic scale.2 
A Problem with Indexicals? 
Although dynamic adjectives are scalar. they seem to work differently. 
There are two ways in which our construal of the predicate '. . . is angry' 
differs from the predicate ·. . . is large'. The first difference occurs in the use 
of indexicals. We frequently use emotion statements like "I am bored now." "I 
feel guilty," "I am grieving," as reports of psychological states. These first 
person reports differ from third person reports. "He is bored now," and other 
first person reports stated as a response to the same object. We also use 
emotion statements interpretatively, as explanations of our conduct. Imagine 
a situation where John, the grandson of Bill, the man who has raised John, has 
smothered Bill in an act of euthanasia. When asked, "Why did you smother 
Bill?" John answers, "Because I love him." We need to be able to explain what 
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is equivalent and what is different across a range of differing first person and 
third person reports. In order to know what we can understand about 
another's boredom. say. requires an explanation of the semantics of indexicals. 
The most important study of demonstratives (the pronouns 'this'. 'that', 
the adverbs 'today', 'here'. 'now' and others) and indexicals ('I', 'my'. 'you'. 
3 'here', etc.) is that by David Kaplan. Although his study is detailed. the 
essence of it can be summarized simply. Kaplan begins by distinguishing 
between demonstratives and pure indexicals. Demonstratives require an 
associated demonstration of their referent to be understood. To understand the 
statement, 'she is angry'. requires for comprehension some way in which 'she' 
is picked out as the referent. A pure indexical ('I'. 'here'. 'now') is one where 
the linguistic rules for their use fully determine their referent in each 
context (Kaplan, "Demonstratives" 489-491 ). This linguistic fact of the use of 
indexicals has implications for their senses. 
The importance of understanding the semantics of pure indexicals can 
be shown by considering the following statement, "I am here now." In one 
sense the statement cannot be false. Whenever and wherever I utter this 
statement, it will be true. But it is not necessarily true; I could be somewhere 
other than where I am when I utter it. By understanding the idea of context in 
the semantics of indexicals we can, he claims, clarify several issues in the 
logic. semantics and epistemology of demonstratives and indexicals. The 
solution to the problem raised by the puzzle of "I am here now" lies in 
clarifying the sense and reference of indexicals. Two kinds of meaning are 
present in indexicals. Sense, that part of a word's meaning that contributes to 
a statement's being true or false. is composed of content and character 
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(Kaplan, "Demonstratives" 501, 503-506). The content of an expression is 
always taken with respect to a given context of use. If I say, today, "I am bored 
now," and tomorrow you utter the same words. what is said is different. Yet, if 
on the next day I say, "I was bored yesterday," the same content is expressed in 
different contexts. If I were to say, "Mark Armstrong is bored on November 10. 
1994," then the content is the same with respect to all contexts. 
Content refers to propositions; character refers to meaning. The 
character of an expression is that component of sense which determines how 
the content is determined by the context. The statement, "I am here now." can 
be understood in light of this distinction. The character of 'I' in this statement 
determines three features. First, in different contexts. an utterance expresses 
different contents. Second. the content expressed is a contingent proposition. 
Third. in all contexts the utterance "I am here now" is a true proposition. 
Thus, the sentence is analytic; it is true by virtue of its meaning. Character is 
analytic; propositions are necessary or contingent (Kaplan, "Logic" 84 ). 
We must distinguish between the occurrence of an expression (i.e., the 
expression and its context) and the utterance of an expression. Utterances are 
part of our understanding of speech acts; occurrences are sentences in a 
context and fall under the purview of semantics. We are interested in the first 
person emotion reports as occurrences. Kaplan argues that "the linguistic 
conventions which constitute meaning consist of rules specifying the 
referent of a given occurrence of the word in terms of various features of the 
context of occurrence" (Kaplan, "Demonstratives" 523). The rules which fix 
the referent of an indexical do not constitute the content of such an 
occurrence. They determine the content for a particular occurrence of an 
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indexical, but they are not a part of the content. That is, they constitute no 
part of the propositional constituent. But there is another sense of meaning in 
which two occurrences of the same word or phrase must mean the same 
(Kaplan, "Demonstratives" 524). It is thic.; sense of meaning that makes first 
person reports intelligible. 
Dynamic Adjectives Used Predicatively 
There is another way dynamic adjectives differ from stative ones. 
Emotion terms used as adjectives belong to that class of dynamic adjectives that 
describe something's state or condition in terms of some change or operation 
that induces that condition (Gordon 113). They are, thus, similar to adjectives 
like 'magnetized', 'soluble', and 'brittle'. Emotional states and events are 
frequently expressed predicatively: "X is lovable, shameful, pathetic. 
regrettable, irritating," and so on. The delineation of these terms must pick 
out the relevant standard, and that standard will vary according to the 
function of the predicate. The causal complexity inherent in the emotions 
makes these predicables ambiguous and resolving the ambiguity yields 
different possibilities of predication. The predicate, "lovable" can refer to: 
1. the object (who or what is lovable); 
2. that object's propensity or capacity to produce the state; 
3. or, that for which it is permissible or appropriate to experience love 
or regret. 
Not all emotional properties that can be predicated this way fill these three 
roles. "Enviable," "malicious," "malevolent" and "spiteful," for example, can be 
predicated in the first two ways but not the third. These three conditions of 
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predication are instantiations of different sets of success conditions necessary 
for an emotion to be successfully predicated of its object. 
To say that "X is enviable" in the first sense is to, initially at least. pick 
out the particular object of the emotion. As we saw in the discussion of the 
objects of emotions. the initial act of identification is insufficient for knowing 
whether the object is the proper one. To say "X is contemptible." that is, X is 
capable of causing a feeling of contempt (the second sense). is to locate the 
first causal condition that necessarily exists between the focus of the emotion 
and the purported focal property of that object. As we saw. that causal 
condition is, by i~self, explanatorily insufficient. If the reasons that ground 
the emotion are false, then the emotion is irrational. Furthermore, to find an 
action contemptible is not the same as saying it is contemptuous. If the 
judgment implied in the contempt is false, then the agent towards whom the 
emotion is directed may be beyond its effects. 
To be able to say "X is contemptible" in the final sense requires that the 
two sets of conditions be satisfied. First, the reasons that ground the emotion 
must not only be intelligible, they must be true. Second, the causal 
relationship between the emotion's focus and the focal property must be an 
actual property of the object. Finally. the judgment contained in the emotion 
and directed at the particular object must conform to the emotion's formal 
object. 
Unlike the large flea example above, some predicative adjectival uses 
are ambiguous. The statement, "Joe is an angry administrator," admits of two 
possible interpretations. On the first reading we can say, 
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1. Joe is angry 
2. & 1 oe is an administrator 
or we can see 'angry' operating adverbially, 
3. Joe administrates angrily. 
In the first, co-predicational reading, 'angry' is a predicative adjective; and we 
say, of Joe, that he is angry. In the second, adverbial reading we say that some 
aspect of Joe's administrating reveals some quality of anger (Larson and Segal 
4 70-4 71 ). We have difference in the mode of predication. The difference in 
the mode of predication is important because it helps us to locate the 'agency' 
of the emotion by showing us how the emotion operates on us. 
The Attributive Use of Adjectives 
In order to understand the notion of predicate modes we need to 
examine the attributive uses of adjectives. Grammarians employ a simple 
initial test for these central adjectives. Attributive adjectives premodify a 
noun. appearing after a determiner and before the head of a noun phrase 
<Quirk et al. 402). Typically, attributive constructions will be used in four 
different contexts. They can describe an action, e.g., "an angry gesture," name 
an attribute of a person, "a jealous husband;" characterize a feature of an 
event, "a pathetic, last-minute shot;" or identify a feature of judgment, "a 
resentful feeling." Significantly, each use is a kind of qualitative judgment, 
but the specific quality invoked may differ. The phrases, "an angry person," 
"an angry gesture," "an angry scene," and "an angry response" all appeal to 
some property of anger that warrants their use, but there is no reason to think 
that the property appealed to is identical in each use. 
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The differences in meaning in these related uses can be partially 
delineated by a procedure first suggested by Aristotle in Book I of the Topics. 
By examining why the contrary of a particular mode of meaning fails we can 
confirm that the selected mode is correct. The phrase, "Joe bore his sad 
burdens," suggests weight borne with gravity; its contrary would be 
"frivolous." A "sad visage" is one that is composed; its opposite would be 
something like "distraught." A "sad invalid ill three days" suggests something 
unfortunate or regrettable; "heartening" might be its contrary. To say, "A 
funeral is a sad day to see old friends." suggests something "miserable" in the 
circumstances of meeting; "happy" could serve as its contrary. Each sense of 
"sad" has a different contrary and an explanation of why that word is its 
contrary helps confirm the particular sense of "sad" (Ross 129). 
The use of contraries reveals only a part of the semantic value of these 
attributive adjectives. In his work, Portraying Analogy, I. F. Ross discusses 
and elucidates a more precise feature of meaning relations that are pertinent 
here. He argues that adjectival phrases like "angry gesture" and "angry man" 
have contrast dependent denominations of meaning. As their mode of 
predication differs so does the meaning of its contrast dependent relatum. 
Consider the pair "brave man" I "brave deed." If the phrase, "brave man," 
indicates one's character, then "brave deed" is a characteristic of that 
character. If the bravery of "brave man" is a characteristic of that man, then 
a "brave deed" is a manifestation of that characteristic. If the bravery of 
"brave man" refers to a tendency in his conduct, then "brave deeds" are a 
habit with him. If "brave deeds" are a habit, then his bravery is a disposition 
(Ross 129). The contrast dependent meaning relations revealed in this 
example are: 
I . character 
2. characteristic 
3. tendency 
4. habit 
characteristic 
manifestation 
habit 
disposition 
Ross lists twelve common contrast dependent relations: 
1. cause 
2. sign 
3. disease 
4. character 
5. characteristic 
6. manifestation 
7. activity 
8. activity 
9. proclivity 
10. tendency 
11. habit 
12. disposition 
effect 
symptom 
syndrome 
characteristic 
manifestation 
indication 
capacity 
proclivity 
tendency 
habit 
disposition 
function ( 129) 
The contrast-dependent relations provide us with a criterion for delineating 
the semantic value of an attributive adjective. Contrast dependent relations 
yield a further payoff. If we know that a property is, for example, a 
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characteristic. then we can look to see if there is possibly present some related 
issue involving character or some further manifestation that will serve as 
argumentative material. Obviously, the meaning relations do not posit objects. 
they posit semantic possibilities that serve a heuristic function. 
Propositional Objects 
In an earlier section I argued that the objects of the emotions can be 
classified as material or intentional and nonillusory or illusory. This fourfold 
classification was necessary to handle several types of nonexistent objects that 
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result from misidentification or misdescription. In these cases, either the 
. 
object was misidentified or the causal conditions were not properly 
motivating. Crucially, not all misdescriptions will be caught by this division. 
One of Robert Gordon's most important insights was the idea that some 
objects of the emotions can be expressed with a that-clause as the grammatical 
object of the emotion (46, 66, 122): 
1. Joe hopes that he will not forget his lines 
2. Joe trusts that he will not forget his lines 
3. Joe fears that he will forget his lines 
4. Joe is worried that he will forget his lines. 
These objects can occur with present tense states as well; 
5. Joe regrets that he forgot his lines 
6. Joe is ashamed that he forgot his lines. 
This grammatical possibility has been named the propositional object of an 
emotion. Yet we also recognize that it is possible to experience worry, for 
example. without being able to specify what it is that one is worried about. de 
Sousa argues that the fact that an emotion can be experienced. without a 
specifiable object raises a troubling question about the relationship between 
an emotion and its propositional object (137). 
There are several reasons that account for the variable specificity of an 
emotion's propositional object. This variability is most easily explained in 
terms of one's fears. We need to recall two features about one's fears to do this. 
First, fear has two kinds of reasons operating within its cognitive structure. 
There are epistemic reasons and there are attitudinal reasons. Propositional 
objects are more easily expressed as epistemic reasons, and even here there 
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are degrees of specifiability. If the object of the emotion can be seen as an 
event or a situation one can. in principle, specify at some time T: 
I. the agent of the action, 
2. the recipient undergoing the action. 
3. the object moved by the action, 
4. and the goal or purpose of the action. 
This four fold analysis of propositional objects is important for three reasons. 
First. it provides us with a method of explicating the content of these 
judgments held towards the propositional object. Second. these criteria pick 
out those features of the situation that will also possess significance in another 
evaluative domain, whether it is moral, ethical or practical. so that one's 
emotional judgments are conceptually related to these other kinds of 
judgment. Third, the analysis suggests avenues of inquiry into the character 
of the agent having the judgment. Consider. 
Joe is afraid that the storm will destroy his boat. 
The agent of his fear is the storm; the boat is the object of the action; the 
integrity or seaworthiness of the boat is the recipient undergoing the action; 
and the likely destruction of that vessel is the 'goal' of the storm. The 
propositional object of an emotion is successful, in part. if the object, event or 
situation instantiates the formal object of the emoticn. Joe's propositional 
object satisfies that requirement. Yet, we recognize that fears have attitudinal 
reasons, reasons that motivate the agent. In the boat example, Joe's attitudinal 
reason may be reasonably inferred from his epistemic reasons; Joe doesn't 
want his boat destroyed. We can assess the epistemic reasons in a propositional 
object for their reasonableness (which invokes the criteria of likelihood, 
probability, etc.), but that reasonableness also depends on how much weight 
one should give to the attitudinal reason if the event comes to pass. 
Propositional objects may be complete or incomplete. A propositional 
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object is complete if all four characteristics are dealt with. It is incomplete if 
one or more of the characteristics are absent. Although incomplete 
expressions are not necessarily defective, they may be. Again, fear is 
illustrative. The nature and the degree of uncertainty present in the fearful 
situation can affect one's ability to specify the object propositionally. 
Consider, 
Joe is afraid that Mary will Kiss Sam. 
The propositional object names the agent, Mary; it names the recipient, Sam; 
but the description leaves vague why the kissing is fearful; its purposiveness 
is not expressed. Crucially, what is missing in the kissing example is a way to 
assess Joe's attitude towards the kissing. An attitude expresses a relation 
between the subject and its object, and that relationship will comprehend both 
the focus of the emotion as a manifestation of that attitude and the 
intelligibility of focal property of the object relative to the motivational aim of 
the emotion. An attitude held towards a propositional object is successful if the 
attitude is appropriate to the object, event or situation it describes; and the 
property of the object picked out by the attitude instantiates the formal object 
of the emotion in question (de Sousa 139). These criteria are important in two 
ways because the relation points in two directions, so to speak. Frequently, 
what is important about a propositional object is its relation to the situation, 
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but the agent's relationship to the propositional object is no less important 
Thus, the appropriateness of the attitude must also comprehend the stance of 
the subject. 
Attitudes 
The appropriateness of one's attitude towards the propositional object, 
and towards objects in general, is, thus, a crucial issue for persuasive success. 
Emotional attitudes are significant in two ways. Their use implies a broader 
conception of the agent's relation to the objects of the emotions; but perhaps 
more importantly, they suggest an agent's relationship to one's emotions 
themselves. Emotional attitudes are not well understood. Part of the reason 
stems from the relative newness of the concept as a conceptual category. 
According to the OED. the notion of an 'attitude' emerged in the late 
seventeenth century. 
painting or statuary. 
Originally, it denominated the disposition of a figure in 
In the early eighteenth century the term came to 
denominate the posture of the body itself or implying some action or mental 
state. Recently, the first sense was transferred to refer to the orientation of an 
airplane or spaceship relative to its direction of traveL The sense of 'attitude' 
we typically think of emerged in the nineteenth century. The term 'attitude' 
denominates those durative behaviors and mental states that occurrently 
represent feelings, emotions and opinions. They may be viewed aspectually as 
being continuous or frequentive. 
If we are to understand the persuasive potential inherent in one's 
attitudes, the vague notion of an attitude needs to be made more precise. Such 
an explanatory task is not simple. Emotional attitudes serve pragmatic ends, 
and these practical functions do not admit of easy explanation. We can, 
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however. identify four functions that attitudes perform. Most 
straightforwardly, perhaps, attitudes strive for consistency of response; we 
want to have the same emotional response to the same kinds of situations that 
elicit them. We approve or disapprove of people and their actions. We like 
what we find agreeable, and we dislike what is disagreeable. We enjoy what is 
pleasant and endure what is not. Conversely, attitudes strive for consistency 
in motivation. Attitudes help regulate and coordinate the kinds of reasons and 
intentions that are necessary and sufficient for effective motivation. These 
attitudinal judgments also offer a partial causal account of the aspectual 
nature of one's desires. Desires that are frequentive, for example, are 
agreeable, and we presumptively expect that the agent approves the reasons 
present in the second order desire. 
Third, attitudes work to coordinate one's emotional life in two ways. 
They categorize one's emotions by evaluative type: emotions are agreeable or 
disagreeable, approving or disapproving; we like or dislike the object or find 
the object attractive or repellent, and so on. This higher level judgment stands 
in an intermediate relationship between the particular emotions and the 
various virtues as well as the moral and prudential principles that govern 
one's actions. Many of these attitudes are directed at others, and some are 
presumptively agent-neutral. Benevolence is an attitude governed by the 
principle of justice. Gratitude and retribution are contrary attitudes governed 
by one of the principles of reciprocity. Gratitude returns good for good; 
retribution, harm for harm. Sympathy and compassion are concerned with 
issues of non-desert. Some attitudes, though other directed, are personal. We 
love our families. and we feel fidelity towards our friends. Finally. some 
attitudes are directed at oneself or one's well-being. 
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Fourth. attitudes name one of the crucial agencies of purposive change 
in one's emotional life and in one's character. This causal agency manifests 
itself many ways. One common way is through the use of second order 
emotions. The use of second order emotions. for example. is possible because 
one has an attitude towards the targeted emotion. A person can regret being 
afraid. enjoy being titillated. and so on. The first emotion is directed towards 
the object in question; the second is an emotional evaluation of the 
appropriateness or propriety of the first. The appropriate attitude selects the 
second order emotion because that emotion possesses an evaluation that will be 
causally efficacious; it will change the character of one's affective response. 
There are two issues here. We need to distinguish the causal 
mechanisms operating within and on our emotions from the persuasive 
techniques that activate or utilize those mechanisms. Although the programs 
offered by self-help gurus and motivational experts that are now currently 
popular can be faulted for their narrowness of focus and reductive 
psychology's. their programs do recognize the importance and efficacy of this 
function of one's attitudes. Their manuals use exempla and what-if thought 
experiments to help the user project the consequences of a way of life made 
possible by altering one's attitudes. The climax of these procedures typically 
ends with a maxim like. "It is attitude. not aptitude. that will determine the 
altitude of your life." Obviously, their procedures are productive to the extent 
that they have translated a causal mechanism into a regimen for change. 
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Although the individuation of these functions is reasonably clear, the 
criteria we use to deploy these attitudes are not. Perhaps the greatest 
impediment we face in clarifying how the attitudes serve these functions 
comes from the fact that they are dynamic agencies of change in the 
individuaL Attitudes express what we want. When we succeed or fail in 
satisfying these wants, the attitude itself undergoes changes. Sometimes these 
changes are subtle; sometimes they are dramatic. In any event, they are 
comprehended temporally. Throughout our interaction with the object of 
these attitudes over time, we change as agents and the character of our actions 
changes as welL Crucially, the attitude itself changes as welL Attitudes are 
understood as histories within the life of the individuaL The narrative 
character of one's attitudes is related to narrative dimension of emotional 
experience. As the semantic depth of one's emotional concepts changes, the 
domain and scope of the relevant attitude changes as welL 
I want to suggest that this dynamic operates in two broad ways. 
Attitudes related to moral principles, for example, are subject to reflection. 
imagination and reasoning in a way that allows for more or less conscious 
changes of attitude. Attitudes involving love and hate towards individuals, 
one's family, one's friends or one's enemies, for example, change in less 
consciously controllable ways. Love and hate take people as their objects; 
moral principles comprehend actions and states of character. We change 
through our dealings with others; they, in tum, change as well, and the 
attitude itself changes over time. The inner workings of these processes are 
subtle, and they are less open to conscious reflection than are principles of 
action. 
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The dynamic dimension of attitudes is not the only problem one faces m 
characterizing these relations. To serve the first three functions named 
above. attitudes categorize the types of experiences one undergoes. and they 
categorize the emotions themselves. The brief survey of criteria named above 
suggests that there is no obvious classificatory principle operating here. The 
emotions are not subject to the same kind of regimentation and voluntary 
control that moral principles. for example. accept. More importantly. perhaps. 
attitudes articulate these criteria at different levels of generality. We have 
noted that the 'general' is opposed to the specific. and it is opposed to the 
particular. 
I want to look at three broad categories of mental experience that 
involve attitudes. Most generally, we use the word 'attitude' to name states of 
temperament or dispositions. These general stances stand in relation to 
particular emotions and they can specify responses to types of situations. 
Second, we speak of propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes are 
typically expressed by statements like, "A (thinks, believes, hopes, fears, etc.) + 
that-clause." These attitudes are quite specific. and they lie at the opposite end 
of the spectrum from dispositional or temperamental attitudes. There is a third 
category of attitudes that are more general than propositional attitudes but less 
general than temperamental attitudes. The term, 'predicational attitude', 
names a cognitive and evaluative or affective complex held towards some 
object. 
Attitudes, like the emotions, exhibit dispositional or occurrent 
manifestations. The dispositional attitudes may ex~ibit themselves as matters 
of temperament or as tendencies. Grammatically, dispositional attitudes are 
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expressed adjectivally. A person's attitude may be optimistic. pessimistic, 
hopeful, and so on. We can clarify this sense of attitude as a durative state or 
frame of mind by contrasting it with two related phenomena. A person who 
subscribes to moral pessimism. say. the belief that nearly everyone. most of 
the time. does in fact act in what is believed to be his or her self interest. is a 
This individual may or may not, however. have a pessimistic pessimist. 
attitude. It is quite possible that this individual has chosen. as a matter of 
principle. to act in an upright manner. or to ignore the petty and self-
destructive behavior of his neighbors. or to resist the negative consequences 
that such a belief could engender. Whatever attitude the moral pessimist 
adopts is. in principle. justified by that evaluative belief. The justification of 
the moral pessimist's attitude is importantly subject to truth conditions. 
On the other hand. a person who is pessimistic may. in fact. have a tacit 
or explicit belief like the moral pessimist: but it is neither conceptually nor 
causally necessary that he or she do so. A pessimistic attitude is maintained. 
not because it is true; rather. it is maintained because the agent holding the 
attitude finds it practically efficacious. We maintain attitudes of this sort not 
because they are true; we maintain them because they work in practical 
situations. I suggested earlier that the governing principle of a dispositional 
attitude like love or hate is what we want or don't want. In this sense. an 
'attitude' names a motivational stance. This is. I think. correct. but it is 
incomplete. Attitudes do indicate motivational stances. but another principle 
operates within them. Attitudes are also evaluative. The evaluation implicit in 
an attitude is expressed as an expectation. To be 'pessimistic', for example. is to 
expect people to act in certain ways. But this expectation is dynamic. it seeks 
out features of the relevant situation or the properties of individuals that 
confirm that expectation. 
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Individuating the attitude in question from some other feature of the 
attitude is relevant here. To call someone's attitude 'depressing' is not to name 
the attitude in question; rather, it is to identify some aspect, an implication or 
effect perhaps, that evokes the attribution 'depressing'. An attitude that is one 
of temperament (being phlegmatic, choleric, happy, etc.) expresses a reactive 
or dispositional relation to the world. It marshals and partially coordinates 
those relevant aspects of one's character or personality to react to situations. 
A dispositional attitude may also express an inclination to perform some 
characteristic action. Attitudes of this sort are like the lens of a camera. A 
camera lens brings certain features into focus at a certain distance, as well as 
defining the depth of field. An attitude picks out and brings into focus certain 
features of a situation, but it can also restrict how deeply or how closely other 
features of the situation are viewed. What is picked out and what is excluded is 
warranted on practical or motivational grounds rather than exclusively on 
epistemic grounds. 
·To see an attitude as a generalized and practical response warranted on 
grounds of efficacy makes an attitude resemble other long term tendencies in 
one's personality or character. A pessimistic attitude, for example, resembles 
the vices (cruelty, misanthropy, hypocrisy, peevishness, etc.) that people are 
prey to. A vice is a voluntary but unchosen disposition in someone's 
character. It is formed as a response to certain conditions in life, conditions 
like the insufficiency of goods, the indifference of nature, and the propensity 
for malevolence in man (Kekes 66-83). Attitudes, like vices, are voluntary in 
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the sense that we have a choice to act otherwise each time an event that can 
possibly strengthen the attitude in question presents itself. An unwanted 
attitude. like a vice is unchosen in the sense that we do not and would not 
consciously choose to develop that trait in our character. 
Attitudes of this sort come in different degrees of entrenchment. 
Deciding how entrenched the localized manifestation of the attitude may be is 
crucial for determining how one is to make a persuasive appeal in the face of 
it. Like adjectives. the meaning of these attitudinal terms are contrast 
dependent. The more common are listed below: 
I. tendency proclivity 
2. proclivity propensity 
3. propensity inclination 
4. inclination habit 
5. habit habitude 
6. habitude disposition 
7. disposition virtue 
8. disposition vice (Ross 129) 
Entrenchment is apprehended through the agent's tone, and that tone 
magnetizes all of the related attitudinal and emotional manifestations of that 
entrenched stance. 
Propositional Attitudes 
More interestingly for the issue of persuasion. attitudes can be 
occurrent. Bertrand Russell was the first to notice the philosophical interest 
of a class of verbs which we now call 'propositional attitudes'. The term 
'propositional attitude' is used to cover such mental states and events as to 
believe, know, hope, fear, regret, infer, think, see, love, hate, expect, want, 
wish, and the like. Propositional attitude verbs take a that-complement: 
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John believes that Vesuvius erupted in 79 AD 
Hector feared that the thief would steal his computer 
Sally hopes that she will be able to have lunch with you next Monday. 
In each case, the subject believes-true, fears-true or hopes-true that X, where 
X stands for the complement. Propositional attitudes form a paradigmatic set. 
as illustrated in the following example: 
I (hope. fear, think, doubt) that the insurance company will renege 
on its contractual obligations. 
The intuitive idea is that the proposition in the that-clause stands in some 
relation. expressed by the propositional attitude, ~o the grammatical subject. 
An expression where one fears-true, hopes-true or expects-true. and the like. 
implies that there is an object about which people may reasonably disagree, 
when disagreements arise. The disagreement. if there is one, arises over an 
intentional state. We evaluate this intentional state in terms of the criteria 
specified by the formal object that governs the expression of the propositional 
object. The representational state expressed by the complement is successful if 
it appropriately instantiates the normative conditions of rationality under 
which the intentional state of the emotion is evaluated.4 
In situations where one experiences doubt or hesitation about what is 
true. one examines, tests or entertains the belief; and these operations can be 
expressed by "I believe that X." It is possible to entertain a proposition, that is, 
to one considers whether it is plausible, reasonable, or warranted to believe 
that X. One cannot, however, entertain an attitude. Beliefs can be 
hypothetical; emotional attitudes cannot. Of course, one can say, "If X has 
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attitude Y, then X will want Z," where Z names the desired object. But this is not 
the kind of conditionalization I have in mind. Bernard Williams illustrates the 
problem with the example, "If he broke his blasted tricycle again, he'll go 
without his pocket money" ("Morality and Emotion" 211). The irritation is not 
cancelled by the conditionalization. de Sousa pushes this idea even farther. 
He argues that if I express an attitude. I cannot view it hypothetically. I 
already accept it (157). 
Emotional attitudes cannot be expressed as conditionals in the way 
beliefs can because they contain the element of wanting or not wanting it to 
be the case that X. To be sure, we do say, "I want to believe that X is true," but 
this kind of wanting involves a wish that we discover that the facts about the 
world are other than they appear to be. With emotional attitudes, the wanting 
involved may different. Emotional attitudes express a relation between subject 
and object. The characteristics targeted by the attitude are understood in 
terms of what the subject wants or doesn't want the world to be like. Attitudes 
like knowing and believing want the truth; hoping, loving and fearing want 
what is good. When one considers the accuracy of the propositional object of 
an emotional attitude, the procedure followed is not one of entertaining it; it is 
a process of discovery. 
Consider the case of a doctor diagnosing the medical condition of a 
friend with the symptoms of a serious illness. The doctor tells a colleague that, 
I am afraid that I know what Sally's medical problem is. 
Intuitively, we know that the utterance announces the possible discovery of 
the source of the problem, and it expresses the mental state of the utterer. 
Actually, there are two ways in which we can explain the relation between 
being afraid and knowing: 
I am afraid (that I know what Sally's medical problem is), 
or it can mean. 
I am afraid that I know (what Sally's medical problem is). 
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In the first case, the doctor discovers that his fears have proved true. It 
expresses a statement about his own relation of discovering the truth of her 
condition. In the second case. the doctor expresses a mental state or stance he 
holds in relation to her condition. Like the first, the second interpretation is a 
discovery, but it is a discovery about the subject. The second statement is an 
expression of self discovery; it expresses a judgment about the doctor's own 
emotional stance towards the object. Emotional attitude statements are 
particular expressions within the narrative history of that attitude, and the 
dynamic processes operating there affect the subject in a way that the other 
propositional attitudes do not. The temporal dynamic can affect the appraisal 
of the object{s) of that attitude as well. To distinguish these two possible 
analyses we need to recognize that emotion terms can also express 
predicational attitudes. 
Predjcational Attitudes 
Propositional attitudes like 'thinks that', 'hopes that', and 'fears that' 
play a crucial role in the emotions. There is another class of attitudes that 
emotions participate in. In her discussion of emo.tional ambivalence, Patricia 
Greenspan recently argued that some emotional states express what she calls 
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predicational attitudes (231-234 ). Ambivalence. the holding of two contrary 
attitudes towards a common object. is a common enough experience. She asks 
us to imagine a case where a colleague. whom I like and respect. and I are 
competing for the same promotion. The colleague wins the promotion. I may 
have ambivalent emotions towards my colleague's winning that can be 
expressed: 
I think it is good that she won 
I think it is bad that she won. 
If I am expressing a propositional attitude. then the statements would be 
analyzed: 
I think (it is good that she won) 
I think (it is bad that she won). 
This analysis does not capture the notion that it is my attitude. rather than my 
belief. that is ambivalent. I do not have contrary beliefs; I have contrary 
attitudes. A more accurate analysis of ambivalence would be: 
I think it is good (that she won) 
I think it is bad (that she won). 
After all. what I am expressing with ambivalent feelings are contrary attitudes 
towards a common object. that she won. More importantly. this contrary 
attitude expresses a judgment. The statement "I think it is good that she won," 
is logically equivalent to: 
I think ((that she won) is good). 
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This logical equivalence turns out to be important for our understanding of 
the role attitudes and their judgmental stance can take. Judgments within an 
emotional episode manifest themselves as the belief conditions present 
themselves. The assent to the success conditions that constitute the emotion 
are understood temporally. 
This assent presents itself as a kind of discovery; we find. see. or learn 
that we feel X. When we reflect on our emotional state. we find that this assent 
may be expressed by statements like: 
1. I see that I am pained by X (where x stands for some bad thing) 
2. I find that I am disturbed by X 
3. I find that I am distressed over X 
4. I see that I am disappointed by X 
5. I find that I am angered by X 
6. I find that I am resentful about X 
7. I see that I am envious of X 
8. I find that I am jealous of X 
This attitude expresses a judgment if. like the case of contrary attitudes. the 
statement can be expressed in the logically equivalent form: 
I find ((that X) is painful. disturbing. distressing, disappointing, etc.). 
Statements I through 4 fit this logical form, but statements 5 through 8 cannot 
be placed in logically equivalent form. They are causal reports of the 
emotional state I am experiencing. Statement 5, for example. is equivalent to "I 
find that X angers me;" statement 6 states that "I find that X makes me feel 
resentful." and so on. It is the judgment, not the causal force of the episode, 
that will affect the deliberative judgment in the correct way. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter began with the claim that the deliberative emotions are 
sensitivities capable of producing salience. That sensitivity directs the agent's 
attention to what is significant. But the presence of attitudes that govern 
these emotions introduces other dimensions to the comprehension of salience. 
Attitudes categorize emotional experience by situational type and by the kinds 
of emotions that are relevant to those situations. This process of categorization 
implies a causal role that attitudes play in the life of the emotions and in 
determining who we are. 
These are complex issues, and they will be explored in the next chapter. 
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ENDNOTES CHAPI'ER IV 
Lyons 104-112. The idea that emotions have objects is, of course, an 
ancient one. The direction of current research has taken its cue from Book II 
of Horne's Treatise . In this century the important research began again with 
Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1963 ). The two most important discussions of this idea are found in Lyons 
( 1980) and Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge: MIT P, 
1987) chap 5. I follow the ideas of these two closely in what follows. 
2 For a discussion of the semantic promise, complexities and puzzles 
involving the use of the comparative form to mark the delineation, see Platts. 
174-189. 
3 See, David Kaplan, "On the Logic of Demonstratives," Journal of 
Philosophical Logic 8 (1978) 81-98; and David Kaplan, "Demonstratives." 
Themes from Kaplan, ed. Joseph Alrnog, John Perry and Howard Wettstein (New 
York: Oxford UP, 1989) 481-614. 
4 de Sousa 139. 
CHAPTERV 
HARM AND THE DELmERATIVE EMOTIONS 
No mortal is there but pain finds him out 
And sickness; many must their children bury, 
And sow fresh issue; death is the end for all; 
In vain do these things vex the race of men, 
Earth must go back to earth: then life by all 
Like crops is reaped. So bids Necessity. 
Euripedes, Hypsopyla 
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[Thrasymachus] was also clever at rousing a crowd to anger and 
again at soothing its anger by his spells; most powerful was he also 
in devising and dissipating calumnies, whatever their source. 
Phaedrus 267c 9 
Emotions and attitudes are purposive. As William Lyons points out in his 
important study, Emotion, the idea of 'purposive' is ambiguous; it suggests 
three different interpretations. First, emotions are 'purposive' in the sense 
that 'they give rise to purposive behavior'. When fears and desires have 
appropriate objects, we are properly motivated. Our judgments of approbation 
and disapprobation are partly constituted by those emotions that help form 
that judgment. More generally, an emotion directs its focus or attention 
towards some object, picking out some property for evaluation. When some 
feature of the deliberative situation is understood in terms of a particular 
emotion, then we have achieved salience. Second, they are 'purposive' 
because they can serve some function. They are purposive in the sense that 
they are useful; they organize or disrupt our experience, and they help 
constitute what is fitting or inappropriate. In addition to the distinction 
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between useful and useless emotions operating as a part of our conduct, 
emotions may be thought of as socially approved or disapproved. The third 
sense of purposive suggests that emotions are had for some purpose. This final 
sense implies that the purposes in our emotions are species of manipulation or 
deception. directed at others or oneself (178). While this can cenainly be the 
case, the families of deception and coercion are not the purpose of this study. 
Virtually no one writing on the emotions, ancient or modem, disputes 
the claim that emotions are purposive. We frequently explain actions with 
phrases like, "I did it because I wanted to ... ," "They quit because they feared 
that. . ., " or "she brought suit because she was angry that he refused to support 
the children." This purposiveness is one of the most reputable notions in our 
commonsense view of the emotions and action. ·These writers disagree 
vigorously, however, on the explanatory role this fact plays in a broader 
theory of action and in a theory of self interest. In his essay, "Wants and 
Intentions in the Explanation of Action," Robert Audi usefully summarizes the 
differences among the three theoretical models we appeal to explain actions. 1 
There is the covering law model, where action is explained in terms of a law 
that covers, in the sense of entailing, the phenomenon to be explained. 2 
There is the hermeneutic model, where the central feature of the explanation 
is "expressing the meaning, for the agent, of the action explained."3 There is 
the Aristotelian model, where action is explained in terms of final causes with 
the agent serving as the efficient cause. Although each theory accepts the 
different senses of 'purposive' delineated above, each theory differs as to what 
is explained, and each theory carries different ex.planatory strengths. 
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Likewise, the claim that emotions are purposive has ramifications for 
our notion of rational self interest. Derek Parfit outlines the differences 
among the three competing theories of rational self interest in Reasons and 
Persons (493-502). Hedonistic theories argue that what is best for someone is 
what makes his life happiest. Desire-fulfillment theories argue that what is 
best for someone is what best fulfills his desires. Objective list theories argue 
that certain things are good or bad for us, whether we want them or not 
(Parfit 493-495). Certainly, many desires will be shared by the proponents of 
each of these theories, but the value and importance of these desires will vary 
with each theory. The role of the desires will differ because those desires will 
be justified in different ways. 
We are concerned in this chapter with the conceptual and pragmatic 
relationships that exist between the first two interpretations of the claim that 
the emotions are purposive. and which must be explained as part of any 
successful theory of action or rational self interest. Fortunately, we do not 
have to decide which theory is best in either domain in order to proceed with 
our arguments. Although we are able conceptually to distinguish these two 
senses of 'purposive', the success conditions that operate under either 
interpretation work together in the argument from pathos. In this chapter I 
want to explore the necessary success conditions that must obtain for the 
argument from pathos to be cognitively purposive. 
In Book II of the Rhetoric Aristotle uses the two senses of 'purposive' 
distinguished above to name the elements necessary for emotional persuasion 
to be successful. He distinguishes three conditions that are necessary and 
jointly sufficient for emotional persuasion to be effected. Emotion produces 
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changes which affect judgment. The emotion is directed towards some object 
and that object can be an action, a person, a situation or thing. The state of 
mind of the agl!nt experiencing the emotion will provide opportunities for 
persuasion by directing that agent's attention and focus towards some aspect of 
the situation by controlling the intensity and strength of the episode. Finally, 
emotions are thought dependent; they are constituted by beliefs and 
judgments. Comprehending these will lead to an understanding of the kinds of 
reasons that can be appealed to will affect the success of the appeal. 
These success conditions will be explored in four stages. First, I will 
characterize the two classes of emotions that operate in deliberation. The 
emotions that function in deliberation are constituted by beliefs and 
judgments of various sorts, which help characterize the mind of the person 
experiencing the emotion; and these in turn help explain what sorts of 
reasons will be efficacious. The discussion of those features present in the 
deliberative emotions will lead to the second stage of inquiry. There are 
several success conditions that must be satisfied if an emotion is to tell us 
something about the world and thus achieve salience. As mentioned above, 
salience is the condition whereby we understand a deliberative situation in 
terms of some relevant emotion. Salience is necessary because it is the ground 
from which the other possible persuasive functions inherent in the argument 
from pathos grow. Finally, one's possible role in a deliberative situation 
largely determines what emotional responses are possible and. of those. which 
are appropriate. Thus, the necessary success conditions for salience must be 
buttressed by a discussion of point of view and agency. These success 
conditions are the subject of this chapter and the next. This chapter will 
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explore which emotions are efficacious in deliberation and for what 
substantive reasons. The next chapter will discuss point of view. 
The Deliberative Emotions 
At the beginning of Chapter II. I named the four formal success 
conditions necessary for the argument from pathos to work. It is time now to 
move beyond formal issues and explore some the substantive issues operating 
in several particular emotions that are important to deliberation. 
Of the several hundred emotions, moods and feelings for which we have 
names, not all (thankfully} are appropriate candidates for successful use in 
emotional . 4 persuasiOn. We are limited by an important practical 
consideration. The practice of emotional persuasion implies that we concern 
ourselves with only those emotions for which we can exercise some control 
over the effects sought. Grumpiness, peevishness and insincerity are 
unmanageable in their effects. Likewise, querulousness, irascibility and 
dudgeon, for example, can be eliminated because they are either too 
dispositionally entrenched or because they are chronic susceptibilities in 
one's character. Others are too remote from deliberative concerns to be of 
much use; it is difficult to see how the emotions of torpor and lassitude could be 
utilized. There are two reasons these emotions fail. Each of the emotions just 
mentioned fails because none gives rise to purposive behavior, and none can 
be seen as serving the purposes of the people having that emotion. 
We have two classes of emotions that meet these two criteria and, in fact, 
function in the deliberative search. The first class of deliberative emotions 
are the emotions of self-assessment. With good reason, David Hume 
characterized these emotions the 'indirect passions' (Book II, Part 1, sections I-
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III 275-282). In the class of 'indirect passions' Home includes pride, humility, 
shame, vanity, love, hatred, pity. jealousy, malice and generosity. To this list 
we can add anger, resentment, indignation, envy, sympathy, compassion, 
regret and grief, among others. His attempt at characterizing these emotions 
reveals a significant feature of the deliberative emotions. Home argued that 
our comprehension of these emotions requires a distinction between that 
emotion's causes and its object. He also argued that we must both distinguish 
between and discern the 'connection' between the qualities which occasion 
that emotion and the person who undergoes that emotion. That is, for the 
emotion to be present the agent must not only be aware of what causes the 
emotion. but he must also be aware that it is possessed by or due to the self or 
another. Baldly stated, a deliberative emotion will have two sets of causes. The 
first 'cause' names an antecedent event or condition that precipitates the 
second 'cause'. The second 'cause' is one's assent to a belief or judgment about 
the antecedent cause. That assent eventuates the emotional episode. Thus, 
within the set of beliefs and attitudes that structure an emotion one belief is 
decidedly causal, the assent to which precipitates the emotion. Furthermore, 
that belief is, in some important way, self referential. 
The emotions that comprise the first class are central to deliberative 
concerns. Its members share four characteristics. First, the emotion takes as 
its formal object an evaluation of some feature of that experience that is bound 
to the well-being of communities or individuals. An emotion's formal object is 
essential to our understanding of the emotion in question because the formal 
object is that part of the emotion that makes the particular object of an 
emotional episode rationally intelligible. As we have seen, the formal object of 
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an emotion names that property or quality present in the emotion's definition 
which the particular object of each emotional episode must instantiate if the 
emotion is to be one of that type. Second, these emotions will have desiderative 
or evaluative conditions which are cognitively manifested in the form of 
oeliefs. attitudes and desires that constitute it, and these conditions are capable 
of comprehending both the actions of agents as well as their characters. The 
cognitive structure of four emotions will be discussed below and will serve to 
illustrate the complexities of these conditions. 
Third. the deliberative emotions do not occur in psychological isolation. 
Over time we experience a broad range of occurrent emotional episodes. While 
many of these are seen as spontaneous episodes, in the sense that their 
appearance is not under voluntary control, we recognize that these 
occurrences can be seen as signs of deeper and more fundamental aspects of 
our characters. Perhaps the most obvious instance of this fact is the 
recognition that some emotions are manifestations of traits. For example, if 
Joe is repeatedly anxious in unfamiliar situations, then Joe is temperamentally 
anxious. To call someone's temperament irascible or phlegmatic is to say at 
least two things. First, there is a 'cross-situational consistency' in that 
person's behavior. A person's behavior is 'cross-situationally' consistent if 
three conditions are met. Different situations will produce the same emotion if 
they have common incentives, they provide a range of emotional options as 
possible responses, and they are relevant to a person's goals. Second, there is a 
demonstrated stability of temperament of over time. 5 Although these traits are 
common, traits of temperament are not the only way in which an emotion 
forms a part of a larger pattern. 
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An occurrent emotional episode is a determinant of some determinable. 
Just as pink and scarlet are determinants under the determinable red. 
resentment and anger are determinants under the determinable called the 
retributive emotions. The determinable involves the idea of retribution. The 
retributive emotions are. in tum. determinants under the determinable of the 
virtue of justice. The determinable is. typically. some disposition. character 
trait or virtue. The emotion exists as a member of a permanent ordered family 
with a governing disposition such as temperance. justice and benevolence. 
Appetitive desires are partially governed by the virtue of temperance. Pity 
and indignation are informed by a sense of injustice. Compassion. kindness 
and sympathy are governed by benevolence. 
These propensities can also manifest themselves as sentiments. A proud 
man is one who takes pride in his pride. While the emotion is a fallible sign of 
some disposition. this disposition. when present. is important because it 
manifests itself as a kind of attentiveness or propensity to raise questions or 
animate related concerns. This propensity is recognized by the type of 
explanation required in giving an account of the particular emotional episode. 
Finally. the relevant sentiment. attitude. disposition or virtue. along 
with the complex belief structure within the deliberative emotions. make it 
possible to experience a range of coordinate emotions. This condition can 
manifest itself in two ways. First. a deliberative emotion is frequently 
compatible with other deliberative emotions. A brutal crime. for instance. can 
produce several emotions simultaneously: pity for its victims. indignation on 
their behalf. anger or resentment directed at the perpetrators. and horror at 
the crime itself. Second. while the particular deliberative emotion people 
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experience may be determined by their roles in the deliberative situation. the 
evaluative component of these emotions are sufficiently complex to 
accommodate that fact of perspective without a loss to our persuasive 
possibilities. That loss is prevented because the coordinate emotions will 
invoke the relevant moral or practical concept as part of their formal objects. 
The deliberative emotions are also compatible with the property-
response emotions discussed in the previous chapter. These emotions comprise 
the second class of emotions that are important to persuasion. One feature of 
the property-response emotions differs crucially from the deliberative 
emotions. The deliberative emotions carry some evaluation of the world 
within the structure of their beliefs. The direction of fit in the deliberative 
emotions moves from us to the world. The direction of fit in the property-
response emotions moves from the world to us. They are important in 
deliberation because they are instrumentally efficacious. As we have noted 
earlier. they focus the impetus of the deliberative emotion by inclining one's 
attention towards one feature of that emotion as opposed to another. When an 
author creates surprise, for instance, the sense of immediacy carries force. 
The property-response emotions are, thus, useful matter for producing 
enargia, the power of a passage to make something vivid and immediate; and 
they provide matter to produce the effect of amplification. Amplification is 
achieved through the successful deployment of tactical arguments that direct 
and modulate those aspects of the targeted emotion to achieve one's persuasive 
purpose. 
In order to see how these four features manifest themselves we will 
examine in some detail four emotions (pity, indignation, fear, and anger) that 
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are important in deliberation. Pity, indignation and anger are emotions 
concerned with what we think people deserve or fail to deserve. Fear is also 
important in this area of concern. There are occasions where we can and do 
fear what we don't deserve, but we can also fear what we do deserve. Fear, 
however, is important because it stands as a counterpart emotion to pity and 
functions within the emotion of anger. Initially, each emotion will be 
discussed individually, and later I will discuss several ways we coordinate 
them. 
Harm and Four Deliberative Emotions 
Many of our emotions are directed at external goods that we place high 
value on; and, typically, these goods lie beyond our control so that they can be 
harmed in various ways. These goods can be harmed through human agency. 
We frequently suffer from limited knowledge, limited intelligence, and limited 
sympathies. With the case of limited sympathies, for example, we find that 
agents can be indifferent. malevolent, unfair or deceptive. Significantly. we 
also find that circumstances can harm those activities and performances 
which are important to our lives in one of four ways. First, some material 
resource, instrumental means or capacity necessary for the completion or 
attainment of that activity can be blocked. The blockage of the resource can 
be partial so that the end is delayed, constrained or impeded. If the resource, 
absolutely necessary for that activity, is absent, then the impediment totally 
blocks the activity. Third, circumstances may harm our activities when they 
deprive us the very object or end of the activity itself. If the loss of the object 
is temporary, then the harm is partial. If the loss is permanent or complete, 
then the harm is total. If we lose a friend, the harm is total and we grieve 
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(Nussbaum, Fragility 327). But partial losses due to circumstances can produce 
an ancillary harm. While we are not totally prevented from performing the 
activity, we can be harmed when that impediment prevents us from 
appreciating the value of what we are doing. Harm itself, and the possibilities 
for harm. produce many emotions. 
While we can understand harm in terms of its extent and formal mode of 
achievement, we also recognize that harm may be deserved or undeserved. 
Certainly, many people commit stupid actions and lead foolish or vicious lives 
and the consequences of their actions catch up to them. But not all harms are 
deserved. In his important study, Facing Evil. John Kekes argues that evil is 
undeserved harm (4, 50). Some undeserved harms are 'simple'. An act of 
simple harm, he argues, "is to deprive people of the minimum requirements of 
their welfare" (51). When the physiological, psychological and sociological 
matters that constitute part of the minimum requirements of human welfare 
are damaged simple evil occurs. There are. for example. certain physiological 
conditions necessary for life. We need, for example, air, water and food. While 
the specific needs here will vary somewhat from individual to individual, they, 
along with other physiological conditions, form a core of constant needs 
shared by all. 
Furthermore, we have such psychological capacities as thinking, 
remembering, imagining wishing and language use that form a port of human 
nature. These capacities are not exercised in isolation; their expression and 
functioning are dependent on our families and friends. Much that forms the 
minimal conditions of our psychological well-being is relational. Social life 
exists, in part, because it is necessary for satisfying the needs of human 
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nature. Kekes argues further that "simple harm is caused by frustrating the 
needs and curtailing the exercise of the capacities" inherent in human nature 
(53). Premature death, preventable diseases, dismemberment, chronic and 
lasting pain, prolonged thirst and hunger, and torture, among others, are 
simple harms. Furthermore, these harms are evil. Simple evil "is to cause 
harm to people who don't deserve it." There are, to be sure, other harms. 
Complex evil "is undeserved harm inflicted on a particular conception of the 
good life" (53). These conceptions vary historically, culturally and 
individually. These conceptions go beyond the minimal requirements for 
avoiding simple harm, but they also presuppose the existence of them. 
By examining pity, fear, indignation and anger. emotions which can be 
precipitated by harm, we see more clearly the nature of the deliberative 
emotions and what is at stake here. 
~ 
Pity is a deeply important emotion in a variety of contexts, and 
Aristotle's discussion of it is both important and instructive. He defines pity as 
"a certain pain at an apparently destructive and painful happening to one 
who does not deserve it and which the person might expect himself or one of 
his own to suffer, and this when it is close at hand" (1385b 11-14). For this 
painful occurrence to qualify as pity three conditions must be met. The first 
two conditions specify what is at stake and our corresponding beliefs about the 
situation confirm the presence of those conditions; the third condition entails 
a causal belief that we see our own possibilities as being like those of the 
sufferer. 
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First. the individual pitied is really suffering. The suffering must be 
significant. We do not pity those who have lost their car keys. Aristotle 
divides the occasions of suffering with the right degree of magnitude into two 
causal classes: the painful and the injurious. and substantial damages caused 
by luck. He cites as typical occasions for pity such conditions as the loss of 
friends, the loss of effective opportunities for effective action. sickness. old 
age, impending death, childlessness, the loss of children, and bad children. 
Two further observations may be made here about the first condition. We can 
and do have emotional responses to conditions that do not have the requisite 
magnitude for pity. The responses vary from kindness (an attentive response 
that pays special attention to the justice of the injured's feelings), to sympathy 
and on to benevolence. The other observation is only implicit in Aristotle's 
account. There are individuals who live in privation or penury and do not 
recognize their condition. Others are so brutalized that they do not recognize 
that the nature of their condition warrants a sense of suffering. I want to 
suggest that what we feel here is compassion and not pity. Lawrence Blum 
argues that in these situations compassion is an attitude requiring a 
distinction between naming the necessary conditions to identify who or what 
is an appropriate object for compassion and what the necessary conditions are 
for compassion to be the dominant emotional response (Blum. "Vocation" 186). 
Furthermore. many individuals who recognize their situation as potentially 
piteous frequently find expressions of pity acts of insult. This psychological 
fact implies an important feature of emotion and judgment. Judgment in the 
emotion of pity is asymmetric from the point of view of the agent who is 
suffering and the individual witnessing the agent's suffering. 
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The second conditior for pity requires that the suffering be 
undeserved. This undeserved suffering appeals to our sense of injustice (85b 
24ff). Martha Nussbaum has argued that this condition carries a generalized 
truth: we are capable of pity only if we believe that there are good people and 
that they are vulnerable to undeserved misfortune. A cynic, for example, is 
incapable of experiencing pity because the cynic believes that everyone 
deserves the suffering they undergo. 6 As Aristotle argues. we typically praise 
and blame voluntary actions (1109b 30-32). If an action is involuntary 
because the agent acted from nonculpable ignorance, then the agent deserves 
pity and indulgence from the pitier. We further recognize that there is an 
important but elusive connection between desert and autonomous action, 
between what should be and undeserved harm or undeserved merit. All claims 
of desert have a common structure; they assert that some person deserves some 
occurrence or mode of treatment in virtue of some fact about the agent or the 
situation. These claims have the schematic form, "Agent S deserves treatment 
X for reason A" (Sher 7). What counts as the reason for desert may differ in 
detail. It may be some action on the part of the agent or it may be some 
characteristic or attainment. The idea of desert excludes the arbitrary or 
unexplainable dimensions of human experience. Pity shares with desert 
questions of causation, responsibility and innocence. 
The sense of injustice may be enough to inspire pity, but Aristotle 
insists that the pitier also has the belief that one's possibilities are similar to 
that of the sufferer. Pity has a self-regarding element and thus differs from 
sympathy, a close relative, in crucial respects. As. Aristotle accurately 
observes, we pity in others what we fear for ourselves. If the pitied individual 
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is subject to undeserved misfortune then the pitier is likewise vulnerable to 
chance misfortune. Sympathy, on the other hand, is animated by a broader 
conception of those who are the target of that emotion. Sympathy requires a 
more general or universal recognition of one's kinship with undifferentiated 
humanity. The domain of sympathy is larger because the criterion for 
membership is more inclusive. Still, the belief which relates oneself to others 
in sympathy is causal in the same way the corresponding belief in pity is 
causal. Empathy owes its existence in part to the larger domain that is the 
concern of sympathy. But empathy also tries to find some imaginative 
mechanism with the effective power of pity's causal belief. While empathy 
owes its existence to the power of these emotions it is not an emotion. Empathy 
is the imaginative projection of oneself into the role of another or the 
identification with another's thoughts and feelings. Empathy is a developed 
capacity that is a part of the moral imagination. The self-regarding element 
that is necessary for sympathy and pity to be what they are is absent from 
empathy. 
The justificatory and causal conditions necessary for pity imply that 
there are particular contraries to pity. Aristotle argues that pity has two 
contraries. The causal belief locates the first contrary of pity. We have a 
corresponding fear concerning our own vulnerability. This is a causal 
contrary. We also have a contrary concerned with the evaluative object of 
pity. Pity is concerned with undeserved and significant misfortune; 
indignation is concerned with undeserved and significant good fortune. These 
emotions will be discussed in the next two sections. Contrary emotions are 
209 
important because they reveal the dynamic interplay between the causal and 
evaluative dimensions operating within the emotion itself. 
But we must remember that the genus in which the emotion is one of its · 
species also has contraries. These genera should be thought of as dispositions. 
We have already noted one pair of contrary dispositions. our desires and fears. 
But there are also contrary dispositions within the classes of desires and fears. 
Benevolence. for example, has malevolence as its contrary disposition. and 
retribution has gratitude as its contrary. We can adopt one of four possible 
responses to the fact that our lives are subject to misfortune. We can be 
indifferent. or we can be cynical. We can feel compassion. or we can feel 
malice. Malice is the contrary of compassion. There will be emotions within 
the contrary genus that are inversions of their counterparts in the opposite 
genus. 
Compassion has pity as one of its species; malice has contempt as its 
counterpart emotion. Pity is a painful feeling directed at the significant and 
undeserved misfortune! of others. Contempt is a pleasurable feeling directed at 
that which is judged unworthy. These pairings can be expressed as an 
analogy: 
pity compassion : : contempt : malice 
Just as fear is the causal contrary of pity. pique is a causal contrary of 
contempt. Indignation is the evaluative contrary of pity; envy is the 
evaluative contrary of contempt. If pity has fear as its causal contrary, 
indignation will have a causal contrary as well; that contrary is shame. (I will 
argue for these contraries in the next section.) Three conditions within the 
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emotions--significance, the lack of desert, and the strength of the emotion--
may be felt as a matter of degree and can also be expressed as analogies: 
pity fear : : contempt : pique 
pity indignation : : contempt : envy 
pity fear : : indignation : shame 
The analogies with their multiple scales offer us a way to locate argumentative 
material. discern significance, and afford us with a powerful method for 
amplification. Finally, the significance of the harm leads to another pair of 
contrasted emotions. We reserve the expression 'to feel sorry for' to describe a 
painful feeling directed at situations where the misfortune is not significant 
enough to warrant pity. Schadenfreude is a pleasurable feeling directed at the 
petty misfortunes of others. 
The contrary dispositions of compassion and malice suggest that we 
have two psychological and evaluative levels that we can appeal to. We can 
address the occurrent emotion or the disposition governing it. Actually, the 
dispositions of compassion and malice participate in an even higher pair of 
contrary judgments. The disposition to act compassionately is, itself. grounded 
in two kinds of judgments: that cases involving such circumstances are 
undeserved and that compassion is a particular manifestation of the more 
general disposition to act with benevolence. Benevolence names the 
determinable that has kindness, generosity, gratitude, humaneness as well as 
compassion as its determinates. The nature of the nondesert acts as the 
differentia of compassion under this determinable. Likewise, the disposition 
of malice is grounded in a judgment that such acts are deserved and that 
malice is a particular manifestation of the more general disposition to act with 
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malevolence. Malevolence names the determinable that has meanness, 
selfishness, ingratitude, hatred as well as cruelty as its determinates. 
When an emotion can be made salient at the occurrent level, we have 
two other psychological levels of increasing generality and which are also 
under greater voluntary control that we can appeal to. What is apprehended 
ar the occurrent and particular level can, a fortiori, be strengthened or 
modified at a higher level. Furthermore, what is not seen at a more concrete 
level may be apprehended at a higher level. 
Yet the further pursuit of contraries with their inherent persuasive 
potentialities in this way can lead to problems. I need to introduce several 
complications to these observations. It is tempting at this point to schematize 
the process of seeking the contraries for pity. We can do so by formalizing the 
conditions present in that emotion: 
X is a (painful/pleasant) emotion directed at 
(significant/insignificant) and (dese rvedlund e served) 
(good fortune/misfortune) for (oneself/another). 
By ranking the conditions on a continuum moving from general to specific. 
one can map them through a tree diagram. 'Desert' names the most general 
determinable; it has two contrary determinates, 'deserved' and 'undeserved'. 
These two contraries serve, in tum, as determinables with two contrary 
determinates, good fortune and misfortune. Good and bad fortune have two 
contraries, pleasure and pain. By adding the distinctions of significance and 
insignificance, and the distinctions between self regarding and other 
regarding emotions, we can finish mapping out the tree. (See the chart on the 
next page.) There are 32 possibilities for particular emotions; but, 
significantly, we don't have 32 particular emotions that map onto these 
possibilities. It is important to see why this is so and what it reveals. 
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Such a procedure assumes that the emotions in this class are fixed (all of 
the possibilities are identified), exhaustive (all of the possibilities are named), 
and disjoint (each term names only one emotion). While the class is fixed, all 
of its members are not named. We don't have a name, for example, for the 
pleasant emotion directed at the significant and undeserved good fortunes of 
others. 7 The relevant terms are not disjoint. 'Sympathy' names an occurrent 
emotion and an attitude. The phrase, 'that's pathetic.' is ambiguous. It can be 
used to point to a situation deserving of pity, and it can be an expression of 
contempt. The ambiguity of expressions like 'pathetic' suggests that the 
relevant judgment is grounded in a deeper disposition and the depth of one's 
judgment within one's character is not captured by this procedure. 
The ambiguity of these expressions suggests a further complication. We 
have ambivalent feelings. In cases of ambivalence we do not have contrary 
beliefs; we have contrary attitudes that are held towards a common object, that 
is, we have the contrary attitudes of judging-it-good and judging-it-bad that 
are held towards a common object. These are called predicational attitudes. We 
saw earlier that we have contrary dispositions expressed as attitudes towards 
these conditions. The scope of one's attitudes is not captured by this 
schematization process. The predicational attitudes revealed in case of 
ambivalence are useful evidence for comprehending the hierarchical culprit 
that creates it. 
"" 1-' w 
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The schematization project outlined above does name the 32 possible 
responses to deserved and undeserved good and bad fortune. It assumes 
falsely, however, that one's emotional responses will be particular emotions. 
To be sure. we do have the particular emotions of pity, indignation, fear and 
envy. But not all of our emotional responses are particular. Some of our 
emotional responses are manifestations of more general dispositions and 
judgments that are specified responses to the particular deliberative situation. 
This is especially clear in cases involving the virtues. 
Consider one's pleasurable emotional responses to deserved good 
fortune. One can. of course, feel pride; and we saw in the previous chapter 
how pride works. But significantly, one can respond through and give 
expression to the appropriate virtues that govern our actions in these cases. 
can respond to deserved and significant good fortune for myself with 
equanimity and insignificant but deserved good fortune with equability. 
CThere are negative possibilities as well. Equanimity has amour propre as its 
contrary.) My response to another's insignificant and deserved good fortune 
can be an expression of geniality, and my response to significant good fortune 
can flow from a generous spirit. Each response manifest itself as an emotional 
expression. Our responses are manifestations of perceptual sensitivities that 
attend to what the situation requires, and each response is an expression of 
some virtue--magnanimity, humility or benevolence. Just as we can respond 
to deserved good fortune virtuously we can respond to undeserved bad fortune 
through the virtues. Kindness is a sensitivity to the propriety of another's 
feelings. Kindness is not gentleness. One can be gentle with another's 
feelings without attending to their reasons for being upset. In cases 
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requmng kindness but not gentleness we are attentive to the justice of those 
feelings. 8 The general capacity that structures one's virtuous response is made 
specific in the occurrent situation. 
Indi~nation 
In her detailed analysis of the retributive emotions. Jean Hampton 
defines indignation as a defiant protest against an immoral action or event by 
defending the value which the action violated (59). While the specific value 
defended may vary, it will be an instar.tiation of moral desert. 'Desert' names 
that principle which justifies the differential distribution of goods in society 
that mark differences between people. While it is the defense of a value, 
indignation is typically experienced on behalf of another person. The 
emotion focuses on some property of the action or event that we judge 
'immoral'. If the person judging the action as immoral can be harmed as a 
result. the emotion experienced will be fear or anger. not indignation. Unlike 
anger, where the agent's status can be diminished, it is the value that is seen 
as diminished rather than the agent who is the victim. As Jean Hampton 
observes. "indignant people fear that not to oppose a wrongdoer's challenge to 
some value may be to encourage further challenges to people's values" (59). 
Even though one's judgment in indignation concerns moral criteria, 
there is a tendency in this emotion to view the wrongdoer as morally inferior 
and oneself as morally superior, increasing one's sense of self-righteousness. 
The phrase 'righteous indignation' is frequently applied to an adolescent's 
confused reactions over bruised honor. While adolescents often confuse anger 
with indignation, their confusion conceals an important aspect of this 
emotion. 'Righteous indignation' can mean that one is prone to these protests, 
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but it can also mean that some immoral actions are worthy of protest.9 What a 
person feels indignation about names the possible objects of that emotion. 
What is worthy of indignation names the possible objects of the sentiment that 
governs the emotional occurrence. 
It is the value of moral desert that Aristotle has in mind when he argues 
that indignation is the evaluative contrary of pity. Pity is concerned with the 
undeserved and significant misfortune of another whose situation we 
recognize as similar to our own. We feel indignation at the significant and 
undeserved good fortune of others (1386b). We are, thus, indignant at acts like 
discrimination, nepotism, and invidious class distinctions. When we feel 
indignation over discrimination we respond not just to bad motives and 
prejudice. we are defending a principle of equality of treatment. When we 
feel mdignation at nepotism. exclusive access to higher education, and 
preferments due to privilege we are defending a principle of equality of 
opportunity. We can also feel indignant at situations where talent and effort 
are not properly rewarded. We are defending a principle where we ought to 
differently reward ability and demonstrated performance. Indignation is 
bound to the idea of equality and normatively justified differences in the 
treatment of individuals. Like pity, indignation is concerned with the idea of 
just deserts. What he locates in this definition are the possible objects of the 
governing disposition that deploys pity and indignation. If this is the case, 
then the objects of indignation are coordinate with anger and resentment in 
allied ways. 
But pity has two contraries. Indignation is its evaluative contrary, and 
fear is its causal contrary. With the exception of anger, each of the 
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deliberative emotions will have contraries in each of these two classes. Like 
pity, indignation has causal contraries. In tracing this causal line we will find 
much that is relevant to emotional persuasion. When we consider the causal 
contraries of indignation we find two candidates. shame and envy. The 
possible objects of indignation are also coordinate with those of shame. Shame 
is another emotion of self-assessment where the agent sees himself as being at 
some disadvantage in the eyes of another actual or imagined observer. This 
disadvantage is viewed as a loss of power which manifests itself as some 
dishonor or as a loss of respect. 
More often, however, the contrary of indignation is not shame; it is. 
rather. envy. An understanding of envy is important for deliberative 
purposes for two different but related reasons. However malformed and 
disruptive. envy is essentially comparative. It is a kind of distress felt at the 
apparent success of another, but not primarily with the desire to possess what 
the envied has; it is directed at the fact that the envied has it. The several 
varieties of envy can be articulated by understanding the several attitudes and 
judgments held towards this fact, and by understanding the relationship 
between the nature of the comparative judgment made and the kinds of desire 
that judgment allows. 
Every society with egalitarian political aspirations or with claims to 
promoting distributive justice must deal with the problem of envy. While 
envy is a deeply personal emotion, like hate, it can be socially shared by 
people who find themselves in similar situations and who perceive that they 
share adversaries. This is so because society offers goods that mark 
differences between its members. We develop skills, talents, capacities and 
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virtues that help us to attain these goods. Importantly, we do not envy a 
person the possession of those attainable virtues like temperance and courage; 
rather, we envy those attributes or possessions that come in part from the 
exercise of those capacities. Any of these attributes or possessions (wealth, 
power. status, preferment. opportunity. promotion. fame. and so on) are the 
possible objects of envy. 
The attitude or judgmental stance one takes towards the fact that 
someone else has that causal attribute can produce an emotion. Some of these 
emotions include admiration, delight or a desire to emulate; others include 
indignation and envy. John Rawls argues that there are five kinds of envy: 
general envy. particular envy. benign envy, emulative envy and envy 
proper. When a group envies the more favored for the kind of goods they 
have and not for the particular goods they possess, we call that 'general envy'. 
'Particular envy', on the other hand. is singular. The envier envies another 
for the possession of some particular object. 'Benign envy' is a way of 
speaking. When we say, "I really envy you your vacation," we are making a 
kind of compliment. The object of envy is isolated as a good of a particular 
kind. It signals our recognition that the good in question has value. It is an 
expression or an assertion of the worth of something (532-533 ). 
Envy proper is the most powerful member of the family of emotions we 
call envy. Envy proper requires four conditions to be satisfied for that episode 
to be so understood. 
. t. 
First, the envier believes that the envied 1s, m some 
important respect, superior to the envier. Second, the object possessed is 
desired by the envier; this desire must see that attribute as pleasurable. Third, 
the envier recognizes that that attribute is unobtainable. This impotence may 
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be manifested as a painful feeling of insecurity, anguish or humiliation; or it 
is a species of ill-will, usually felt as rancor or malice. Finally, the envier is 
willing to deprive the envied of those goods even if it means that the envier 
cannot have the goods herself. It is important to recognize that this 
willingness is another form of desire, qualitatively distinct from the appetitive 
desire present in the second condition (Rawls 533). 
These conditions open up several possibilities for manipulating one's 
feelings of envy. If the psychological state is one of ill-will, then a powerful 
motivational potential is present. Perhaps the most common strategy is to 
cultivate the feeling of malice. To feel malice is to desire the misery of others, 
but malice can be triggered only when it is perceived as useful to our 
interests. At bottom, the motive in envy is amour-propre, not some ultimate 
intention of mischief (although the mischief is experienced as pleasant). 
It will be helpful to examine the condition of the person envied. The 
envier wants and probably needs for her envy to be kept hidden. When it is 
not hidden from the envied, several responses from the envied potentially can 
be present. In some cases, the envied may be indifferent to the fact of being 
envied, or the envied is confident enough to want or at least to find it 
acceptable to share that good. But all too frequently, the envied suffers from 
some degree of insecurity. This insecurity colors the differences so that are 
seen as invidious. If this is so, then the envied does not want the envier to 
obtain those goods. The envied is 'jealous' of that attribute, and this condition 
is manifested attitudinally as one of begrudging the wants of the envier. As an 
attitude this may be an incipient state that can be motivated into a spiteful 
disposition or even a specific act of spite (Rawls 533). 
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With characteristic insight, the Stoics recognized the complexity of 
fear. 'Fear' names one of the four most general categories of the passions. 
'Fear' is the determinable that organizes its many determinants like panic, 
hesitation. shock. dread and the like. They glossed the term 'fear' as the 
expectation of a future evil, and this definition is indeterminate between fear 
as a kind of judgment (which they defined irrational) and as an emotional 
state. Concerned primarily with fear as an emotional state, Aristotle defines 
fear as "a sort of pain or agitation derived from the imagination [phantasia ] of 
a future destructive or painful evil; for all evils are not feared. . .but [only] 
what has the potentiality for great pains or destruction. and these [only] if 
they do not appear far-off but near" ( 1382a 21-25). 
There are four characteristics of fear. First, the object we fear is an evil 
that seems capable of causing great pain and destruction. Second, although 
fear is caused by uncertainty (it seems capable of causing harm) the 
destruction appears to be impending. We do not fear what appears remote. We 
judge events to be 'remote' through two frames of reference. Some events are 
remote in time. Adolescents sometimes act as if they are immortal, in part 
because their own mortality seems a remote possibility. 'Remote' may also 
refer to those possibilities that are, in some important sense, unlikely. Third, 
the evil appears to be one we are powerless to prevent, and this powerlessness 
frequently suggests a role of passive suffering. Finally, because fear is the 
apprehension of some future evil, its object is, in some important sense, 
intentional. 
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The intentional component of fear, the way things are seen, is the 
central issue in fear. The intentional component requires certain beliefs and 
judgments to be present. We can be startled, for example, by a truck's 
backfire, and this impulse is distinct from fear. The noise 'appears' 
threatening, just as the situation when we pull to an intersection and our 
perception of an approaching car is momentarily blocked by the roof support. 
The car appears to be less than three inches wide. We don't believe the car to 
be that wide; it just appears to be that width. When we are startled we react to 
the appearance of some threat without assenting to a judgment about its 
reality. 10 When we experience fear, we expect to be harmed. For fear to be 
present, we must assent to some belief or judgment. This assent concerns a 
judgment about a future evil and is, thus, intentional. This judgment is painful 
and it is sometimes experienced as pain. This intentional component is a 
necessary condition for all the members of the family of fear. To experience 
fear in some form we must accept an antecedent generalized claim and the 
occurrent cases of fear will be an instantiation of that claim. We recognize 
that we and the goods of our lives are vulnerable to misfortune and 
malevolence. If, on the other hand, the goods of our lives are impervious to 
harm we will feel no fear. (The force of this idea lies behind part of the Stoic 
arguments that the only goods in our lives are those things we can control, 
namely the virtues.) The pain we feel does not cause fear; it is the result of 
fear. 
The character of this judgment has a motivational effect. When we 
assent to this judgment we are motivated to take control of the world around us. 
We have a desire to avoid being vulnerable so that we act as if the judgment 
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were true. Significantly, what we are motivated to do depends on why we fear 
X, not what X is (Gordon 73-74). 1 1 When we become angry over the result of an 
insult. for example, we do not fear the insult itself; rather, we fear the 
potential effect of that insult on us. We become angry, in part, to counteract 
the potential effect of the insult. A nonswimmer is not, typically at least, 
afraid of water. The nonswimmer is afraid that if he falls into deep water he 
may, or will, drown. The judgment has the logical form of if p, then q. The 
motivational impetus in fear is to break the contingent causal connection 
between the antecedent and the consequent of that judgment. 
The object of fear may be externaL A drunk driver weaving repeatedly 
into the opposite lane on a narrow street causes fear about what may happen 
to the approaching driver. The fear of what may happen to us through 
external forces is one source of fear. Other fears arise from deliberative 
uncertainty. Deliberative uncertainty is the fear of making the wrong choice 
d th d · harm.
1 2 W d"f~: · h · f ~ · an us pro ucmg e 1 aerenuate t e many species o aear m part 
on how that painful judgment presents itself to us. and in part on how that 
pain affects judgment. Although fear is often seen as a correlative of 
confidence relative to decision, it does not exist solely on this one continuum. 
Fear can upset judgment through a loss of equanimity; hesitation, confusion 
and consternation are fearful emotions in this way. Fear can focus on some 
property relevant to judgment and cloud that capacity; we have misgivings. or 
we are apprehensive. Finally, fear can manifest itself behaviorally; our 
actions can be timid. pusillanimous, or we can bolt in panic or terror. 
Significantly, we see that these emotional conditions are the privatives of 
other, positive emotional states. In the domain of judgment the species of fear 
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are privatives of equanimity. Hesitation is the privative of steadiness; 
consternation is the privative of composure; to be confused is the privative of 
being sure; to have misgivings is the privative of being imperturbable; to be 
apprehensive is the privative of being tranquil. In the domain of action many 
states of fear are privatives of courage. Timidity is the privative of boldness; 
pusillanimity is the privative of audacity. 
Fear is closely related to and distinct from awe and respect. The Old 
Testament injunction to "Fear the Lord" does not advise us to be afraid, though 
our behavior and the nature of our soul may make us fear as a consequence of 
what we have done or omitted; it counsels us to stand in awe. On occasion we 
are in the presence of someone we greatly respect we experience a fear that 
we may do something for which we may be negatively judged. The fear here is 
'internal' and self originating, not external, and it is a difficult matter to judge 
what would count as saying we don't have 'it', thus arousing fear. Factors such 
as the agent's personal history, the perceived relative merit of the individuals 
involved, and the constraints defined by social or professional roles may serve 
as motivational reasons for the fear felt, or they may serve as an explanation 
of the fact that fear is felt. While the emotion is real in the sense that fear was 
felt, it does not follow that the fear was legitimate. The presence of an 
emotional state does not, by itself, say anything about the possible justification 
for its occurrence. In fact, the topics we possess to arouse or quell a particular 
emotion are built from reasons to or reasons for, which produce motivational 
arguments; or reasons that, which produce arguments of justification; or 
reasons why, which offer explanations. A reason to is a normative and 
impersonal reason, and a reason for is a normative and personal reason. 
The object of fear is one we seem powerless to prevent. We stand in 
some practical relationship to that object. As agents we possess certain 
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inclinations, abilities and capacities to respond to harmful circumstances. But 
these capabilities are, sometimes, not enough. There are occasions where we 
have an interest or inclination to respond but lack the opportunity to do so. 
Wrestling coaches, for instance, can foresee the harmful consequences of an 
illegal hold threatening their wrestlers but be powerless to prevent the 
injury. We may lack the ability to prevent the harm. When climbing I cannot 
prevent rockfall from causing injury (I cannot alter the laws of physics). A 
doctor at the scene of a serious automobile accident may have the medical 
ability to prevent that death at a hospital but lack the resources to prevent it at 
the scene of the accident. 
Not all fears are objective in this sense. Aristotle argues that "such 
things [as] are necessarily causes of fear as seem to have great potentiaiity for 
destruction or for causing harms that lead to pains." especially when this 
potential is close at hand (1382a 28-30). Thus, even the signs of things cause 
fear. The enmity or anger of those with the capacity to act on their emotions 
can cause fear. Since injustice is the result of deliberate choice, the unjust are 
capable of further similar evil decisions. Aristotle also focuses his attention 
on evil agency. He recognizes that man has the propensity for malevolence. 
When this propensity has a dispositional structure and the opportunity to 
express itself, fear will be considered, if not felt. We fear the cowardly, the 
dishonest, the unreliable, the unscrupulous and the greedy when these 
individuals have the power to harm us. 
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Still. much within our fears and many of our fears themselves are 
under our control. In Epistle XIII of Epistulae !Jarales Seneca argues that, 
"some things torment us more than they ought; some things torment us before 
they ought; some torment us when they ought not to torment us at all. We are 
in the habit of exaggerating, or imagining, or anticipating sorrow" (75). The 
appropriateness of one's fear turns on two questions. The first question 
concerns the object of our fear. The appropriateness of that object is 
governed by three conditions: the importance of the good being harmed; the 
magnitude of the harm directed at that good; and the nature, as well as the 
extent, to which we are powerless, when this is an objective matter. Obviously. 
we should not fear trivial matters. The good which is threatened can be an 
instrumental good when that resource or activity is absolutely essential for 
the attainment of some intrinsic or contributory good. The intrinsic or 
contributory good itself can be harmed. These goods can be harmed partially 
or totally. 
The second question concerns our mental stance towards the prospect of 
this harm. As Seneca observes, some fears are groundless; others are witless 
(Epistulae Morales 79). Confusion, timidity and panic are terms that refer to 
different cognitive states of or behavioral responses to the prospect of fear. It 
is important to recognize that we possess an intellectual capacity in our 
contemplation of fear and hope that we do not possess with most of the other 
deliberative emotions. This capacity is most easily illustrated by a grammatical 
construction. We can say, "It is, I fear, possible (or, likely, inevitable. etc.)," or 
"It is, I hope, possible (or, likely, looked for, etc.)." . Other verbs that serve 
similar functions include, 'wish', 'regret', 'think', 'suppose', 'believe', and so 
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on. These verbs express propositional attitudes. Two ideas are important here. 
The grammatical construction reflects an intellectual or emotional capacity to 
distance ourselves from the emotional occurrence itself and entertain the 
propositions in question. We can, in short, judge the truth-value or 
satisfaction conditions of its claims. This implies the presence of a second 
capacity. Because fear and hope are prospective, we possess, in principle, 
some strategic capacity to control the intentional content of the emotion. its 
directedness if you will, to evaluate our situation. 
An&er 
Anger is a particularly complex emotion, and our understanding of it is 
complicated further by the various uses licensed for that term. The term 
'anger' is often used as a synechdoche for our propensity for aggression. As 
such it stands for that emotional component present in acts of this sort. That 
component may manifest itself as wrath, wroth, rage or ire, among others. 
When used in this sense one of the species of anger is seen as a natural 
consequence of the rivalry, either for honors, status, advantages or for limited 
or scarce resources that are necessary for living well. This aggression may 
manifest itself as malice, spite, rancor, animus or schadenfreude. The Stoics 
argued, accurately, that the source for this sort of aggression is intemperance, 
which is "a revolt from all guidance of the mind and right reason, so 
completely alien from the control of reason that the cravings of the soul 
cannot be guided or curbed" (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations N 21 ). Such flaws 
of character can become vices. 'Anger' may also stand for some tendency in 
one's character. To call a person 'churlish', 'peevish', 'petulant' or 'irascible' 
is to name a propensity within that person's character to act in predictable 
ways when the proper precipitating conditions arise. 
'Anger' is also a term naming a member of the family of retributive 
emotions, anger, resentment and indignation. and this use will identify a 
qualitatively distinct emotional episode. The point of this classification is to 
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highlight (correctly, if incompletely) the importance of retribution. In The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith argues that retribution is the point of 
this family of emotions. Of the several sets of qualities he ascribes to actions 
and conduct--which include propriety and impropriety. and decency and 
ungracefulness--there is another pair that must be included if we are to 
capture a full range of emotions. The qualities of merit and demerit, the 
deserving of reward and the deserving of punishment, are crucial for 
comprehending the organization of our sentiments. He then argues that 
"whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve 
reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper 
object of resentmenl. appears to deserve punishment" (67). He makes this 
claim because gratitude names that sentiment which prompts us to reward. to 
return good for good received; resentment names that sentiment which 
prompts us to punish, to return evil for evil that has been done. Gratitude 
prompts us to desire to recompense another, through our own agency, for a 
particular benefit conferred on us. Resentment prompts us to desire, not only 
that he be punished, but that he be punished by our own means and for the 
particular injury we have suffered because of him (69). 
Smith's account has a certain kind of conceptual elegance. He argues 
from contraries: we can return good for good or evil for evil. 1 3 He intends for 
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us to see that the evil made in return is deserved and proportionate. His choice 
of the term 'resentment' for this family is, thus, deliberate; 'anger' for Smith 
denotes those species of excess, like rage and wroth. Gratitude and anger 
appear to be counterparts in both kind and degree (Nussbaum, Therapy 243). 
The benefit for which gratitude is owed must be given freely. voluntarily and 
intentionally: the belittling that precipitates anger is likewise voluntary and 
intentionaL The benefits others offer us are expressions of generosity; insults 
are expressions of meanness. If we characteristically respond with gratitude 
we will also characteristically respond with anger to a like degree. This 
converse relation explains, for example, the conduct and character of 
Lawrence Boythorn in Charles Dickens' Bleak House. His impetuous character 
focuses on people's deeds, not their characters, so that his condemnations of 
people like Sir Leicester Dedlock are manifestations of his personal energy 
rather than expressions of some deep ill wilL 
But when we see that there are two other possibilities, that we can 
return good for evil and evil for good. we recognize that the 'evil' meted out 
for evil given is problematic in a way that is not apparent in Smith's 
presentation. His notion of 'evil' as deserved harm must participate in some 
conception of justice. Thomas Aquinas recognized this problem in his 
discussions of anger. The return of evil for evil in anger should be done 
under the aspect of good, by which he meant justice; whereas the return of 
evil for evil in hatred is done under the aspect of eviL But we know that 'evil' 
can be motivated by ill will in resentment as well as in anger, and the personal 
role of revenge in anger or resentment is only masked rather than eliminated. 
Anger, not resentment, is the central emotion in this family. Anger and 
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resentment are not distinguished by the strength or intensity of response as 
Smith claims; rage and wroth are specific possibilities that may occur as states 
in an episode of anger. They are to be comprehended as stages in the etiology 
of anger. Anger and resentment are differentiated by the relationship of the 
victim(s} to the person who is angry or resentful. By placing anger at the 
center we also see the ambiguity of revenge and the role ill will may play that 
a discussion of resentment may leave out. 
An explanation of the particular emotion called 'anger' must precede an 
understanding of these wider uses. In fact. we use 'anger' to name two distinct 
and particular emotions. We use 'anger' and 'angry' to denote those states and 
their expression which result from frustration or impatience. The shade tree 
mechanic who can't loosen a head bolt and begins to beat the engine with the 
wrench is said to be 'angry' if he, in some way, blames the engine for its 
recalcitrance. In this sense, some people become 'angry' when animals get in 
the trash. a storm cuts short a vacation, or a discarded toy hurts a bare foot. We 
use the term 'anger' for these reactions of frustration and impatience because 
we retaliate and because we blame, admittedly irrationally, that which can not 
be intentionally responsible for the offense felt. These are not cases of the 
kind of anger we are concerned with. 
Aristotle's definition of anger captures better than any other the 
implications we want to understand. He defines anger as "the desire, 
accompanied by [mental and physical] distress, for conspicuous retaliation 
because of a conspicuous slight that was directed, without justification at 
oneself or those near to one" (1378a). Although I will follow Aristotle's 
analysis of this emotion on several crucial points, my explanation is not 
intended as an explication of his analysis. 
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Aristotle's definition of anger has two crucial components: a desire for 
retaliation, from which a kind of pleasure follows, and the feeling of distress 
caused by the belief that one has been slighted. While the desiderative 
component is dominant. it will be helpful to examine the subordinate feelings 
of distress first. Aristotle argues that anger is caused by "belittling. the 
actualization of opinion about what seems worthless" (1378b). If we think of 
cause here as antecedent to the emotional episode so that our description of an 
episode involves a two-term relation such that a precipitating event of 
belittling causes anger we will misunderstand what is meant here. Here it is 
important to note that anger is not simply the effect of an extrinsic cause; 
anger is caused by the belief that one has been belittled. Initially he identifies 
three species of belittling: contempt. spite and insult. He later adds other 
causal or strengthening conditions: mockery, forgetfulness. actions or 
attitudes which are unfitting. and actions which cause shame or 
embarrassment. The result of this belittling is 'distress'. The notion of distress 
is significant and the Stoic insight that distress is a contraction of the soul is 
apt. The distress caused by belittling is felt to the degree that the insulted feels 
that his dignity or worth has been diminished. 
The arguments of Jean Hampton on the causal features of anger are 
relevant here. When one has been subjected to belittling. one (or more) of 
three beliefs are possible (54-60). The first belief is a normative claim: 
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1. The insulted can believe that the insulter made a moral mistake about 
the worth of the insulted and that the insulter is treating the insulted in an 
unjustifiable manner. 
The second belief expresses a relation of consequence: 
2. The insulter is right to think that the insulted's worth is lower so that 
such treatment is permissible. 
The third belief is a causal claim about our vulnerability to such actions: 
3. The· insulter is right to think that the insulted's worth can be 
diminished by such conduct and that it is permissible to do so (57) 
The individual who has been belittled can assent to one of several 
combinations of these beliefs. If the insulted accepts belief 1 and rejects 
beliefs 2 and 3, then the insulted is beyond anger. The insulted accepts the act 
as demeaning but rejects the implication that they are diminished in any way. 
The insulter is guilty of a moral mistake and that mistake becomes the target of 
the insulted's concern. Parents and teachers who are insulted by their 
children or students face this possibility as a matter of course. We suffer these 
insults in the sense that we allow ourselves to undergo them. But to be beyond 
anger is not a state of willed endurance. To endure is to become inured to 
suffering. To be beyond anger is to find the act insulting but not one where 
we feel insulted. If, on the other hand. the insulted accepts the second and 
third beliefs as true and rejects the first belief, then the insulted can and 
probably will feel pain and distress, but he cannot feel anger (Hampton 56-57). 
The final combinatorial possibilities· are those that produce anger. 
Anger requires that the insulted believe (at least to some degree) the first 
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claim, and wants to believe I with certainty. while fearing either the second 
or third belief is true. This cognitive state is complex; it requires the 
conjunction of two sets of propositional attitudes held towards two related yet 
distinct propositions: 
l. A believes (that belief 1) & A wants to believe (that belief is true) 
2. & A fears (that belief 2 or 3 is true).(Hampton 57) 
Aristotle argues that the dominant element of anger is the desire for 
conspicuous retaliation. In Book II of de Ira Seneca accepts this insight and 
argues that this desire passes or can pass through three stages (II 4). The first 
stage presents itself as the result of the appearance (specie . = phantasia) of a 
14 wrong. This appearance may produce bodily responses--a trembling. a 
pallor or flushed expression, a clenching of the muscles, pupil dilation. etc. 
We share these responses with the animals (cf. the raising of hackles, 
growling. the baring of fangs and claws). Those who see anger as a 
synecdoche for aggression typically see these signs as presumptive evidence 
for the universality of this emotion. This stage may not require any cognitive 
15 assent to the appearance. The second stage requires an assent to the 
judgment that "it is right for me to take revenge since I have been wronged." 
Seneca claims that this stage is not 'stubborn'. Our capacity to reason and 
reflect is not overcome by the desire for revenge. Our passion is still 
amenable to reason. It is with and in this stage that the argument from pathos 
is most efficacious. In the third stage the passion is not amenable to reason. 
At this stage anger disquiets the mind, blinds judgment and seduces the will. 
Revenge will seek its own satisfaction regardless of its rightness. Rage, wrath 
and wroth name some of the states experienced in this third stage. It is also 
necessary to recognize that the third stage of anger can, over time, come to 
manifest itself dispositionally. 
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It is important to recognize one feature of this desire that is present at 
each stage. To know that you have been wronged is not the same as anger. 
Anger requires more than blame. Martha Nussbaum offers an important 
insight into anger when she argues that what is crucial in anger is the wish 
for another's suffering. The conceptual link between one's painful fears and 
the desire that is necessary for anger to be what it is a "negative wish directed 
back against the aggressor" (Therapy 244). We need not desire to commit an 
overtly retaliatory act for the emotion to be anger. We can desire a far more 
subtle ill for that person. As she points out, we can wish that their lives do not 
go well and that people recognize that person's badness; we can wish that they 
be punished in the next life; we can wish that the agent continues to be the 
same person the individual is (244). We cannot separate the judgment of being 
wronged from the ill-wishing associated with anger. Ill-wishing is an 
essential part of anger. Although ill-wishing is not a criterion sufficient to 
classify a set of emotions, it is, importantly, an essential part of many other 
emotions and ill-will manifests itself in ways as subtly as it does in anger. 1 6 
Adam Smith defined 'resentment' in terms of the second stage and 
'anger' in terms of the third stage. That division is false. It confuses the 
strength of the passion with its personal character. We should never lose 
sight of the fact that the objects of anger and resentment are actions, but we 
must also recognize that we frequently direct that feeling at a person. Anger 
is, certainly, the most personal of the retributive emotions. This personal 
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dimension manifests itself in two ways. First, the contexts in which anger 
arise are more direct and immediate than in resentment. I can resent the 
contemptuous actions of an elected official say, but unless I personally know 
that official I do not feel anger as a result of that contempt. Second, to be 
provoked to anger the insulted must believe, or want to believe, that some 
relevant kind of parity exists between the insulter and the insulted. (The 
insulter does not believe in this parity, otherwise the insult would not occur.) 
It may be true that a personal desire for revenge in anger is stronger and 
hence more common, but this fact does not establish any conceptual 
distinction between the two emotions. A large difference in degree is not a 
difference in kind. 
Interestingly, this desire for conspicuous retaliation is often 
accompanied by a kind of pleasure. This pleasure lies in the hope for getting 
revenge. Hope strengthens our expectations, and our expectations allow us to 
anticipate it, and our anticipation depends on our ability to imagine the 
revenge. Thus, this pleasure may also manifest itself as imagining that 
retaliation. But we must be careful about the role of that pleasure. We don't 
desire retaliation because it is pleasant; rather, 'it' is pleasant because we 
desire retaliation. We need to specify what 'it' is. 
The desire for retaliation can be expressed, 'I want to retaliate'. By itself 
this desire is not a complete account of the desiderative state in anger. At least 
two other beliefs are present. First, the desire for retaliation has another 
evaluative desire to buttress it; we judge it good that retribution would be good 
for the person who did the wrong. In principle, this judgment will secure the 
normative rightness of the response. Second, we also believe, given the way 
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the world is, that it is necessary for us to defiantly defend our honor, or the 
importance of whatever value that has been threatened. Jean Hampton argues 
that this second condition is an act of reaffirmation; it is the essence of our 
desire (60). This claim may be too strong. It is one thing to wish ill, it is quite 
another to act on it. We can say that this reaffirmation is a pragmatic 
condition which is guaranteed by the first condition. The necessity within the 
emotional structure of anger is conceptual but its expression is one of 
practical necessity. The necessity of this belief has an important practical 
consequence for the second belief. The normative rightness secured by the 
first belief should constrain the motivational excesses which the second belief 
is prone to. 
Yet anger is one of the most disturbing and dangerous of the emotions 
we experience. It is liable to produce a disproportionate response. and the 
defiant defense against what was unjust may well tum out itself to be unjust. 
It is dangerous for two reasons. The desire for retaliation is animated by a 
kind of ill will, and this ill will is morally problematic. We also recognize that 
the desire for retaliation will be an instantiation of one of several possible 
retributive principles, and it is possible that the principle selected will 
produce a disproportionate response. 
The danger of a disproportionate response which is the result of 
excessive desire has long been recognized as a significant moral problem. The 
Stoics, particularly Seneca, argued that anger is a cultural artifact and that is 
not necessary for one's proper motivation to action. In essence he took the 
moral features inherent in anger and relocated them in different faculties and 
concepts. His work, de Clementia is the product of this conceptual 
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realignment; a broadened conception of mercy becomes the motivational and 
justificatory principle for moral action. The Stoics were not the only people 
concerned with the problems of anger. The Christian tradition recognized 
that ill will and the desire for retribution were linked, and their moral 
solution is the act of forgiveness. 
In his essay, "Morality and the Retributive Emotions," J. L. Mackie 
argues that the retributive principle of punishment is paradoxical (1-9). He 
argues that the retributive principle cannot be explained solely within a 
reasonable system of moral thought, and that such a principle cannot be 
eliminated from moral thought itself. The desire for retaliation or 
reaffirmation cannot be subsumed wholly into a reasonable system of moral 
thought and that a moral belief in retribution cannot be explained without an 
explanation of that desire. To prove this point he argues that there are six 
possible retributive principles we can consider. First, there is negative 
retributivism: one who is not guilty must not be punished. Positive 
retributivism claims that one who is guilty ought to be punished. Permissive 
retributivism claims that one who is guilty may be punished. Three possible 
variants to these principles emerge when the question of how much 
punishment is proper is added in. The fourth possibility claims that one who is 
guilty must not be punished our of proportion to his guilt. The fifth possibility 
claims that one who is guilty ought to be punished in proportion to his guilt. 
The final possibility claims that one who is guilty may be punished in 
proportion to his guilt (Mackie 1-3). 
Four observations can be made. First, all of the retributive principles 
have, as an ineliminable component of their claims, a desire for retribution. 
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Second, that desire does not arise out of an abstract system of moral thought; it 
arises out of our emotional life. Third, while the desire for retaliation within 
these emotions is ineliminable, it is capable of being corrected and tutored. We 
can correct it by focusing on the action rather than the agent. That the desire 
arises out of one's emotional life complicates the issue of retribution greatly. 
Before turning to the final observation it will be helpful to see just how some 
of these complications have been dealt with. The ancient Greeks were acutely 
conscious of the problematic nature of these desires. In the Oresteia 
Aeschylus transforms the desire for vengeance in the blood feud to an 
expression of civil law. The motivating belief expressed in Agamamnon that 
"each must suffer the thing he did" is not conceptually transformed as much 
1 7 as it is relocated and is thus given a new locus for its expression. 
Thucydides is also concerned with vengeance and justice. In the 
Mytilenian Debate Cleon persuades the Athenian Assembly to punish its client 
state harshly. In the second day's debate Diodotus argues that the punishment 
previously rendered must be set aside. Among the persuasive strategies he 
employs two deserve mention. He offers a motivational argument. Fear is a 
less powerful motivation that hope and desire. He then alters the status of the 
issue; he argues that the case is not one of retributive justice, it is a case of 
prudent administration. He argues: 
the right way to deal with free people is this -- not to inflict 
tremendous punishments on them after they have revolted, 
but to take tremendous care of them before this point is 
reached, to prevent them from even contemplating the idea of 
revolt, and, if we do have to use force with them, to hold as few 
as possible of them responsible for this. (~oak 3 46) 
238 
The argument turns on the recognition that in this case the desire for 
retribution will be self-defeating in its application but not that retribution is, 
in principle, wrong. 
Thucydides offers another related example. In 425 BC a Spartan force is 
cut off in Spacteria. Their envoys come to Athens and argue: 
Sparta calls upon you to make a treaty and end the war. 
She offers you peace, alliance, friendly and neighborly 
relations. . .In our view where great hatreds exist, no lasting 
settlement can be made in a spirit of revenge. . . what will 
make the settlement lasting is when the party that has it in 
his power to act like this takes a more reasonable point of 
view, overcomes his opponent in generosity, and makes peace 
on more moderate terms than his enemy expected. In such a 
case. . .the enemy is already under an obligation to pay back 
good for good, and so is the more ready. from a sense of honor. 
to abide by the terms that have been made. (Book 4 20) 
The Spartans recognize what we have already argued for. Gratitude is the 
contrary of retribution. Make us a debt of gratitude to repay rather than a 
debt of retribution. 
The possibility of tutoring the desire returns us to the opposition of 
anger and gratitude and, thus, the fourth observation. Adam Smith was not the 
first thinker to discern that gratitude and anger are closely related. Epicurus 
observed that the gods, who are blessed and indestructible, have no need for 
anger and gratitude. Their self-sufficiency makes them invulnerable. 1 8 And 
we just saw that the Spartans invoked this conceptual connection in their plea 
to the Athenians. Anger and gratitude are signs of our weakness and 
individual insufficiency. The strength of our desire for retaliation can be 
measured by the strength of our fear, rather than the strength of our 
commitment to retaliation. Likewise, the particular retributive principle we 
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select would be determined by the character of that fear. If we weaken our 
attachments to the targets of belittling we will weaken the power anger has 
over us. But this freedom comes at a price. We will lose the strength of our 
gratitude to a corresponding degree because the goods we feel grateful for will 
become diminished as well. We may find this too high a price to pay. 1 9 
How to Arouse or Extinguish Anger 
While the tactics we can use to control emotional persuasion will vary 
with each particular emotion, there ar.! topical principles, formulable as 
strategies, that govern the persuasive possibilities for each deliberative 
emotion. When we undergo an emotion we have assented to two judgments. 
We respond to some aspect of a situation which we judge good or bad. By 
allowing ourselves to suffer the emotion we are judging that that emotion is 
appropriate in this particular situation. These judgments open two avenues 
for persuasion. We can assess the correctness of the judgments about the 
worth of externals and we can judge the appropriateness of the response. 
Anger contain~ these two judgments. We judge it good that the insulter 
should suffer, and we judge that it is appropriate to defy the insult through 
anger. More precisely, we find that anger has three topical principles. The 
first strategic possibility concerns motivation. Because fears and desires are 
concerned with our apprehension of apparent future evils and goods, many of 
the topical arguments available are motivational in structure and content. One 
can target the component of fear, the desiderative component or both. The 
action advocated should have the proper motivation for the correct course of 
action. Second, specific occurrences of anger can be caused, in part, by 
various forces: by intemperance, by a deficiency of respect for another, or by 
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excessive contempt. Conversely, one's response can excessive or deficient in 
some way. The question of magnitude--of harms inflicted and harms 
returned--governs much that is important in anger. The argument from 
degree is the second topical principle governing anger. Finally, the 
normative legitimacy of one's anger is of crucial concern; anger is or is not 
justified. If anger is to have a normative role, it must be governed by one's 
virtue of justice. As long as one's anger is t;ontrolled by the virtue of 
temperance, its presence or absence is, at best, only coincident with justice. 
The putative role of anger in one's desire for retributive justice is, ultimately 
h. 1 2 0 an et 1ca concern. 
If an author wishes, like Thrasymachus, to incite the audience to anger 
or to quell the anger already aroused, the choice of the topical arguments to be 
deployed and their ordering must reflect the spontaneity of the angered 
person's stance on two levels: 1) they must track and manipulate the dynamics 
of the occurrent situation, and 2) they must reflect the temperament of the 
audience. The arousal of a desire is a highly circumstantial matter, and thus 
the sequencing of the arguments must follow the promptings of the angered 
21 person's heart. When considering the fearful component, an old adage of 
folk psychology can serve as a useful guide. In situations of doubt and fear we 
typically express the real source of our distress only on the third prompting. 
The first and second reasons, though true, do not probe the sources of our 
turmoil too deeply. The ordering of one's arguments should reflect the 
reticence of the audience. With the onset of anger, when we respond with an 
impulse, several judgments must be made for the impulse to become a 
judgment bringing on anger or for the impulse to remain just that, thus 
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blocking the occurrence of anger. When we are concerned with occurrent 
cases of anger, we must control the pace of this first stage. Delay is the most 
powerful initial tool for preventing anger, and conversely preventing delay 
and reflection is the most powerful tool for bringing on anger at this stage. 
The temporal dimension is important because it is easy to confuse or conflate 
the unexpected with the unfair. A confusion of the unexpected for the unfair 
can trigger a willingness to believe things or even the worst. This strategic 
response can make the search for reasons self fulfilling. It is also easy to 
confuse unintentional harm with intentional hurt. Inanimate objects are 
incapable of intentional actions and animals are incapable of deliberate action 
that causes insult (Seneca, de Ira II 31-34 ). Intemperance is not anger. 
We are interested in the audience's temperament because one's 
temperament is the nexus for reason states. A reason state is part of the 
cognitive stance an agent adopts towards the world; it expresses itself as 
reasons of various kinds, and these reasons have causal power (Audi 147). 
Examining an audience's temperament is useful for other reasons. It is 
prereflecti ve enough to be spontaneous and is thus a reliable indicator of 
other, related psychological states. In particular, that reliability makes 
temperament stable enough so that predictions about an audience's particular 
emotional responses are reasonable. It can comprehend both inclinations and 
interests, and it is a reliable sign of deeper traits and dispositions which are 
crucial for comprehending one's full 'stance' towards a situation. Since the 
audience's stance towards a situation can be understood through matters of 
temperament, an author can influence the role of temperament by modulating 
the type of contact between author and audience. 'Contact' is that determinant 
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of mode that creates a sense of communicative 'presence' in writing and which 
is necessarily present in oral communication between author and audience. 
From the author's point of view there are three forms of simulated contact: 
personal contact gives the impression of a single speaker talking or lecturing; 
collective contact gives the impression that a group of speakers is speaking in 
unison; and impersonal contact gives the impression that the book is doing the 
communicating. We have two further varieties of contact available when we 
consider the point of view of the audience: isolative contact is present when 
the audience sees itself as being singular and directed at that individual; 
aggregative contact pretends to speak to all readers at once (Beale 46-48). The 
contact a writer establishes will help strengthen or weaken the force of the 
kinds of reasons that are used in the argument from pathos. 
The arousal or quelling of the passion of anger can be achieved 
through the use of topical arguments that are directed at either the occurrent 
emotional episode or at the dispositions that govern anger's occurrence. 
Whether an author is concerned with the particular emotional episode or the 
affective stance of the audience, anger is controlled by manipulating either 
the beliefs and evaluations concerned with the element of fear present or the 
beliefs and judgments that animate or govern the desire for revenge. 
Motivational arguments work to show that the motivational force 
present in anger is a practical necessity. These arguments do this by 
targeting the element of fear or the desire for revenge. First, one can arouse 
or extinguish anger by controlling the dimension of fear that is present. One 
can do this by arguing for the truth or falsity of the beliefs that are necessary 
for causing anger. The individual who is capable of anger partially fears that 
the belittling is appropriate and wants to believe it is false. The argument 
from consequences is a common tactic to control these attitudes. One can 
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argue about the intentions of the insulter. If the insult is unintentional or the 
insulter's opinion is demonstrably false, then one's anger would be 
illegitimate. One can argue for or against the relative importance of the value 
in question. Finally, one can criticize or utilize the credulity or self 
indulgence of the insulted. Second, one can address the dispositional stance of 
the insulted, arguing that one is or is not vulnerable to the belittling directed 
at them. Finally, one can work on the causal or explanatory role of 
propositional attitudes that activate the beliefs necessary for the desire for 
revenge by strengthening or weakening the attitudes of hope and desire that 
define the relationship between the propositions in question and the results 
wished for. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ONE'S AUDIENCE AND THE TOPICAL STRATEGIES OF PERSUASION 
My purpose was. . .to see if the shameful facts, spread out 
in all their shame. would not bum through our civic 
shamelessness and set fire to American pride. 
-Lincoln Steffens 
Aristotle argued that three conditions must be satisfied if emotional 
persuasion is to succeed: one must understand the nature and value of the 
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object towards which the emotion is directed; one must understand the nature 
of the reasons that orients the audience to that object; and one must 
understand the character of the audience whose judgment will be affected by 
the emotional episode. In Chapter II I argued that the combination of these 
three success conditions yields five formal patterns of persuasion: desire + 
delight, desire + distress, fear + distress, fear + delight, and some emotion of 
distress followed by a consequent or governing attitude. These three success 
conditions can be considered in relationships with each other and are 
necessary for achieving salience. The relationship between the audience and 
the reasons they will find persuasive deserves exploration. 
We possess several powerful strategies for effecting emotional 
persuasion in particular deliberative situations, but these possibilities are 
governed by several constraints that need to be mentioned first. Quintilian 
observes that there are limitations placed on one's persuasive opportunities by 
the character of one's audience. He argues: 
When we are going to declaim on a theme that turns largely on its 
emotional features, we must give it a dramatic character suited to 
the persons concerned. For emotions are not transferable at will, 
nor can we give the same forcible expression to another man's 
emotions that we should give to our own. (IV. i. 47) 
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Emotional force matters, and that force is evoked in another. Yet emotions are 
not easily transferable; quite obviously, the writer is limited by the 
perspectival nature of emotional experience. This perspectival nature 
manifests itself in emotional reasoning as a matter of presumption and as a 
matter of point of view. 
The reasons used in emotional arguments are presumptive; they depend 
on the audience's acceptance of them. We often confuse the fact that these 
reasons are internal to an agent's motivational or justificatory stance with the 
idea that they are subjective. That we conflate these two distinctions has led us 
to ignore the possibility that some of these reasons are agent-neutral. They 
appeal to some principle that anyone should find to have normative force in 
that situation. One's reasons may also be reasons for that agent, but they need 
not be reasons for anyone else; these reasons are agent-relative. There is, 
importantly, another distinction we draw about one's audience. Although one 
wants an audience's decision to be judicious, what counts as judicious will vary 
according to the role the audience can and does play in the deliberative 
situation. An audience may play the role of judge; as such, they are to be 
detached and impartial. Detachment does not imply the absence of emotion or 
any lack of feeling; it only requires that personal and self-interested 
considerations be excluded. Impartiality does not imply a lack of concern; it 
excludes, for example, irrelevant identifications with one or more of the 
participants or biases that would distort judgment. 
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More often perhaps, the members of the audience involved in 
deliberations are or will be active participants in both the decision and the 
actions that bring that decision into being. Even here one's reasons to act may 
be objective. To act morally, for example, is to act from agent-neutral reasons. 
In a similar way, one's role may require adherence to agent neutral reasons. 
To be a teacher is to serve a role characterized by obligation and permissions 
that apply to anyone serving that role. These obligations exist independently 
of the personality of the agent occupying that role. The audience's emotional 
perceptions are filtered through their deliberative stance so that they may be 
impartial in one of several ways. An occupational or institutional role will 
specify which perceptual sensitivities are relevant, and these sensitivities 
may operate independently of the agent's personal sensitivities. An agent may 
accept, in principle, a sensitivity prescribed by that role and see that it exists 
independently of the personal desires of the agent. This situation is common 
enough. Teachers accept the responsibility of caring for their student's needs, 
but we also find that there are occasions when responding to the demands of 
that caring are inconvenient. 
A vocation is a role whose commitments, obligations and ideals carry 
greater moral force for the individual occupying that role than for one who 
sees that role as an occupation. One internalizes the impartial sensitivities 
demanded by one's vocation (Blum 191). In these cases, an appeal to one's 
second order desires will have a double focus. The. writer can offer reasons to 
act as the justification for that desire; these reasons are normative and 
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impersonal. The formal object of the targeted emotion involving normative 
reasons will be conceptually related to public, normative principles. Because 
these sensitivities have been internalized, the reasons which can constitute 
the principle can also be reasons for acting. Reasons for acting are normative 
and personal. These arguments will be satisfactory according to the degree to 
which the normative principles invoked are central to the deliberative aim. 
The topical principle of priority evaluates the centrality of that appeal. The 
argument will successful to the degree to which the claims are seen to have 
'weight'. As a psychological matter, weight is measured in terms of the 
targeted emotion's strength. Obviously, these various features of importance 
are affected by the strategies of amplification. 
Not all considerations of the audience's sense of agency can be 
subsumed under agent-neutral or role related reasons. The audience's goods 
also involve subjective desires and fears as well as self-related desires. The 
writer must search for reasons for acting that will move the audience to act. 
Like impersonal appeals. the centrality of the desires that are appealed to are 
subject to the appraisal of the principle of priority. Again, like impersonal 
appeals, the strength of the emotion is a measure of its potential success. 
Material Objects and Their Persuasive Function 
Aristotle's first condition argues that one must understand to whom or 
towards what object the emotion is directed. I want to argue that he conflates 
two distinct kinds of objects. We can direct our emotions at some object in the 
deliberative situation. and we can direct our emotions at our opposition. There 
are, thus, four sources of material for effecting the argument from pathos: 
from the character of the author, from the character of the author's opponent, 
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from the audience. and from the deliberative situation proper. The material 
will be found by examining the six relationships that exist between these 
various points of view: 
1. between the author and his or her audience 
2. between the author and his or her opponent 
3. between the audience and his or her opponent 
4. between the author and the deliberative situation proper 
5. between the audience and the deliberative situation proper 
6. between one's opponent and the deliberative situation proper. 
Either the audience already has some emotion(s) or attitude(s) directed at any 
one or more of these sources. or they do not. If there is no emotion already 
present. then one can. in principle. elicit the targeted emotion. If an emotion 
is present. it will either be appropriate or inappropriate for one's persuasive 
aim. 
Good Will and The Introduction 
Rhetorical theory comprehends quite well what is necessary and 
usually sufficient for the writer to initially establish the proper rapport with 
one's audience. The writer must make the audience attentive to what will 
follow. The writer must make the audience receptive to the issues to be argued 
for. and the writer must establish good will. Good will is also a necessary 
preparatory condition for establishing trust. Finally. deliberation is grounded 
in rational hope. hope that this particular decision will participate in the 
larger narrative of one's life and be conducive to the rational aim that one's 
life will go as well as possible. 
The relationships between the audience and the author's opponent and 
the author and his opponent will frequently yield ad hominem attacks. The 
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genre of negative political advertising affords a common example of this type 
of argumentation. The opponent's relationship to the deliberative situation 
proper will also yield circumstantial ad hominem attacks. It also provides 
opportunities for the use of the expressive and performative appeals discussed 
in Chapter III. 
Emotional Con&ruence: Correspondin& and Counterpart Emotions 
A more interesting and important question can be posed: how is the 
match between the author's relationship to the deliberative situation and the 
audience's relationship to the same effected? Obviously, there must be some 
sort of correspondence between the two. In fact, there are two ways in which 
the audience's emotions may correspond to the author's deliberative aim; the 
audience's emotion may be congruent with the deliberative aim, or it may be 
made congruent because it is a counterpart of some emotion that will achieve 
salience. 
The focal properties of particular objects play a crucial role in the 
argument from pathos. When we discussed focal properties we noted that 
those properties may be an instantiation of some property of the object or 
some relational quality. When a writer targets an emotion for persuasive 
purposes and that emotion has some feature or person in the deliberative 
situation proper as its object, the audience may likewise have some emotion 
directed at that same object. If the author's targeted emotion is the same as the 
audience's, then the author has found the emotion that is requisite for 
effecting persuasion. While this may appear to be matter of luck, luck is not 
the way such a match can be achieved. 
,-
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The audience's emotion may be congruent with the author's targeted 
emotion. This idea of congruence can be explained through the analogy of 
seeing. The presence of an emotion that can affect judgment is part of the 
characteristic stance we take when evaluating a deliberative situation. Our 
spatial relationship to the object we see (distance, elevation, relation to a light 
source, etc.), our 'position', so to speak, helps explain what we see. The 
'position' of the audience towards the deliberative situation is analogous to 
one's physical position when seeing. Sharing a physical vantage point is a 
necessary condition for viewing an object from the same point of view as 
another. An audience's emotional 'position' is a part of their sense of agency; 
and an emotion is congruent, in part, if the audience's sense of agency 
corresponds to the writer's intended sense of agency. 
The evaluative content of what we see is also determined in part by what 
we look for and what the object of the emotion is; we attend to certain details 
over others because they are relevant to the task at hand. The 'orientation' of 
an emotion is that directed attentiveness. One's directed attentiveness in 
'orientation' can be further specified by recognizing that one's motivational 
set pushes and pulls the agent. 'Push' names that part of one's motivation that 
directs the attention from the agent to the object or to another person. 'Pull' 
names the converse relationship; it explains how the motivational power that 
flows from the value of the desired object, action or individual to the 
deliberating agent. 
Congruent emotions will involve these two pairs of features of 
orientation and position as well as push and pull. Anger and resentment, for 
example, can be directed at the same event. They are oriented in the same 
254 
direction because their evaluations are similar and their moral pulls are 
similar. But resentment differs from anger. in part. because anger requires 
the unjustified and injurious action be committed against the person who is 
angry or someone very close to that person. An insult directed at an 
individual who is not in the agent's close circle will not produce anger. The 
agent feels resentment instead. The push of anger and the push of resentment 
help to qualitatively differentiate the two. Still. the feeling of resentment will 
correspond to the feeling of anger. 
Sympathy. pity and compassion felt for individuals who suffer 
unjustifiably are also congruent and corresponding emotions in this sense. 
These emotions can be corresponding ones because the attitude that governs 
the targeted emotion is congruent with the writer's deliberative aim. A 
targeted emotion is corresponding if its particular judgment or its 
motivational stance and its governing attitude are in alignment with the 
writer's deliberative aim. Part of this alignment is also the result of the 
audience's position and orientation. 
Yet there is another condition that must be satisfied if the targeted 
emotion is to be a corresponding one. To have a corresponding emotion is to 
possess the ability to share emotional experience. and this ability is one of the 
most important imaginative faculties necessary for reasoning well. Adam 
Smith makes this very argument in The Theory of Moral Sentiments when he 
argues: 
In all such cases. that there may be some correspondence of sentiments 
between the spectator and the person principally concerned, the 
spectator must. first of all, endeavor, as much as he can. to put himself 
in the situation of the other, and to bring home to himself every little 
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circumstance of distress which can possibly occur to the sufferer. He 
must adopt the whole case of his companion with all its minutest 
incidents; and strive to render as perfect as possible, that imaginary 
change of situation upon which his sympathy is founded. (I. i. 4. 6) 
This capacity is necessary, but not by itself sufficient, to deliver correct 
judgments. Other forms of rational argument are required. The right 
principle. for instance, must be invoked, and its specification must be 
appropriate. Still, we have seen that it is one's emotional capacities that help 
to deliver that principle and its specification. 
Yet not all congruent emotions are corresponding ones in the sense we 
have described them. The relative orientation of the person feeling the 
emotion will help specify what the congruent emotion may be. A child who 
has her feelings hurt usually wants tenderness or sympathy, not a fellow 
feeling of distress. The motivational push in the felt emotion is what counts, 
not the pull of an identificational fellow feeling. Tenderness and sympathy in 
this case are counterpart emotions; counterpart emotions are congruent 
emotions as well. Emotions in the genus of distress are perspectival in nature. 
The fellow feeling necessary for the audience's emotion to be appropriate 
requires that the counterpart emotion share the same judgment or end, but it 
must also respect the perspectival nature of these emotions. Counterpart 
emotions do not have to fall into the same genus; emotions of distress felt by 
people in deliberative situations can produce a desire to ameliorate or alleviate 
that distress. These desires are also counterpart emotions. 
The congruent emotions, whether they are corresponding or 
counterpart ones, share the feature of motivational pull; one's orientation will 
help determine the motivational push of the counterpart emotion. This 
feature may be a relevant causal condition, or concern the character of the 
desires involved, or form a part of the emotions' evaluative concerns. 
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To summarize: simple correspondence obtains when the two emotions of 
the audience and author share the criteria of position and orientation held in 
terms of the evaluation of X; counterpart emotions become congruent when 
the evaluation of the objects of both emotions are made in terms of the same 
criteria X. 
Counter Arguments 
Audiences do not always share the point of view of the author. They 
may hold emotions or attitudes that would effectively block the author's 
deliberative aim. These emotions may arise spontaneously as the deliberative 
situation comes under consideration, or these emotions may have been elicited 
by one's opposition. 
Both the anonymous author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium and Cicero 
in De lnventione recognized that there were occasions when the members of 
one's audience were not favorably disposed to one's aim. Both authors identify 
three occasions where this problem can occur: when one's case is scandalous 
or discreditable, when the audience appears convinced by one's opposition, 
and when the audience is weary (RH I vi 9; DI I 20). Cicero classifies these 
occasions into four 'cases'. A 'difficult' case is one which has alienated the 
sympathies of the audience towards one's aim. A 'mean' case is one where the 
audience makes light of the aim or thinks it unworthy of serious attention. An 
'ambiguous' case is mixed; honorable issues are mixed with dishonorable ones. 
Finally, an 'obscure' case is conceptually difficult or subtle and often must be 
presented to a slow witted audience. 
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Cicero's analysis commends itself on three counts. First, he gives 
adequate attention to the audience's stance. Second, he recognizes that 
particular emotional judgments may block one's deliberative aim in various 
ways. Finally, he recognizes that issues of conceptual complexity play a role 
in the apprehension and acceptance or rejection of emotional appeals. Yet his 
notion of a 'case' is analogous to the notion of a genre. The term 'genre' is a 
category that names a specific convergence of subject, purpose and method in 
discourse (Beale 30). Like the notion of genre, Cicero's 'cases' name types of 
rhetorical occasions with some content and a recommended method to meet a 
specific purpose. While a discussion of occasions for counter arguments would 
be a helpful addition to the analysis of pathos, what is needed is an analysis of 
the strategies, those operations of discourse, one can deploy. The explanatory 
power of these strategies should not be limited by substantive issues arising 
out of single emotions. To have the broadest scope possible, these strategies 
should be as formal in nature as the deliberative emotions allow. 
In Chapter II I argued that each formal pattern involving the desires 
and fears has three possible lines of counter argument. The pattern of fear + 
distress, for example, can be countered by accepting that the situation is 
fearful but not hopeless; by countering the prospective results of that threat 
the pattern becomes fear + delight. One can deny that the situation is, in fact, 
fearful and argue that it is more appropriate to focus on the desiderative wish; 
by taking proper precautions one can produce a felicitous result. Finally. one 
can again focus on the desiderative wish and caution that a failure to attend to 
the operational risks attendant to its success will produce an unhappy result. 
Although each particular emotion in a concrete deliberative situation with a 
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particular audience will make unique persuasive demands. some features 
remain constant enough to allow us to discern strategies of counter argument. 
We possess four topical strategies that can be used to effect these 
counter arguments. These topical strategies will arise out of highly general 
and formal features of the audience's emotional stance towards the 
deliberative situation. One can transpose the audience's emotions that are 
directed at the deliberative situation and effect a change in salience. Seccnd. 
one can transform the emotion into another one. Finally, one can extirpate or 
attenuate the emotion and substitute another in its place. The choice of one's 
strategy of counter argument will depend on how the audience's lead emotion 
or emotional set blocks the writer's deliberative aim. Although each of these 
strategies will be explained individually. they frequently occur jointly in 
deliberative discourse. 
Transposition 
Perhaps the simplest strategy is that which depends on the strength of 
the salience evoked. Deliberative situations can potentially evoke many 
emotions. A brutal crime, for example, can produce many emotions 
simultaneously: pity for its victims. indignation on their behalf. resentment 
towards the criminals. and horror at the crime itself. One's evaluative stance 
as an agent coordinates these emotions, and writers exploit that possibility for 
coordination by making one of those emotions salient. The prosecution in a 
criminal court case may work to make resentment the salient emotion in the 
minds of the jurors; the defense, on the other hand, will emphasize the 
defendant's remorse and regret, or guilt, or even try to make the defendant the 
object of pity. The defense attempts to recoordinate the jury's emotional 
responses by making a different emotion salient. The transposition of the 
range of coordinate emotions through the office of salience is a common 
technique. 
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The example of the criminal court case points to the first of two methods 
by which the strategy of transposition may be effected. Each method depends 
on the satisfaction of one necessary condition. We saw in Chapter IV that it is 
possible for an individual or an action to be the particular object of more than 
one emotion at the same time. This state of affairs is quite common. We can, 
for example, be surprised and pleased by unexpected help from a friend. This 
occurrence can be quite complex as well. Satire is a literary genre of comic 
protest involving a wide range of emotions that play constituent roles in its 
success. Anger, indignation, derision, contempt, ridicule and censure are 
some of the more common emotions operating in this genre. Satire is 
successful. in part. when the judgments of these emotions as expressed by 
their formal objects are coordinated and directed at the representative object 
of that satire. 
The two (or more) emotions in question must possess some property that 
informs the motivating aspects of the two emotions. These properties will. in 
tum, be present in the formal objects of the two emotions. The two emotions 
will be jointly successful if the particular object actually possesses the 
properties that define the formal object. All emotional patterns are subject to 
these criteria for their success if the emotions are to be normative. If a writer 
argues for a different emotional pattern than her opponent, then at a 
minimum, this new pattern must meet these criteria. Success, however, is not 
the same as satisfaction. Satisfaction is a condition of desires and fears; it 
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refers to the attainment of the want (in the case of desires) defined by the 
intentional component of the emotion. Two emotions are incompatible if they 
cannot be jointly satisfied (de Sousa 208). 
The first method of transposition uses this distinction to produce two 
possible lines of counter argument. The common aim shared by the 
prosecution and defense in the coun example is to see that justice is served. 
First, each side will investigate the other's emotional pattern to see if the 
emotions appealed to are consistent with each other or with the desire for 
justice. Second, each side will look to see if the satisfaction conditions of each 
of the desires or fears present in the set are compatible with the interests or 
pursuit of justice in that case. 
Sometimes the writer finds that the audience's relevant emotion is 
oriented towards its object in such a way that that focus wiii effectively block 
the attainment of the writer's persuasive aim. 'Orientation' concerns the 
direction of focus of the targeted emotion. 'Orientation' has two components. 
First, it possesses an evaluative judgment in form of an attitude, and the act or 
the agent is appraised in light of that positive or negative attitude. More 
imponantly, the emotion can be directed at oneself or at another. 
The second method of transposition accepts the positive or negative 
attitude, but it works to effect one or two changes in the focus of the emotion 
in question. It redirects the focus of the emotion in such a way as to allow for 
successful persuasion. Like the first, the second method of transposition takes 
the emotions found in the deliberative situation or in the audience as given. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions present in the first method must be 
satisfied as well. The second method exploits two sets of distinctions that are 
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present in our emotional experience: conceptually. we distinguish the objects 
of our emotions by their orientation; emotions are directed at oneself or at 
others. Second, we distinguish the judgmental components of an emotion from 
its motivational potential. 
Just as some emotional reactions can produce counterpart emotions. 
certain emotions possess complementary emotions. Complementary emotions 
share a common attitude, but their orientation differs. 'Praise', for example, is 
other directed; 'pride'. one of the complementary emotions of praise. is self 
directed. 'Blame'. typically. is other directed; 'guilt' and 'remorse' are two self 
directed complementary emotions of blame. The same holds for emotional 
conditions. 'To embarrass' is other directed; 'to be ashamed' is self directed. 
Mockery is other directed; shame is self directed. 
Significantly. the emotions that form these complementary pairs can 
function as judgments or as motivational states. Consider 'blame' as an 
example. To say that someone deserves blame is to make a judgment; to say that 
that person should be blamed is to claim that the illocutionary act of blaming 
should produce good results. The two dimensions are obviously related. It is 
plausible to think that an individual is blameworthy whenever blaming will 
produce good results, but a moment's reflection casts doubt on this idea. It is 
doubtful that blaming Jeffrey Dahmer would have produced good results, yet 
his deeds were, at the least, blameworthy. Blaming people for the absence of 
innate talents (intelligence, sagacity, physical strength in the elderly, say) is 
likewise fruitless. There are borderline cases: absent mindedness, shyness, an 
ingratiating personality. all can manifest themselves in action or inaction 
that is blameworthy; but each particular case must be examined to see if 
blaming will produce the desired results. 
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The method of transposition examines the orientation of the audience's 
emotion towards its object, and it seeks a complementary emotion possessing a 
different orientation in the deliberative situation or towards one's opposition. 
But transposition does not end here. Just as blame can be a judgment or a 
motivation, the complementary emotion will be capable of judgmental or 
motivational manifestation. The audience's emotion that must be altered can 
be transposed in one of three ways. 
Take, for example, the case of blaming. Suppose the audience desires to 
blame an individual in the deliberative situation. The emotion is an other 
directed, motivational state. The writer looks to see if that individual has 
experienced (and possibly manifested) a complementary, self directed emotion; 
guilt is one such emotions. In Chapter II we argued that emotions of distress 
can manifest themselves 'retrospectively' or prospectively. The retrospective 
manifestation is an all-things-considered judgment; prospective emotions 
produce motivational attitudes, which in the case of guilt is 'reparative guilt', 
guilt with the desire to make amends. By evoking the sense of guilt felt by the 
targeted individual in the audience, the emotion of blaming can be transposed 
so that the audience directs their attention and alters their emotional response 
into either the judgmental or motivational manifestation of that emotion. 
The ability to transpose an emotion depends on the exercise of one of 
two imaginative capacities: the application of the principle of reversibility or 
through the ability to feel empathy. These capacities in tum are governed by 
the principle of priority. 
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Transformation 
The audience's emotional stance may also contain emotions with 
contrary judgments and attitudes that block one's deliberative aim. It is 
possible to counter this problem through the strategy of transformation. In 
the headnote to this chapter I quoted Lincoln Steffens' explanation of the 
method of argument he used in The Shame of the Cities. The strategy he 
invokes in that explanation is transformation. One may transform the 
dominant emotion of the audience into a new one that is congruent with the 
writer's deliberative aim. Transformation involves and depends on normative 
considerations. For example. envy may be transformed into disdain if the 
audience can be brought to believe that the desideratum does not. in fact. 
possess the worth originally thought. The possibility for transformation may 
be found by looking at an emotion's contraries. In fact, much of the analysis 
m the previous chapter should serve as a justification for this strategy. 
An appropriate contrary of an emotion can be found if the two emotions 
of the audience and author admit of contrary evaluations in terms of either 
their formal or typical objects and the particular objects. Fear. for example. 
has as its typical objects many things: things which are harmful. things 
which are dangerous. and things which are bad. among others. If the kind of 
fear being contemplated is a fear of that which is harmful. it cannot have as 
its contrary things which we want even though what is harmful is unwanted. 
The evaluative property in the formal object is the means for achieving 
transformation. What has been seen as harmful is now seen as harmless; what 
was seen as dangerous is now seen as benign; what was bad is now neutral. 
Trust is both similar to and different from fear in this respect. Trust admits of 
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many panicular contraries, and those contraries group themselves under two 
general ones: distrust and mistrust. Distrust questions the grounds and 
warrants of trust (and in this respect it is like fear); mistrust questions the 
motives and intentions or the evaluative propriety of trust (and this differs 
from a contrary evaluation of fear). If trust is the felt emotion, the 
appropriate contrary of trust will be found by discerning whether it is the 
grounds or the evaluation of that trust that is assailable. 
A congruent emotion may thus also be evoked if an appropriate 
contrary of the audience's emotion can be used to meet the author's desired 
end. This can be accomplished through finding a common causal factor in the 
emotion and its targeted contrary. Such a common causal factor may emerge 
in the causal sequences of emotional response. Envy, for example, depends on 
secrecy for its maintenance. When envy is discovered, the envied may 
respond with jealousy. The 'jealousy' here carries the sense Shakespeare uses 
in "Jealous in honor;" it is the reverse of envy. Such jealousy may tum into 
spite, the envy into malice. 
Pericles combined these two methods of counter argument, 
transposition and transformation, in his final war speech to the Athenian 
assembly. The Athenians were in despair; the second Spartan invasion and the 
plague challenged their beliefs that Pericles' strategy could, in fact, exercise 
some control over their destiny. The epistemic reasons present in their 
despair and hopelessness cast doubt over the wisdom of Pericles' policies. The 
Athenians thus blamed Pericles and were, hence, angry with him for having 
persuaded them to adopt his policy. Pericles recognized that the epistemic 
reasons operating in the assembly's despair and the fearful dimension of their 
anger were sufficiently sjmilar to be viewed as a common causal factor that 
could be persuasively exploited. His persuasive task was two-fold. He 
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discerned that despair was the dominant, deliberative emotion present; and his 
speech worked to evoke despair's appropriate contrary in this situation, in this 
case confidence. to meet his deliberative aim. To accomplish this. he had to 
shift the target or object of these emotions: he recognized that he had to shift 
the responsibility for the Athenian's continued plight from himself to those in 
the assembly who wanted to sue for immediate peace. 
Conversely, an appropriate contrary can also be found at a more 
abstract level of judgment. Some people envy others for having certain 
attributes and possessions like wealth, power, status, promotion, preferment. 
fame, and so on. The envied object is seen as a kind of good that society uses to 
differentiate people. Envy can be transformed into disdain if the particular 
object can be shown to not possess the worth the envier or the evaluative 
group has invested it with. 
Finally. one can also effect transformation by evoking a qualitatively 
different evaluation that governs the occurrence of the emotions themselves. 
That is, one can transform the emotional repertoire of the audience by 
changing the character of the deliberative aim of the discourse. Diodotus 
transforms the Athenian assembly's judgments in the Mytelenian debate by 
arguing that the issue was not one of justice involving a client state as Cleon 
had argued; rather, the issue was a deliberative one involving what is 
advantageous to Athens. Clean had argued that the issue was retributive 
justice and that the decision had symbolic or rhetorical importance for the 
rest of the empire. The subject city-states must be governed by fear. Diodotus 
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accepts the symbolic import of whatever decision will be reached and uses that 
psychological fact to transform the issue to one which involves the prudential 
well-being of Athens as the head of an empire. He redirected the character of 
the Athenians' fears by transforming the object of their desires from 
retribution to what was advantageous. 
Extirpation and Attenuation 
Finally, the audience's emotional stance can have as its targeted emotion 
one whose evaluation or second order desire is the contradictory opposite of 
the evaluation or second order desire of the emotion the writer needs to evoke 
for the deliberative aim to be successful. Emotions involving contradictory 
opposites cannot be countered in the way contrary emotions can be countered 
using the strategies of transformation. There are two strategies of counter 
argument that one can use in the face of contradictory evaluations. One can 
eliminate the audience's emotion. or one can weaken that emotion. Extirpation 
requires the elimination of the emotion present, thus allowing the formal 
possibility for a new emotion to work to achieve salience. When an emotion is 
weakened, it is altered in degree so that what remains is either vitiated or 
benign, allowing another emotion to be substituted for it. Extirpation and 
attenuation employ the same methods, but they differ in their success 
conditions. Extirpation requires an elimination in kind for its success; 
attenuation, a change in degree. 
Emotional arguments are 'reasonable' ones, and like these, they are 
susceptible to the same kinds of objections and counter arguments that non-
emotional, reasonable arguments are prey to. Reasonable arguments are open 
to two kinds of challenges. A counter argument defeats its rival when it shows 
267 
that the first argument is categorically false. A counter argument may 
undermine a rival argument when it casts doubt on some claim or claims that 
are necessary or sufficient for its success. Extirpation is like the counter 
argument that defeats its rival; attenuation is like the argument that 
undermines its rival. 
Both extirpation and attenuation refer to two different. but related. 
psychological strategies. Extirpation names the process of eliminating 
altogether a targeted emotion. seen as a type. from an individual's emotional 
makeup. It also names the process whereby the grounds for the targeted 
emotion. seen as a token of a type. are defeated in a particular deliberative 
context so that that emotion or its persuasive force is eliminated. Attenuation 
likewise refers to two different but related processes. The process of 
attenuation may ameliorate or weaken the force of the judgments or 
motivational power of an emotion. or it may refer to the weakening of the 
strength of emotional condition itself. Thus. to become calm after being angry 
names the attenuated condition following anger. The discussion of the 
privatives of certain emotions in the previous chapter identified some of the 
more common ones. 
These distinctions must be distinguished from another set of 
distinctions. The strategies of extirpation and attenuation can address an 
emotion as a particular occurrence or holistically. Briefly. a holistic approach 
advocates ending the experience of an emotion (nervousness or hesitation. 
say) in the sense that one works to eliminate all future instances of these 
emotions. The particular approach works on an em.otion that occurs in a 
particular context. such as frustration with a particular individual at work. In 
what follows, I will be concerned with extirpation and attenuation in 
particular contexts. 
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It is tempting but mistaken to think that these strategies vary only in 
degree. It is tempting to do so because they share the same topical methods of 
argument. Thus an attempt at extirpation that is only partially successful 
would actually be an exercise of attenuation. This notion is mistaken because it 
evaluates arguments in terms of the degree of perlocutionary effect; success 
becomes a matter of the degree of preference or aversion created. We have 
examined several arguments and examples, particularly in Chapter IV, where 
it was shown thai this cannot be true. 
With the exception of one topic, the strategies of extirpation and 
attenuation share five lines of argument: a consideration of evaluations and 
judgments, the appropriateness of the targeted emotion, the nature of 
anticipation, the use of analogous cases, and the normative status of the 
emotion itself. The particular nature of the audience's emotional state and the 
personal nature of the reasons they hold in relation to the targeted emotion 
suggest that several of these topics must be deployed together for either of 
these strategies to succeed. 
The first line of argument works only with the strategy of extirpation. 
The cognitive structure of an emotion can be explained in terms of different 
sets of contrasting types of beliefs. These beliefs can be characterized as 
identificatory or evaluative ones, or they can be characterized as evaluative or 
causal beliefs. The distinctions were used earlier to highlight two different 
aspects of the cognitive structure of an emotion. The first line of argument 
for extirpation utilizes the first contrast. Identificatory beliefs are 
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descriptively true or false. All too often one misperceives or misidentifies or 
mislocates the actual and particular object of that emotion so that the 
descriptive beliefs that are a part of the emotion are false. A husband hears of 
a plane crash on its approach to the airport where his wife is shortly to land. 
He fears she is dead. or he begins to grieve believing that his wife has died. 
When he learns that her plane was not the one that crashed, the emotion ends. 
Similarly. one can misidentify who the object of the emotion really is. We saw 
in Chapter IV that Joe, whose lawn mower broke, mistakenly confused the 
belief that whoever broke the mower is responsible with the belief that that 
person was his neighbor. Any clearcut case of illusory focus falls under the 
purview of this topic. 
The second topic concerns the evaluations. beliefs or judgments within 
the emotion. An emotion places some value on the good or evil that its object is 
supposed to possess. One can ask whether the object is actually the type of 
good claimed for it. Is the object, for example, really an instance of an 
intrinsic good, or is it an instrumental good? Pleasure is an intrinsic good, but 
it is by no means clear that any or all means by which pleasure is achieved is 
an instrumental good. Instrumental goods are means to an intrinsic good. 
Malice can be pleasurable, but we cannot choose to be deliberately malicious 
and justify those acts in terms of the pleasure achieved thereby. 
Other goods are problematic. Bernard Williams poses an interesting 
paradox about political honor. People who make political honor a good in their _ 
lives find that that good can be defeated because the attainment of that honor 
is dependent on those to whom the politician tries to be superior (Limits 39). 
Loyalty is also problematic. In 1954, J. Robert Oppenheimer was denied the 
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necessary security clearance to continue work on nuclear weapons on the 
grounds of loyalty. He was not seen as disloyal. Because he had helped a 
friend cover up a questionable political past, his actions in this case were seen 
as unreliable enough to warrant fears about his future conduct. 
Frequently the value attributed to an object depends on that object's 
being unique. Like the Stoics in general, Epictetus recognized the force of 
uniqueness in one's emotions. Uniqueness is such a powerful motivator that 
he argued in the Enchiridion: 
In every thing which pleases the soul, or supplies a want, or is 
loved, remember to add this to the (description, notion); what 
is the nature of each thing, beginning from the smallest? If you 
love an earthen vessel, say it is an earthen vessel which you 
love; for when it has been broken you will not be disturbed. If 
you are kissing your child or your wife, say that it is a human 
being whom you are kissing, for when the wife or child dies, 
you will not be disturbed. (III) 
Such deflationary techniques of description and classification are common, 
yet they are apt to be of limited or partial value. Uniqueness is often 
considered a sufficient criterion of value. A genuine work by Vermeer, for 
example, is more valuable than any copy. reproduction or forgery, no matter 
how accurate that performance is. What makes the original more valuable 
than a copy is its genuineness. But there is another distinction lurking here. 
During the Civil War, the treasury of the Confederacy was plagued by the 
proliferation of counterfeit currency. In the early days of the war, this 
currency was easily detectable because it was more professionally executed 
than the official currency. Genuineness is not the same as aesthetic merit. 
Just as we can confuse genuineness with aesthetic value, we can confuse the 
experience of the emotion. its felt quality. with the value of the object 
(Goodman 53-55). 
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Uniqueness can also imply what is unrepeatable. This notion suggests 
that what is valuable about some object is its punctual aspect or the singleness 
of the performance. Certain concerts or special exhibitions are attractive for 
this reason and manufacturers capitalize on the presumption in their 
advertising ('limited time only'. 'limited quantities', 'special editions', etc.). A 
live performance by Luciano Pavarotti in the hinterlands may be unique, but 
it is Pavarotti that makes it special. In fact, it is Pavarotti's mastery of his art 
that gives the opportunity to hear the performance its uniqueness. 
We can also evaluate the appropriateness of the emotion, whether one 
conceives of it as a performance, activity or state. When a desire is at issue, 
one can question the value of the second order desire. This desire can be 
assessed for the quality of the motivation it advocates, and it can be assessed 
for the worth or value of the outcome. Arguments that invoke fear can be 
questioned from two perspectives. As Seneca argued, fears can be witless or 
they can be groundless. The intentional object of the fear can be assessed to 
test the likelihood of its becoming a material object. The motivational reason 
in the conditional can be imaginatively tested to see if it names a sufficient 
causal condition. Finally, the wish that conceptually controls the conditional 
can be assessed for its motivational and justificatory adequacy. 
Desires and fears produce resultant emotions or states. The 
appropriateness of these desires and fears can be tested by examining the 
likelihood and propriety of the resultant emotions. By seeing which second 
order emotions can alter the quality of the motivations in the advocated desires 
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and fears, one sees how compatible they are with the deliberative aim. What 
may causally successful may not be normatively appropriate. 
The fourth strategy concerns one's ability to anticipate harm or evil; it 
ts, perhaps, the strongest method for extirpating or attenuating an emotion. 
The technique is an ancient one; Cicero tells us that it was advocated by the 
Cyrenaics (Tusculan Disputations ill. 28-31, 34 ). Praemeditatio, as it was called, 
is a technique of psychological preparation; it has us think in advance about 
the ills in life we are prey to. 
At the particular level, anticipation is a particularly powerful antidote 
to the power of the unexpected, and pains that are unexpected are more 
intense. It probably will not eliminate all suffering in an occurrent situation; 
expected suffering is, after all, still painful. Cicero argues that unexpected 
harm or evil produces two deleterious consequences: 
But on a careful consideration of the unexpected, you would find 
nothing else, except that all sudden occurrences are magnified, 
and that for two reasons: first, because no scope is given for 
weighing the magnitude of the occurrences; secondly because. 
where it seems that previous precautions could have been taken 
if sufficient foresight had been shown, the evil incurred, as 
implying blame, makes the distress keener. (TO III 52-53) 
The first insight is, perhaps, obvious. The ability to anticipate the severity of a 
future evil places it in perspective. The second insight is more complex. The 
failure to exercise sufficient foresight likewise produces keener distress. The 
supposed justification of this distress depends on a (usually tacit) subjunctive 
conditional or counterfactual argument (if it were the case that I had done X, 
then Y would have been prevented). Yet if the antecedent is false, then the 
consequent is false. The argument presupposes that the harm is or was 
avoidable. If the harm is unavoidable. then the conditional is also false. 
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If one could have or should have anticipated the future harm.then, 
Cicero argues. self blame will be the emotional condition that results from this 
failure of insight. Culpability, however, can be matter of degree. Self blame 
may be too strong; one can feel remorse or regret. The resultant emotion can 
also be weakened by focusing on issues of agency rather than on one's 
failings as an agent. 
Anticipation is a future looking technique that addresses the 
unexpected. some emotional responses are past looking. and they can be made 
more intense through a condition that is the converse of the unexpected. 
Boethius gives clear expression to this converse condition when he argues, "In 
all adversity of fortune, the most wretched kind is once to have been happy" 
(6 I). Dante agrees; he has Francesca say of her suffering, "There is no greater 
woe/ that happiness recalled in misery" (Inferno V 11. I I 9-120). This intensity 
is apparently confirmed by the perspectival nature of one's memories. 
We are apt today to focus on the expressive dimensions of the genre of 
consolation literature and forget the practical and therapeutic function the 
genre aims for. Consolation literature is certainly expressive. but it had (and 
has) therapeutic functions. The fifth strategy is common one in this genre. 
The need to place one's distress in perspective points to the fifth topic of 
extirpation and attenuation. 
The perspectival nature and the personal character of the emotions 
often narrows one's focus. The topics outlined above attempt to correct that 
narrowness. Most of the topics just discussed are abstract in nature. By 
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drawing on the experiences of others through the use of exempla, one's 
arguments become more concrete. Concrete examples not only show what 
particular people felt or did, their examples exemplify what individuals should 
or should not do. Negative examples undermine the strength of false beliefs; 
positive examples illustrate what is appropriate. They not only show what we 
can do; they exemplify what we should do. Such examples are also successful 
because the reasons which the individuals in the examples act on are reasons 
which the members of the audience have in their motivational set. 
The use of examples works for another powerful reason. Control of one 
emotions depends on the ability to critically reflect on them. Although they 
are cognitively structured, the emotions are too fluid and dynamic to allow 
most of us to stop and reflect on their natures as we undergo them. Examples 
guide one's reflections about an occurrent emotion by offering a structure or 
framework through which the act of reflection can take place. 
The final topic grows out of an insight of Chrysippus. Chrysippus. the 
third head of the Stoa, was the first to distinguish two crucial judgments or 
motivations operating in the passions. It is one judgment to say X is bad; it is 
quite another to join that judgment with the causal belief that one ought to 
suffer because X is bad (TD III. 61 ). This distinction has two sets of 
consequences. First, it provides us with a way to conceptually link decorum 
with judgment so that propriety is no longer a set of conventions. More 
importantly, one can apply the topics of anticipation and analogy to one's 
ostensible expressive duties. 
More to the point, however, emotions like envy and jealousy are not 
normative emotions. Still, people undergo these emotions and act on them, and 
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arguments denying their legitimacy have notoriously little effect on those 
who experience them. Chrysippus' distinction gives us another way to argue. 
The technique involves an informal reductio argument. One begins by 
assuming that it is one's duty to act on the non normative emotion. One then 
introduces a condition that will make action on the emotion self defeating. 
Envy, for example, depends on secrecy for its success. By introducing the 
condition of publicity of one's motive, acting on envy becomes self defeating. 
To behave as if one were jealous of another is to act through a stratagem. To 
have an emotion for some purpose is to engage in manipulation. When the 
point of the emotional episode is revealed the action becomes self frustrating. 
Emotions that are ad baculum appeals can be made self defeating in the same 
way. 
Integrity 
The deliberative emotions are forms of intentional awareness and self-
assessment with occurrent and dispositional manifestations that help us shape 
our destinies. The capacity for self-assessment implies that the agent is 
capable of self evaluation, and the notion of destiny implies reflection about 
how one's whole life is to be Jived, which includes the pursuit and defense of 
principles, projects and activities that make up that life. Undeserved harms 
threaten those activities and projects that are constitutive of our well-being. 
In certain, albeit extreme, cases these harms damage us ; they threaten who we 
are. They can harm our identity by threatening corruption, by undermining 
our autonomy, or by disintegrating our wholeness. Significantly, the very 
emotions that signal threats of harm can, themselves, cause harm. We can, 
obviously, act on the wrong desire, mistake the intensity of a desire for its 
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strength, or confuse strength with appropriateness. We can be overwhelmed 
by fear; and the dangers of hatred , envy and jealousy are well known. We can-
also be overcome by distress. Distress, the appearance of a present and great 
evil, names a family of related emotions. Their power. the Stoic Chrysippus 
argued, lies in their capacity to threaten and dissolve the whole individual. He 
offered an etymological argument to buttress this insight. Lupe (distress) is 
derived he says, from luo, to dissolve. Whatever the accuracy of the 
etymological claim, the real strength of the argument lies, however, in his 
recognition that emotion is a kind of false judgment. When we assent to that 
incorrect belief or judgment, we license the illegitimate or inappropriate 
experience of that emotion. Distress counsels resignation and surrender and 
thus breaks down one's identity (TO III. 61 ). 
If we are to withstand these threats, our emotions must be integrated 
with and into other parts of our characters. We call this capacity to effect 
such an integration and coordination in adverse circumstances one's 
'integrity'. Obviously, not all harms are this extreme; and issues of integrity do 
not, typically, arise in the face of these prospective harms. A stance requiring 
attentiveness, prudence, compassion or care may be all that is required. But it 
is in and through these extreme or adverse situations that the role of the 
emotions in deliberation are most clearly articulated. 
Before turning to the issues of integrity, I need to distinguish it from its 
close relative, dignity. When we are able to act for noble principles in the 
face of misfortune or at· personal cost, we act from a sense of fortitude. The 
ground of this fortitude for noble ends is dignity. Aurel Kolnai argues that the 
notion of dignity suggests worthiness, composure, calmness, restraint and 
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distance.! The emotions are controlled without being dissipated. Dignity, he 
suggests, has two kinds of concerns. First, dignity manifests itself in a lack of 
concern for external advantages and a strong concern for goodness of 
character. The psychic balance required for one to be unconcerned about 
material advantages is called equanimity. Significantly, this disregard for 
one's own material advantages does not extend to a disregard for the 
misfortunes of others. This asymmetry is important. There are three 
possibilities to be contrasted here. 
the effects of misfortune equally. 
First, we could expect everyone to disregard 
This idea is unacceptable to many; it 
counsels a kind of resignation rather than disdain for security. Second, we 
can expect others to regard our own misfortune as more important than their 
own. This position is not only selfish. it is psychologically implausible to 
expect people to behave this way. The third possibility, we saw, can arise from 
a sense of dignity. Pity and indignation are concerned with moral deserts. and 
the concerns of justice contained within these emotions form a part of the 
exercise of one's dignity. The second concern, the manifestation of one's 
character in action, suggests a second volitional capacity we can and must 
exercise. Dignity and integrity name related manifestations of that capacity to 
act. 
When we say that someone acts with integrity or has integrity we are 
expressing a judgment of admiration or esteem. To say that a person acted with 
integrity is to praise that action, but it praises far more. We are praising what 
that action exemplifies. The action is not only the manifestation of certain 
virtues or admirable traits, the character and worthiness of the action is 
constituted by those virtues. These virtues include honesty. courage, fairness, 
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truthfulness, and fidelity. An act of integrity thus both possesses and refers to 
those properties. We are, in essence, praising that person's ethos. Integrity, in 
this sense, is "a form of conscientiousness" (Wallace 95). We are personally 
committed to defending those ethical or moral projects and principles 
necessary for our well being in the face of grave difficulty. 
In her discussion of dignity, Gabriele Taylor reminds us that there is 
another, more ancient, conception of integrity. 'Integrity' refers also to the 
wholeness of an individual's character. The individual's character is 
harmoniously structured in a way such that the person is autonomous. 
responsible, and uncorrupted. An important aspect this sort of integrity can 
be characterized negatively; 'integrity' is a condition where one does not 
deviate from one's nature. Thus. the sense of 'integrity' insures that the 
individual is, in some sense, the same individual. The OED reminds us that 
'truth' was originally a quality of persons. To be true was to be faithful, 
steadfast and constant. When exercised. this aspect of integrity implies 
stability and fortitude. Acts of integrity, in this sense, reveal the persistence 
of admirable traits in the face of adversity. 
Although acts of integrity involve acting on principle, the correct and 
successful discharge of one's duties and obligations is, by itself, insufficient 
for making this judgment. Integrity requires a commitment to some worthy 
and justified end or goal. This commitment to defend, uphold or champion 
some principle manifests itself as an ability to act consistently in the face of 
adversity or conflicts. When we are committed, in this sense, we are bound 
intellectually, emotionally and volitionally to a decided course of action. We 
not only believe that the principle is true, we believe in its rightness and its 
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imponance. This rightness leads the person of integrity to be also 
uncompromising. Thus, when we act from integrity three conditions must be 
present. First, the act to be performed must be justified. Second, our 
motivation must spring from that justification. Finally, that motivation 
presents itself as one of practical necessity (Wallace 95). 
The three conditions necessary for integrity resemble other ways in 
which we can be committed and uncompromising. By contrasting integrity 
with these other kinds of committed action we can see more clearly what these 
conditions demand. The person of integrity is committed to a principle, but 
that commitment is neither dogmatic nor fanatical. The dogmatist is a person 
committed to some idea, usually of a panial, impractical or visionary nature. 
The dogmatist and ideologue are ones who believe they have a monopoly on 
truth or justice. The ideologue and dogmatist experience emotions, but an 
antecedent belief in the rightness of their cause blocks the opponunity to 
cultivate new and richer emotional perceptions. Of course, dogmatists and 
ideologues do have emotions. Yet they are, in essence, emotionally insensitive; 
what is felt is dictated by one's guiding ideological beliefs. Thus, they lack a 
capacity to be self-critical. As we saw earlier, pity requires an ability to see 
one's own possibilities as being similar to another's. Imaginative reversal 
manifests itself only towards the dogmatist's allies, those who are like the 
dogmatist in terms of a set of 'litmus test' beliefs. A recognition of human 
vulnerability by the ideologue, however, is likely to manifest itself as blame or 
contempt. 
The emotions they experience do deliver judgments, but they are judged 
from the top down. If the judgment accords with the prior belief set, 
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emotional judgment usually play an evidentiary role. When they serve as 
reasons, these reasons are open to the charge of being self-fulfilling 
prophecies because they are interpreted in the light of antecedent beliefs. 
Thus. the dogmatist is susceptible, for example, to patterns of argument that 
appeal to the exercise of fortitude in the present situation because those acts 
will be seen as justified in the future. Like the person of integrity. the 
dogmatist or ideologue is uncompromising about their principles (Halfon 68). 
Mark Halfon also argues that while ideologues can distinguish, in principle. 
differences in the quality of the reasons offered, the criterion for a reason to 
be 'good' is its defense of that ideology (68). Unlike the ideologue, the person 
of integrity is willing to reflect on the rightness of those principles and is also 
willing to test whether those principles do, in fact, appropriately apply to the 
case in question. 
Fanatics are also committed and uncompromising. Like ideologues, 
fanatics see their goals as absolute and all-important. They are 
uncompromising in the sense that they refuse to make concessions either for 
any reason at all or irrespective of the reason (Halfon 69). Fanaticism is the 
ruthless desire to pursue one's goal at any cost--including one's own well-
being. Because we are susceptible to incompatible desires, the fanatic 
subordinates all of his, and everyone else's, desires and attitudes to the pursuit 
of that goal. The fanatic is also uncompromising. The fanatic sees an obstacle 
not as a problem but as a provocation. Typically when we are provoked, we 
become irritated or exasperated. One's threshold for frustration and its allies is 
grounded in one's temperament. As we saw earlier, irritation can produce a 
kind of mock anger, with a concomitant desire to return pain for the 
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perceived provocation. These observations, coupled with the more general 
observation that the emotions are a reliable source of motivational energy, 
explain another aspect of the fanatic's emotional life. The fanatic is capable of 
exciting the passions excessively, producing a zeal to work for that goal. 
Two observations need to be made here. First. the disposition to act with 
zeal is not properly motivated. The object of the emotion that originates that 
zeal is not what is out there in the world; it is, rather, within the fanatic. Zeal 
is a form of desire; like all desires, zea~ derives some of its content from the 
psychological state of the agent and some of it from the worthiness of the goal. 
The fanatic confuses the intensity of his devotion with a sufficient 
justification for that zeal. Second, this mistaken judgment affects the manner 
in which that zeal is expressed. Preoccupied with success. the fanatic is quite 
willing to choose any expedient means to reach this goal. For the fanatic, 
expediency exercised to achieve one's goal is justified by the 'moral' claim that 
one must remain committed to achieving that goal (Kekes 77-79). 
An act of integrity is seen as one of practical necessity. This 
requirement concerns the volitional nature of one's act. An act of integrity is 
not one that is fastidiously done, nor is it one that is punctiliously performed. 
While these qualities refer to the manner of execution they are not 
manifestations of an intrinsic motivation. The end is seen as one of necessity; 
it must happen because it is right. This sense of necessity is sometimes 
perceived in terms of a test. To say one ought to do X carries two possible 
negations. If Y is the negation of X, then we may say, "Y ought not to happen," 
or we may say, "it ought not to be the case that Y ever exists." Some types of 
acts, simple evils for example, are clear cut in this latter way. An agent 
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rightly discerns that Y ought never to be the case and that act X, as a matter of 
practical necessity, must be done. Furthermore, the agent believes that to not 
act would be violation of that agent's core principles. 
The act of integrity, however, may be one where we say Y ought not to 
happen and we say X must happen. For X to be an act of integrity X must be one 
of those moral or ethical principles that partially defines who the individual 
is. When someone acts to defend this principle that individual makes 
articulate who one is, in the sense that the act defines what lies at or near the 
ethical or moral core of that person's being. The act exemplifies a crucial 
aspect of that individual's character. Thus, the sense that it is necessary to act 
in defense of the principle will have its counterpart in the agent's character 
because it is also seen as necessary for the individual to act. 
If integrity requires a refusal to deviate from one's nature, then it 
requires the activation of some trait or state of character, and the agent 
recognizes that she has the requisite trait to see the action through. This trait 
must satisfy three requirements. First, the trait is grounded in a form of self 
knowledge that makes the agent autonomous. That trait is a state of character 
with the capacity for self-determination. Second, while we recognize that 
questions of justification and motivation are theoretically distinct, we also 
want these two states to be related so that one's motivation grasps the intrinsic 
rightness of the principle at stake. This trait will, thus, manifest itself 
volitionally, protecting the agent from the threat of corruption while it 
instantiates the rightness of the principle. But the trait must do more than be 
an instantiation of the principle. It will define one's sense of agency in 
relation to the action to be performed, bringing the resources of one's 
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character to bear on the problem. Finally, the trait, by defining one's sense of 
agency, provides the bridge between that intrinsic motivation and the rest of 
the agent's character by coordinating and directing the inner resources of the 
agent. When integrity involves wholeness. 'constancy' names that trait. 
Constancy is that virtue which reaffirms the unity and harmonious wholeness 
of one's character in action (Halfon 49). The exercise of constancy involves 
firmness, but its occurrent manifestation must take into account who one is 
and who one will become. When integrity means conscientious fortitude, 
however, 'rectitude'. the most often cited candidate for this trait, actually 
names the manner in which that trait is exercised. Rectitude itself requires a 
kind of self knowledge to guide its operation. Virtues like courage and justice 
are states of character that deliver us the capacity to act with integrity. 
Significantly, some emotions can serve this function as well. 
An act of integrity is seen as what we must do, but that necessity carries 
a negation: we must not violate who we are. This conceptual fact allows us two 
avenues of appeal. We can appeal positively to the appropriate trait. but we 
can also appeal to its contrary, what we must not allow to happen. The 
capacity for self-assessment allows to see who we are and it allows us to 
imagine how others see us. The appeal to the contrary of a trait is, quite 
probably, the more powerful motivation. It is more powerful because it allows 
the agent more freedom to reveal through action what is most precious to the 
agent. The motivation has a double thrust; it motivates one to fight against 
what must not happen while revealing the strength of what is individually 
important. But significantly, this freedom comes at a cost of self revelation; 
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what is most precious may not be most worthy. Frequently, and appropriately, 
that appeal is to shame. 
Future Directions of Study 
I have focused on the various roles of the emotions as they function as a 
constituent element in one's sense of deliberative agency. The dimension of 
agency is, I think, an appropriate place to begin to understand this dimension 
of persuasion. To pursue this end, I have relied heavily on classical thinkers 
in this study for several reasons. First, they took the passions seriously, and 
their understanding of the cognitive dimensions of the passions was. and still 
remains, quite sophisticated. Because of their cognitive approach to the 
passions, their observation and analyses have a practical import and subtlety 
that we cannot afford to ignore. Finally, and most importantly, they 
understood. as we all too frequently forget. that 'reasoning' is not to be 
conflated with 'logic', even though 'logic' is a necessary condition for 
reasoning well. Practical reasoning involves reason, the passions and one's 
character, and the passions have the potential, as Aristotle rightly observes, to 
make one's argument complete. 
I want to conclude this study by making several observations about the 
directions our inquiries into this area of study might profitably proceed. 
There are three areas of research concerning the emotions and deliberative 
agency that deserve further attention. The first is. I think. obvious. Each 
major deliberative emotion deserves its own rhetorical study. These studies 
should examine the various rhetorical uses of that emotion at different times 
in history. and it should explain how that emotion's functions are manifested 
evocatively and expressively. A study, for example, of the rise of 'resentment' 
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as distinct from 'anger' in the English speaking world. beginning in the 
seventeenth century, would be quite illuminating. Interestingly. 'resentment' -
received comparatively little attention from the British moral philosophers 
(and even less from the rhetoricians) as it made a place for itself in people's 
emotional and volitional lives. The important explorations of anger and 
resentment take place in British fiction. 
Second. more work needs to be done on how we represent the objects of 
the emotions. This will involve how they are depicted and how their 
properties are exemplified. Much of this analysis will be semantic in nature, 
but not all of the puzzles will be resolved this way. The question of 
exemplification will lead to further inquiries into the appropriateness of the 
emotions. The puzzles arising out of the objects of the emotions will also 
require for their solution a third area of study. Emotional appeals affecting 
one's sense of agency may proceed through reasoning (as I have argued in 
some detail), but they also are made through examples and stories. The use of 
examples is so common that we tend to not see how complex their functioning 
really is. Perhaps the most detailed discussion of the nature. types and 
functions of examples is J. D. Lyons' work. Exempla. Aristotle called the 
strategy of argument by example epagoge. and we conventionally translate 
this technical Greek term by another, modem technical term. induction. Yet 
the phrase 'rhetorical induction' is a term of art; any explanation of this term 
must comprehend the intentional nature of rhetorical examples, the 
pragmatics of their use. and the shared psychological factors that exist 
between writer and audience. 
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While emotional persuasion can be explored from the point of view of 
the office of deliberative agency. this approach is protreptic to the study of 
the role of the emotions in the deliberative agent. The arguments concerning 
integrity in the previous section bracketed off the question of integrity as a 
condition of emotional and volitional wholeness guiding the deliberating 
agent. What this wholeness entails is a crucial issue for understanding how 
one should live. Yet the nature and role of the emotions in the deliberating 
agent cannot. at this time, be addressed head-on. At present, we still know far 
too little to make any more that tantalizing speculations. We do have. however. 
several avenues of approach into this question that we can take. 
From time to time we find it necessary to respond to problems with faute 
de mieux claims that evoke some emotion we believe to be relevant to the case 
at hand. Seen in isolation. these claims serve. as Nancy Sherman argues in 
her study of the emotions in the thought of Immanuel Kant. as instrumental 
strategies. and the name of this strategy fits literally many of the instances we 
use it. But she suggests. through her quotation from Kant's Anthropologie, 
another aspect of this strategy that deserves consideration. He argues that it is 
"still wisdom on nature's part to implant in us the predisposition to sympathy. 
so that it it could handle the reins provisionally, until reason has achieved the 
necessary strength" (as quoted in Sherman 158). 
There are three ideas in Kant's argument that I want to call attention to. 
First, a faute de mieux claim may on occasion serve as evidence of an 
individual's dissatisfaction with her current depth of emotional understanding 
that is delivered by that emotion. In these cases. the claim heralds the 
readiness for the advent of a new stage in that agent's emotional 
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comprehension. Although I have already discussed certain aspects of this 
notion of developmental stages of comprehension, more work needs to be done . 
in this area. Kant also places a limitation on which claims are significant in 
this arena when he argues that the emotions that we are to consider are those 
which are 'natural'. The notion of what is 'natural' is quite broad; it named 
quite different ideas in the classical world. and it names different ideas in the 
modem. David Home was one of the first modem thinkers to recognize the 
importance of this concept for our understanding the potential inherent in 
the cultivation of the passions. 
I want to suggest that this restriction also points to the social dimension 
of the emotions that function in these claims. This idea is broached by Eugene 
Garver in his recent study of Aristotle's R he tori c . In his discussion of the 
various ways emotion 'completes' an argument. he quotes Athene's speech in 
the Eumenides: 
It is my task to render final judgment here. 
This is a ballot for Orestes I shall cast. 
There is no mother anywhere who gave me birth, 
and, but for marriage, I am always for the male 
with all my heart, and strongly on my father's side. 
(11. 734-738) 
Athene's claim appears to be corrupt; preference, by itself, cannot be justified. 
Yet Athene does not offer it as an argument. The claim is ad hoc; it allows her 
to move from forensic rhetoric to deliberative considerations. considerations 
that wiii end the cycle of revenge and murder required by the Furies (Garver 
106). Athene's commitment to the service of justice in Orestes' case can be 
understood as a dilemma that must be resolved. Her claim provides her with a 
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stance from which she can resolve the competing demands represented by the 
desires of Apollo and the Furies. 
The third area we need to study further concerns the role of the 
emotions in resolving dilemmas. The roles of the emotions will vary in part 
because we face different kinds of dilemmas. Plato offers a well-known case. 
You borrow weapons from an individual who subsequently goes mad and 
demands their return. You must then decide whether to satisfy the obligations 
based on your promise to the owner or to satisfy the more general principle 
that one ought to prevent harm (Republic I, 331 c 5-9). Dilemmas in this sense 
arise from some conflict between the oughts that are found to arise from one's 
duties (as defined by one's role), one's obligations (based on particular acts). 
and one's moral principles. 
Not all dilemmas are of the sort just sketched. Agamemnon has been 
ordered by the gods to lead an expedition against Troy. The winds are 
unfavorable; his troops are dying. He must sacrifice his daughter, Iphigenia, 
so that the fleet can sail to Troy. If he does not sacrifice her, the entire army 
will die. If he performs the sacrifice, he is a murderer; if he does not sacrifice. 
he is guilty of disobedience to the gods and all die. Bernard Williams argues 
that this sort of dilemma is such that the conflict is contingent ("Ethical 
Consistency"). Both demands cannot be realized. Dilemmas in this sense 
resemble conflicts of desires. The choice of one desire does not cancel out the 
force of the other desire. Significantly, Agamemnon will feel shame 
regardless of the choice that is made. 
An especially interesting and significant conflict of moral desires 
appears in Sophocles' tragedy, Philoctetes. Philoctetes is guided by two moral 
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desires, dike and aidos, desires bound to powerful emotions. In this play, shame 
initially plays a powerful role in the deliberations. The bow of Heracles is 
necessary for an Achaean victory against the Trojans. Philoctetes, the 
rightful owner of the bow, suffers from an excruciating wound and has been 
exiled to Lemnos. The Achaean leaders send Odysseus and Neoptolemus to 
retrieve the bow. At first, Neoptolemus allows himself to be used by Odysseus 
in this task. Odysseus asks him to deceive Philoctetes, a shameful act, and he 
justifies the shameful act by an appeal to courage which will yield 
consequential justification. Neoptolemus sets aside his shame and tricks 
Philoctetes. After he gains the bow, Neoptolemus is overcome by pity for 
Philoctetes' suffering. Philoctetes' wound is the result of an accident; he 
unknowingly trespassed into a divine region. He is innocent of any conscious 
wrongdoing. Funhermore, the bow was a deserved gift offered to Philoctetes 
in honor of his friendship, his courage and his skill as an archer. Philoctetes 
is angry and desires revenge. but he cannot act; that is his tragic situation. 
Significantly, Neoptolemus then defines his duty of justice in terms of the pity 
he feels for Philoctetes. Neoptolemus is torn between conflicts of duty: he is 
under an obligation to retrieve the bow, and he feels an obligation to help 
Philoctetes. Neoptolemus's moral compass is the conviction that he "would 
prefer even to fail with honor than win by cheating." Neoptolemus' dilemma 
helps confirm the most controversial aspect of Aristotle's characterization of 
pity. Aristotle claims that pity is activated by a self regarding perception that 
imaginatively engages in situational role reversal. Often condemned as 
dangerously egoistic, the notion that pity is self regarding and other 
regarding suggests a psychological distance that is necessary for autonomous 
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action. (Identification undermines autonomy.) This causal condition allows 
pity to operate in two spheres of deliberative concern. It can serve the 
benevolent capacities of the individual by perceiving and judging what is 
undeserved. The focus on undeserved circumstances, coupled with this 
distance and perspective. can also motivate one to act so that those 
circumstances do not arise for ourselves or others. The tension in 
Neoptolemus' dilemma arising from the pity he feels for Philoctetes turns on a 
conflict within the fears he feels at the prospect of shame and the fears he 
feels if he does not act to help this person. Dilemmas such as the one faced by 
Neoptolemus reveal the tensions and conflicts within a moral system more 
effectively than almost any other means. 
Finally, I want to suggest that one's patterns of emotional argument 
reveal dimensions of one's will in two related ways. Richard Weaver argued 
that one can discern the habit of a writer's mind by examining the type of 
reason deployed as the major premise of his arguments because such habitual 
choices reveal that writer's view of existence. Just as one's philosophical 
position may be revealed this way, a writer will reveal the nature of the good 
will directed at oneself and others. We have seen that the self-directed and 
other-directed passions are related in complex ways; these passions have 
causal and evaluative contraries, as well as counterpart and complimentary 
emotions. The evocation and expression of these emotions over time will 
manifest themselves as an affective pattern of judgments, desires and fears; 
and once it is discovered, it will help reveal the crucial ethical concerns of 
that agent. 
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There is another dimension of one's emotional stance that is revealed 
over time. We often speak of one's temper. Temper can refer to one's flash 
point, that threshold where anger erupts. It also refers more generally to 
one's self control. But these uses depend on a more general notion of temper, 
an idea that is necessary for understanding one's capacity for passionate 
deliberation. Just as we use 'temper' to describe the strength of steel, we use 
temper to describe the strength of one's emotional spirit. The idea is important 
not just because it encompasses emotions like anger; it is important because it 
encompasses the normative dimensions of the emotions in a social context. 
George Orwell had this notion of temper in mind when he described his mental 
image of Charles Dickens, giving him the face he ought to have: 
It is the face of a man of about forty, with a small beard 
and a high colour. He is laughing, with a touch of anger 
in his laughter, but no triumph, no malignity. It is the 
face of a man who is ·always fighting against something, 
but who fights in the open and is not frightened, the face 
of a man who is generously angry --in other words, of 
a nineteenth-century liberal, a free intelligence, a type 
hated with equal hatred by all the smelly little orthodoxies 
which are now contending for our souls. (1 04) 
Such spiritedness indicates one's deliberative temper, and this temper is the 
ground from which one's good will emanates and, one hopes, will flourish. 
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APPENDIX A 
PARONYMY AND HUMEAN PROJECTION 
Just as the individual attains a more sophisticated grasp of a concept 
through bootstrapping, it is reasonable to expect that the concept itself 
undergoes changes that affect its own conceptual complexity. In this appendix 
I want to speculate how these changes in conceptual complexity are brought 
about. 
Denominative meaning relations are not the only kind of 
meaning _relationships that we can draw on. We also have paronymous 
meaning relationships. Paronymy is the morphological variation upon a 
common root in lawlike correlation with meaning differences.! Paronymous 
meaning relations will reveal the standard conditions for use. They are 
protreptic to the truth conditions that obtain in the particular manifestations 
of each term's possible applications. 
As a linguistic matter, we can describe these morphological derivations 
in two ways. They can be understood as a matter of internal arrangement: 
envi + ous + ly yields enviously, or they can be understood as a matter of 
establishing the stages through which the word develops: un + (envi + able) 
yields unenviable. The role of time in these stages is accorded a secondary 
status. One constraint for the possibility of further derivations is the domain 
in which the property can appear. Only praise can be described as 'fulsome' 
and thus far any extension of its application will produce a noninherent use. 
Furthermore, the number of paronymous forms suggests the conceptual 
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complexity of that concept. 'Fulsome' has three forms; 'resentment' has eight; 
envy, twelve. 
While time may be a secondary consideration from a linguistic point of 
view. it is a significant consideration when we try to understand the 
conceptual complexity of an emotional concept. I want to argue that emotional 
concepts move through several determinate stages of increasing complexity. 
The defining criteria for each stage will be reflected in the semantic and 
grammatical possibilities that are open to that term. The notion that we can 
reconstruct the genealogy of a concept by examining its formal and 
grammatical possibilities was first suggested by Paul Grice. If such a 
procedure is possible, then we can significantly clarify the social component 
of the emotions. Before turning to the procedure itself. it is important to 
distinguish it from intellectual history and cultural criticism. The intellectual 
history of an idea traces the evolution of the arguments concerning that idea 
and tests their force against other arguments in the period and then evaluates 
the success or failure of those arguments on the subsequent development of 
that idea. Like intellectual history, cultural criticism is concerned with the 
development of intellectual, aesthetic and moral ideas and their practices. 
What we want to explain are those operations in language that make the 
intentional arguments that are the concern of intellectual history and 
cultural criticism conceptually possible. In fact, if the procedure works, it can 
make articulate when an argument exploits what is already implicitly present 
and when an intellectual contribution is radically new. 
In a brief but illuminating argument presente_d twice, first in The 
Conception of Value and later in his essay, "Reply to Richards," Grice reflects 
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on David Hume's observation that "the mind has a great propensity to spread 
itself on external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions, 
which they occasion. and which always make their appearance at the same 
time that these objects discover themselves to the senses." It is an idea that 
Hume returned to in his discussion of reason and taste, arguing that we have a 
"productive faculty, gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours. 
borrowed from internal sentiment, [and which] raises, in a manner, a new 
creation:·2 Hume suggests in this passage, and Grice agrees, that this is a deep 
seated propensity in human nature. While Hume cites this propensity as a 
pervasive source of pernicious error, Grice sees it as a primitive capacity that 
is the origin of the concepts we use. He argues that we can explain the 
complexity of a concept by hypothetically reconstructing its genealogy 
through what he calls a 'construction routine'. The construction routine he 
calls Humean Projection offers an account of how attitudes are projected onto 
the world and through that process can become legitimate. 3 In the latter 
argument Grice is concerned with sentence operators like 'or' and 'not', but he 
speculates that it is possible to give an account of how concepts like mood 
indicators, modals and psychological prc>pensities originate and move through 
successive stages, finally becoming an objective concept with satisfaction and 
truth conditions. He suggests that concepts progress through four successive 
stages. Each stage is evidenced by the grammatical and semantic operations 
that are permissible for the term during that stage. By putting a concept 
'through the mangle' of these grammatical and semantic operations. the 
extension of the terms in question change: just as importantly. the intensional 
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meaning relationships present are also altered. At each stage, the concept 
repeatedly takes on new and more objective satisfaction conditions.4 
In sketching the construction routine Grice notes that each stage has its 
own characteristics. In stage one the concept exists as an intuitive and 
unclarified attitude in our conceptual vocabulary. It seems likely that the 
emotions begin as felt qualities projected onto our experiences. At stage two 
we have reached a specific mental state. The specific mental state, judging 
say, is distinguished from other mental states like willing. We have evidence 
of the same sort of differentiation in emotion concepts. The OED reports that 
'anger' originally was "that which pains or afflicts," or was a passive feeling 
produced by such an affliction. It was differentiated from trouble, affliction, 
anguish and sorrow. 5 This state generates a set of responses to the appearance 
of an instantiation of the initial concept. He suggests that if these states are 
labeled the words used would function, initially, adverbially. 
During the third stage references to the specific state is replaced by a 
more general psychological verb. Judging and willing are understood in 
terms of accepting. Being 'fractious', 'irritable,' 'peevish', or 'querulous' are 
understood in terms of annoying someone. The use of an operator like 'not' or 
'or' will appear only within the scope of the general verb, e.g., thinking p or 
q. The term is allowed only maximal scope within the complement of the verb, 
e.g., "thinking it valuable to learn Greek. "6 The question, "Did you respond 
with disdain, contempt or spite?" exhibits this scope restriction. 
At the fourth stage the restrictions imposed by the scope of the general 
verb are removed. The concept has full syntactic and semantic freedom. Grice 
makes several observations about these stages. Stage four requires truth 
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conditions for statements where the term appears. Stage three can only be 
differentiated from stage two after stage four has been achieved. Finally, the 
process is not arbitrary; each subsequent stage that is exhibited has some 
purpose or point that justifies the change in the concept. 
Grice's hypothesis that these concepts are the product of developmental 
stages of articulation and specification explains much. The property-response 
emotions identified in Chapter ITI have become arrested at stage three. The 
use of adjectives like 'startling', 'surprising' and 'horrifying' are legitimate 
when they denote objects that possess properties that produce states where one 
is startled, surprised or horrified. What is intriguing about this stage can be 
illustrated by our 'being startled'. When I startle you, you are startled because 
you find what I did startling. The converse is the same. While the emotion is 
yours or mine because each of us experiences it, what is the same is the 
affective experience of being startled, not some particular property common 
in each circumstance we call startling. While we share the capacity for being 
startled with the animals, what individuals and communities typically find 
startling will vary from individual to individual, community to community, 
and they will also vary over time. While the capacity to be startled may be 
inherent, the circumstances and the extrinsic causes that elicit the emotion of 
being startled are patterned, and possibly institutional, responses that are 
learned. 
The property-response emotions function as widely as they do because 
their possible domain of application is highly general. Our legitimate 
application of the term will be to a concrete situation or individual, but what 
we select to perceive in the situation where the term can be applied is not 
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refined at this stage to cover a certain property of a particular individuaL The 
key is generality. Generality has two contraries. The 'general' is opposed to 
the specific, and specificity is a matter of degree. We are at liberty to be as 
specific in our perceptions as our aims in a situation warrant us to be. The 
'general' is also opposed to the particular. Property-response emotions are 
general in this sense. The noun forms of these emotions (surprise, horror, 
amusement, etc.) when present. refer to a type of experience, not a particular. 
The ambiguity between the specific and the particular is not recognized with 
these concepts at this stage. Recognition of this ambiguity operating in an 
emotional concept is a characteristic of the final stage. 
Grice also observes that a concept. while in stage three. is understood in 
terms of a more general concept. 'Being startled' is a specie in the more 
general class of fears. 'Horror' is likewise comprehended in terms of a more 
general classification. Yet horror exhibits a crucial difference from being 
startled. 'Horror' can be specie of the fearful, e.g. "the coming war fills me 
with horror;" it is also a specie of distress, a painful emotion felt at something 
bad which is present. 'Surprise', on the other hand, can be a specie of distress 
or delight. The condition of generality just discussed licenses the multiple 
classifications. These classifications are important because they are 
conceptually necessary if we are to explain the emotional effects of our 
actions. We do not standardly respond to the question, "why did you that?" by 
saying, "I comforted you." We say, "I was trying to comfort you." Similarly, if 
you are annoyed, startled or surprised by my action I may respond by saying, 
I. I fear that I have (annoyed, startled or surprised) you 
2. I am distressed that I have (annoyed, startled or surprised) you 
If you are comforted, charmed, or interested as a result of my action I may 
respond by saying, 
3. I wanted you to find it (comforting, engaging or interesting) 
4. I am delighted that you found it (comforting, charming or 
engaging). 
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An appeal that purports to say what our intentions are require another verb to 
govern the explanation of the intended emotional effect. These emotional 
concepts are allowed scope only within the complement of a verb. This 
observaticm suggests a topical principle. Any rhetorical use of a property-
response emotion is understood and its purpose will be characterized by the 
end of the verb governing its explanation. 
I want to suggest that the deliberative emotions are those that have 
reached the final stage. The syntactical and semantic freedom possessed by a 
concept that has reached this stage will have different success and satisfaction 
conditions than the emotions just discussed. We can see how Humean 
Projection works by examining the development of the concept of pity in 
English. Our present concept admits of nineteen paronymous forms. There 
are three verb forms: pity, pities and pitied; six noun forms: pity, pitier, 
pitifulness, piteousness, pitiableness, and pitilessness; seven adjectival forms: 
pitiful, piteous, pitiable, pitiless as well as two participial forms, pitying and 
pitied; and there are six adverbial forms: pitifully, piteously, pityingly, 
unpityingly, pitiably and pitilessly. In the Middle Ages there were nine 
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paronymous forms. The Middle English Dictionary, which records citations of 
the first extant recorded use, suggests that pity as a noun and piteous as an 
adjective are the oldest with their first recorded uses in 1300. Pitiful is 
recorded as appearing in 1350; piteously, in 1390; piteousness, 1393; pitifully, 
1400; pitiably. 1447; pitiable, 1450; and pitiless in 1450. Verb forms are 
conspicuously absent. While the present forms retain some of the lexical 
meanings present in the Middle Ages, other meanings were added and lost over 
time. The changes in the extension of a word over time occur as the semantic 
values (e.g. for adjectives: inherence and noninherence, gradeability, 
dynamic vs. stative, etc.) that govern a word's meaning change. Humean 
Projection will indicate what conditions made those changes in meaning 
possible. 
Still, it allows us to gen~rate further morphological variations. In 
being able to locate a general property of some referent, other related 
semantic features become possible. The property of being 'shameful' warrants 
the quality of 'shamefully' and the abstractive noun form 'shamefulness'. 
'Shameful' has the contrary 'shameless', which likewise warrants adverbial 
and abstractive noun forms. But the order in which these derivations appear 
reveals a part of the natural history of that emotion. And that is what we see 
with pity in the Middle Ages; piteous was followed by piteously and 
piteousness. 
'Pity' is a noncount noun, and its meaning was connected with the 
adjective form, 'pitiful' (being full of pity, compassionate) and the adverb, 
'pitifully'. As a noun, 'pity' denoted the quality of _being pitiful or the 
disposition to mercy; it denoted the emotional directedness of tenderness or 
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concern aroused by the misfortunes of others; and it denoted a reason or cause 
for pity; and it denoted the grief, upset or turmoil that characterizes this 
emotional state. 
The first significant change appeared in late Middle English with the 
appearance of 'pitiless' (without compassion) as the contrary of 'pitiful' (full 
of pity. or with compassion) and 'pitiable' (deserving pity or being 
lamentable). At the same time the noun 'pity' added another sense, the 
condition of deserving pity. This sense lasted until the early seventeenth 
century. What these changes suggest is that a distinction between the 
emotional occurrence and its justification emerged at this time. 
Until the late fifteenth century, the experience of 'pity' was understood 
in terms of another related verb. The emotion was comprehended as a part of a 
more general psychological state. The next major change in the concept of 
pity occurred in the late fifteenth century when 'pity' began to be used as a 
transitive verb meaning 'to feel pity for'. In the early sixteenth century 'pity' 
as a transitive verb came to mean 'move to pity, or grieve'. The semantic 
achievement of making pity function as a verb is the second major event in 
the life of an emotional concept. It is important because verbs have aspects. 
Aspect is the grammatical category which refers to the way the verb action is 
experienced or regarded with respect to time. We can now think about how we 
pity, not just that we pity in some way. Pity, functioning as a predicate, is no 
longer conceived as simply the object of thought; it can now operate as the 
subject of thought as well. 
Following this achievement the remaining transformational 
possibilities implicitly present in the term began to appear. The abstract noun 
311 
form of 'pitifulness' emerged in the middle of the sixteenth century. 'Pitying', 
as in grieving or the feeling or showing of pity, occurred in the late sixteenth 
century. A 'pitier', as one who pities, was derived from the transitive uses of 
the verb form. This in tum called attention to its opposite; the adverb 
'pitilessly' arose at the same time. Other qualities which mark the 
psychological state of pity were further differentiated at this time. 
'Pitiableness'. the abstract quality denoting the condition of deserving pity, 
arose at the end of the seventeenth century. The noun form, 'pitilessness,' 
appeared in the middle of the eighteenth century, and 'pitiably' in the early 
nineteenth century. 'Unpityingly' preceded 'pityingly' in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. 
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APPENDIXB 
llLOCUTIONARY ACfS AND THE ARGUMENT FROM PATHOS 
We entreat, blame, inspire, offend, threaten and praise others as ways to 
persuade them to take a certain course of action, alter their conduct, or express 
our evaluations of them or their actions. The use of these speech acts is 
obviously widespread. They are, for example, necessary for raising children; 
parents use them repeatedly and persistently. Despite their necessity, they are 
troublesome. Repeated use frequently becomes overuse; indiscriminate and 
widespread use weakens their efficacy for the individual who uses them. 
There is. however. a further problem. Speech acts like maligning and 
threatening another involve deception or force and are not normative. The 
problems of efficacy, coupled with the vast array of abusive or morally 
problematic speech acts, have certainly worked to foster the impression that 
emotional persuasion is nothing but an arsenal of stratagems that coerce or 
deceive. 
The ubiquitous overuse and misuse of these tactics does not stop us from 
using them. The expression of our emotions is, in some important way, a 
natural response to situations that are not fully under voluntary control. 
Second, we enjoy it; there is something deeply satisfying in praising and 
blaming others. Third, when we rebuke or chide another, for example, we are 
doing something; it is an active response to a situation that calls for some kind 
of practical action. Finally, if that response has a putative moral component, 
we satisfy the motivational urge to respond normatively. 
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'Fulminating', 'praying', 'denouncing', and 'intimidating' all name 
strategies of emotional persuasion, but each differs crucially from the others 
both in its contents and in its purpose. These forms of argument must be 
examined at two levels. First, they name illocutionary acts. Speech acts are 
analyzed in terms of six necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Each has 
an illocutionary point: assertive, commissive, directive, declarative or 
expressive; a propositional content condition; a preparatory condition; a 
sincerity condition; a mode of achievement; and a degree of strength. The 
most detailed analysis of speech act verbs will be found in Daniel 
Vandervaken's Meaning and Speech Acts. 
Second, these arguments are also purposive. and that purposiveness 
manifests itself in different ways. Some speech acts are constituent elements 
in the larger argumentative design of an essay. To 'insinuate' is to move an 
audience by degree to a new position; Cicero, for example, uses this verb to 
explain how introductions that employ 'the subtle approach' work. 
Some speech acts require assent to a prior judgment for them to be 
successful. Censure is an especially complex act. The act of censuring can 
have an assertive point; it is a strong or harsh criticism or rebuke (degree of 
strength) that is usually made formally (mode of achievement). Censure can 
also be a declarative when one officially rebukes another, and censure can 
have an expressive point when the content focuses on the agent's disapproval 
of the act. To reprehend, animadvert or excoriate are speech acts that 
presuppose or imply some prior censure, and their propositional content 
depends on that recognition for it to be intelligible. To reprehend is to 
censure by conveying sharp (mode of achievement) disapproval (dncerity 
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condition). To animadvert presupposes censure (preparatory condition) and it 
is to comment or remark (mode of achievement) critically, usually with strong 
disapproval (sincerity condition). To excoriate is to censure or denounce 
strongly. 
Some depend on a prior argument from one's opponent, and this 
dependence can be a matter of logic or pragmatics. To 'deny' is to deny 
something, a prior claim or proposition; this names a preparatory condition 
for the performative verb, to deny. One denies what one has been accused of 
or inculpated or denunciated for. One can deny a prior claim in many ways: 
one can oppugn, exculpate, repudiate or denounce the claim. To exculpate is to 
clear oneself or another of guilt or blame (mode of achievement). To oppugn 
is to oppose, contradict or call into question the content of the accusation. To 
denounce is to denounce a third party (propositional content condition); the 
speaker assumes a stance of moral authority, usually by attributing a grave 
moral error to a moral inferior (a special mode of achievement) (Vandervaken 
179, 181). 
One can repudiate in two ways. To repudiate can have an assertive 
illocutionary point or a declarative illocutionary point. As an assertive one 
can repudiate by emphatically (sincerity condition) rejecting either the 
validity of the claim (propositional content condition) by arguing that it is 
untrue, unfounded or unjust; or one can deny the authority of the accuser 
(sincerity condition of accusation). To repudiate can can also be a declarative 
utterance. As Daniel Vandervaken argues, to repudiate is "to declare that one 
is terminating an earlier obligation" as in a debt "or a right relative to it" such 
as one's inheritance or nationality (200). This act generally has the 
perlocutionary intention of ending some responsibility. 
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Some strategies work to make the larger argument particular enough to 
be successful. The strategy's mode of achievement strives to offer the 
appropriate incentive. Reproofs strive to work this way. To admonish another 
is to offer counsel or caution with the intention of rectifying the fault or 
avoiding some danger, gently but earnestly (mode of achievement). The 
argument has the preparatory condition of a belief that that some 
responsibility or obligation has been disregarded or forgotten. To reproach is 
to express disapproval (propositional content condition) through usually 
regretful or unhappy criticism (mode of achievement) arising from a sense of 
disappointment (sincerity condition). There is also a belief that the 
reproached action is blameworthy (preparatory condition). To reprove 
another is to offer gentle (mode of achievement) criticism of some disapproved 
(sincerity condition) action, conduct or belief (propositional content 
condition) with constructive intent. To chasten is to correct by verbal 
punishment (mode of achievement) with the intent to restrain or subdue the 
agent. To chastise is to criticize as a means of effecting improvement in 
behavior. To chide is to scold mildly (mode of achievement) in order to correct 
or improve another's behavior. 
Finally, some speech acts complete the argument; the act of pardoning 
another is an obvious example. These strategies, developerl by the Roman 
rhetoricians, were discussed in Chapter II. 
I have appended tables of these speech act verbs on the next two pages. 
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Tables of lllocutionary Verbs 
Assertives 
accuse chasten expostulate quibble 
admonish chastise fault reassure 
affront chide inculpate rebuke 
alarm complain insinuate recriminate 
allay conciliate insult remonstrate 
ameliorate correct kick reprehend 
animadvert criticize lament reprimand 
appease decry libel reproach 
asperse defame malign reprove 
assail denigrate mitigate revile 
assuage denounce mock ridicule 
assure denunciate niggle scold 
belittle deprecate nitpick slander 
berate depreciate objurgate s I u r 
besmirch deride offend stigmatize 
blame derogate oppugn sully 
calumniate discredit outrage taunt 
castigate disgrace palliate traduce 
caution dishonor pettifog twit 
carp dispraise placate upbraid 
cavil excoriate praise vi I i fy 
censure exculpate propitiate vituperate 
Commissives 
abide consent indulge reconcile 
assure constrain ingratiate soothe 
browbeat dedicate intimidate swear 
coerce favor menace threaten 
compel gratify reassure vow 
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Directives 
adjure coax goad plead 
admonish command humor pray 
advise consent implore recommend 
advocate countenance importune stimulate 
alarm credit imprecate supplicate 
anathematize discourage impress tease 
beg encourage inspire urge 
beseech enjoin intercede warn 
blandish entreat invite wheedle 
cajole flatter invoke 
caution forbid mollify 
Dec larati ves 
abjure condemn denounce forgive 
approbate consecrate disapprobate pardon 
approve curse disapprove reprehend 
bless damn doom reprimand 
censure decry endorse reprove 
confirm dedicate espouse sanction 
Expressives 
abhor cheer esteem offend 
abominate cherish eulogize outrage 
acclaim comfort extol plaudit 
admire commiserate exult praise 
adore complain favor rai I 
adulate compliment fulminate rejoice 
affront condole glorify reprove 
applaud congratulate grieve revere 
appreciate crow hallow revile 
approve deplore honor taunt 
belittle deprecate inveigh venerate 
blame detest jeer viIi fy 
boast disapprove lament vituperate 
brag disfavor laud welcome 
celebrate disparage mourn 
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APPENDIXC 
TABLE OF EMOTIONS AND EMOTIONAL CONDmONS 
One immediate and practical problem that any student of the emotions faces is 
the lack of a detailed list of emotions and emotional conditions. In the hope 
that someone working in this field will find it helpful. I append a working list 
of these states and conditions. 
abashment 
abhorrence 
abjectness 
acerbity 
acrimony 
admiration 
adoration 
affection 
agape 
aggravation 
aggrieved 
aghast 
agitation 
agony 
alarm 
allure 
amour propre 
amusement 
anger 
angst 
anguish 
animosity 
animus 
annoyance 
antagonism 
antipathy 
anxiety 
appalled 
appetite 
apprehension 
ardor 
arousal 
arrogance 
ashamed 
asperity 
astonishment 
attentiveness 
attraction 
aversion 
avidity 
awe 
balefulness 
beatific 
beguiled 
belligerence 
bewilderment 
bewitched 
biliousness 
bitterness 
bliss 
blitheness 
boldness 
boredom 
brooding 
brusqueness 
cantankerousness 
capriciousness 
captivated 
care 
cark 
chagrin 
charmed 
cheerfulness 
choleric 
churlish 
comfort 
compassion 
compunction 
conceit 
confidence 
confounded 
confusion 
consolation 
consternation 
contempt 
contentiousness 
contrition 
contumely 
covetousness 
craving 
crossness 
cruelty 
crustiness 
cupidity 
daring 
daunted 
dejection 
delight 
depression 
derision 
desire 
desolation 
despair 
despondent 
detestation 
devotion 
diffidence 
discomfitted 
discomforted 
discomposed 
disconcerted 
disconsolate 
discontentment 
discouraged 
disdain 
disgust 
disheartened 
disillusionment 
dismay 
disquietude 
distracted 
distress 
disturbed 
dithering 
diverted 
dolefulness 
dolor 
dour 
dread 
dudgeon 
dyspeptic 
eagerness 
ebullience 
ecstasy 
elan 
elation 
embarrassment 
embittered 
emulation 
engaged 
engrossed 
enjoyment 
enmity 
enraptured 
enthusiasm 
envy 
eros 
esteem 
euphoria 
exasperation 
exhileration 
exuberance 
exultation 
faithlessness 
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fascination irksomeness ostentation somber 
favor irreso I uti on otiosity s.orrow 
fear irritation peevishness sorry 
fecklessness jealousy penitence spite 
felicity jollity perplexity splenetic 
ferocity joviality perturbation startled 
fervor joy petulance stultified 
fickleness jubilation ph ilia stupified 
fierceness keenness pique sulkiness 
fitfulness lachrymose pitilessness sullen 
flighty lacivious pity sultry 
flippancy lamentation placidity superciliousness 
flustered langcur pleased surprise 
forlorn languidness puzzled sympathy 
fractiousness lassitude qualm taciturn 
fran tic lassitude querulous tantalized 
frenetic lethargy quick tempered terror 
frenzy listlessness rage thrill 
fretful loathing rancor timidity 
fright longing rankling titillation 
frivolous love ranting torment 
froward· lugubrious rapacious torpor 
frustration lust rapture touched 
fulminating malcontented raving transported 
fulsome malefic ravished tremulous 
funereal maleficence regret troubled 
furor malevolence remorse trust 
fury malice resentment umbrage 
gaiety meanness ressentiment unease 
galled meekness reticence unstable 
gladness melancholy revulsion upset 
glee mercurial ridicule vacillating 
gloomy merriness riled vainglory 
gratification miffed roiled vanity 
grief mirth rue vapidity 
grouchiness misery ruth vehemence 
grumpiness mockery sadness vexation 
gui It mopishness satisfaction vindictiveness 
happiness morbidity saturnine voracity 
haughtiness mordancy scared winsome 
hubris moroseness schadenfreude wish 
impudence mortification scorn wistfulness 
incensed mulish sentiment woe 
infuriated mystification sentimental wonder 
inimical nauseated sentimentality worry 
intractable nervous shame wrath 
iracund nettled shamelessness wretched 
irascibility nonplussed shock· wroth 
irate odium shrewish yearning 
ire opprobrium sickened zeal 
